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INTRODUCTION

A. Context of the Project
The past decade has been a tumultuous and energized period in the
study of administrative law and regulatory regimes.' Debate continues
over both positive and normative theories of the administrative state, as
well as over the appropriate directions of innovation and "reinvention. 2
Among legislators and the public, the tax system and the Internal
Revenue Service have been targets for criticism.3

1. See Marshall J. Breger, Regulatory Flexibility and the Administrative State, 32
TULSA L. J. 325 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L. J. 607
(1991); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998); see also Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997) (describing the numerous administrative law
critiques, debates and proposals).
2. See Freeman, supra note 1, at 3-4 n.3 (citing a range of regulatory literature focusing
on "reinvention").
3. In 1996 Congress established the "National Commission on Restructuring the
Internal Revenue Service," which gathered facts and made numerous reform
recommendations to Congress. In July 1998; President Clinton signed into law the Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. Pub L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 689
(codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 781 (1999)).
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This paper outlines a recent procedural innovation in the tax area,
the Advance Pricing Agreement Program ("APA" program)4 , and
evaluates its success. Such a case study can play a significant role in
linking procedural innovation to the broader issues of administrative law
theory and regulatory reform. For example, a working model such as the
APA program, built on flexibility and creativity, may support
administrative theories advocating discretion, flexibility, and
experimentation. Conversely, some interest group theories of regulation
(e.g., public choice theory), can prompt critical examination of reforms
like APAs that exhibit limited openness to scrutiny.6 The APA program
is an ideal candidate for such analysis because it incorporates multiple
factors germane to other fields including cross border transactions,
intergovernmental relations, high information costs for regulation, and
serious risks to all parties from uncertainty. Ultimately, detailed
understandings of innovations in administrative systems are essential to
developing and challenging positive and normative theories of
administrative law-and to designing concrete applications of
administrative law policy.
B. Specific Project
In the field of international tax, there has developed a national, and
even international consensus that traditional mechanisms for
administering the law and resolving disputes have virtually collapsed in
the area of transfer pricing (which plays an important role in allocating a
taxpayer's income among taxing jurisdictions). The tax system no
4. Given the administrative aspects of this paper, it is unfortunate that the acronym for
the tax program in question is the same as that for the Administrative Procedures Act.
However, because the tax program is known exclusively as the "APA program," this paper
retains that terminology throughout. Thus, any reference to "APA" in this paper applies only
to the tax program and its products.
5. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 1,at 22, 82-83, 97 (arguing that discretion
constraining approaches to regulatory reform may fail to address the most important
administrative issues, and outlining a collaborative governance model that involves agency
flexibility and provisional regulatory solutions to maintain receptiveness to change). For a
discussion of the origins of the APA program, see infra text accompanying notes 46-70.
6. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 1, at 39-41 (noting in a comparison and critique of
major theories of administrative law, that "public choice" theorists consider the regulatory
system to favor organized, narrow interest groups and thus such theorists advocate less
reliance on government and regulation).
7. In the most general sense, transfer pricing is a technical term that refers to the
amounts related parties charge each other in transactions. However, in tax analysis the term
has a more negative connotation because it also encompasses how parties might benefit from
these pricing decisions. See, e.g., GENERAL Gov'T Div., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: TRANSFER PRICING AND INFORMATION ON NONPAYMENT OF TAX

(1995) [hereinafter

"NONPAYMENT OF TAX"].
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longer effectively administers these rules.8 The significance of
administrative failure here is tremendous. As described in greater detail
in Part I, transfer pricing essentially refers to the prices related parties
charge each other in transactions. If the parties agree to an artificially
high or low price for the goods, services, intangibles or borrowing, they
can strategically place their total profits in the "best" (i.e. lowest tax)
country. Such off-market pricing is possible because the parties'
common control or ownership means they share a common economic
interest.
Given the volume of cross border business between and among the
United States and other countries, much of which involves related party
transactions, the opportunity for transfer pricing abuse by taxpayers and
the resulting loss of tax revenue continues to be staggering. Successful
application and enforcement of U.S. tax rules designed to prevent
transfer pricing abuse typically require a very fact intensive review with
economic analysis, detailed regulations, and third party comparative
data. Often, necessary information is outside the United States, does not
exist in relevant forms, or does not exist at all. The situation is
compounded by the fact that other taxing jurisdictions, which may
consider their own revenue at stake, can take a different view of the
proper price-disagreeing with the United States, the taxpayer, or both.9
Expressing serious concern about the loss of revenue from transfer
pricing, Congress recently directed the Internal Revenue Service
("Service") to prepare a report on the current transfer pricing situation.
The resulting report concludes that the "average annual [transfer pricing]
gross income tax gap is estimated to amount to $2.8 billion."' ° Even
before this most recent report, the Service recognized the severity of the
transfer pricing problem and undertook aggressive reform aimed at
improved administrability."
8. The challenges of this tax problem produced an explosion of audits and litigation that
have come to dominate much of the Service's and courts' time. See, e.g., id. at 21-22 (for
cases closed in fiscal year 1993 and the first half of fiscal year 1994, the Service spent 1/3 of
its total international examiner time and much more of its economists' time on cases with an
I.R.C. § 482 issue). See infra text accompanying note 34 (discussing burden on the tax system
from transfer pricing).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 17-19 (describing transfer pricing examples)
10. IRS Report on Application and Administration of JR. C. § 482 (Pub. 3218), 1999
DAILY TAX REP. 108, at L-3.
II. The tax system could not sustain the current approach that (1) relied on complex
regulations that failed to provide a clear answer in most cases, (2) involved highly
individualized factual/legal determinations, and (3) ultimately required coordination with a
separate sovereign. These difficulties in enforcing the transfer pricing regime seemed
intractable and not susceptible to substantial remediation through regulatory changes. See
infra text accompanying notes 38-44. The Service, therefore, sought an alternative beyond
modification of the detailed substantive tax rules and regulations.
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In a bold move in the early 1990s, the United States led its trading
partners toward a new model of advance dispute resolution for transfer
pricing, the APA program, which relies on a backbone of familiar
mechanisms complimented by certain novel features. 2 The APA process
is an alternative to the standard taxpayer path of doing the transactions,
filing a return, facing audit (some level of audit is more likely with
larger taxpayers), and, finally, possible appeal with settlement or
litigation. The taxpayer initiates the APA process by approaching the
Service (and typically the corresponding tax authorities in the other
relevant jurisdictions) before engaging in the related party transactions
potentially at issue. 3 At this point the taxpayer voluntarily provides
detailed information to the governments regarding its business activities,
plans, competitors, market conditions, and prior tax circumstances. The
critical piece of this presentation is the taxpayer's explanation of its
planned pricing method. Following discussion and negotiation, the
parties hopefully reach agreement on how the taxpayer should handle the
pricing of these anticipated related party transactions. This
understanding is embodied in the APA agreement which typically runs
for three years.
In order to appreciate the potential issues raised by this innovative
procedure it is necessary to outline briefly the features of the process
from the perspective of the various parties. First, why would taxpayers
participate to the extent it requires disclosure to the government of
significant information, some of which might otherwise be withheld?
Ideally participating taxpayers obtain tax certainty before actually
engaging in their transactions. In addition they obtain a tax treatment
that is uniformly accepted by all of the taxing authorities, thereby
eliminating conflict. There is also an expectation that this alternative

12. See Rev. Proc. 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 375 (revising and superseding Rev. Proc. 91-22);
Rev. Proc 91-22, 1991-1 C.B. 526 (first introducing the APA process). At its core, the APA
program is a mechanism by which taxpayers can approach the Service to develop an

agreement on the tax treatment of their related party transactions under transfer pricing rules
and related provisions. See I.R.C. § 482 (1999); Treas. Reg § 1.482 (1999) and the regulations

thereunder. The agreements, which apply for a specified period of future (and sometimes past)
years, have been treated as confidential and not released to the public. However, in early 1999
the Service indicated a change in its views on disclosure of APAs and announced plans to
release redacted versions. See infra text accompanying note 52. However, Congress

responded in December 1999 by categorizing APAs as "return" information under I.R.C.
§ 6103, which cannot be disclosed. Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 521; 113 Stat. 1860, 1925.
Additionally, Congress amended I.R.C. § 6110(b) to exclude APAs from the definition of

written determinations required to be disclosed. See id. § 521 (a)(2). To provide some
increased information regarding the APA program, Congress directed the Secretary of the
Treasury to prepare an annual report regarding APAs. See id. § 521(b).
13. But see Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12, at § 3.06 (outlining rollback provisions).
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mechanism for dispute resolution might reduce overall costs of
addressing transfer pricing problems.
Second, why should governments be willing to engage in this oneon-one process with taxpayers? Governments may hope to gain
information about pricing practices and transaction specific issues, to
utilize a different forum, and to interact with other countries in a setting
conducive to more comprehensive resolutions of transfer pricing
"problems." Additionally, governments, have historically borne a
significant burden for transfer pricing, both in terms of time and money.
They now look to the APA program to provide less costly dispute
resolution and to enhance their information base for future
improvements to the taxation of related party transactions.
The participating taxpayers and governments represent the central
but not exclusive parties significant to the APA program.
Nonparticipating taxpayers (those with and without transfer pricing
issues) are impacted by both the tax system's problem with transfer
pricing and by the addition of APAs to the mix of procedural options.
On the positive side, a successful APA program might reduce
government administration and enforcement costs, providing a
generalized benefit. Also, to the extent the Service gains more detailed
knowledge about transfer pricing practice and can translate that learning
into improved rules, then all taxpayers with transfer pricing questions
may benefit. On the negative side, the program's use of private
individualized agreements raises a number of risks that might not be
acceptable in an administrative regime, including the specter of uneven
application of substantive law. Not surprisingly, the complex and varied
effects of the APA program have made this procedural innovation a
lightening rod for both praise and criticism from those concerned with
the future of transfer pricing in the U.S. tax system. An in-depth case
study of this innovation provides insight into the scope of its
effectiveness for taxing cross border income, and into its broader
implications for administrative and regulatory reform.
The creation of the APA program illuminates the difficult procedural
choices made in a particular administrative regime in response to
concrete substantive and procedural problems and goals. But of course,
the tax system is not entirely unique. Numerous other administrative
agencies confront comparable issues including complex rules, detailed
facts, and international players. Thinking about such questions from a
more universal administrative law theory perspective allows us to see the
connections across a range of administrative regimes and to develop a
better understanding of the risks and opportunities in reform.
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The first step in this process is to develop a more nuanced
understanding of the APA program. The paper asks two questions
regarding the program's effects and success: (1) what is the impact on
the participants (i.e., does the APA program make transfer pricing more
administrable and if so how) and (2) what is the impact on
nonparticipants (i.e., what is the effect on the larger community of
taxpayers with cross border business activities). This dual focus is
necessary for an evaluation of a new procedural development like the
APA program. The program does not stand alone; it functions as part of
a larger integrated regime, the tax system, and the effects on
nonparticipants may be just as important as the effects on participants.
Because the form of the APA program clashes with traditional
frameworks for designing and thinking about administrative systems-in
particular the distinction between rulemaking and adjudication n4-the
program can seem difficult to evaluate. The standard structural protections inherent in a traditional framework play no role. Thus, a central
question is how much we are willing to consider alternative mechanisms
for addressing administrative discretion, where the upside of the departure from more established practices may be the resolution of intractable
problems. Although the workings of the APA program can be examined
and critiqued without specific reference to administrative law, such an
analysis limits our understanding of both its potential and its risks.
After reaching initial conclusions regarding the effects and success
of the APA program on participants and nonparticipants, and the tradeoffs at stake in granting this kind of flexibility to the tax system, the
paper turns to the second major question-what this success suggests
more generally about administrative reform and regulation in an international environment. The fundamental questions of administrative law
concern how administrative systems do and should work, and how they
can be improved. This inquiry ultimately diverges in two directions. The
first follows the more traditional positive and normative analyses of
regulatory administrative process with alternative theories based on interest group behavior. The second, though not entirely rejecting such
premises, pushes more explicitly for reform and innovation, and considers a "new attitude" essential to any significant reform. Both directions
of analysis demand investigation into real administrative practice. This
paper undertakes that task for the APA program.
The international applications of the resulting observations may
prove the most important because they offer an alternative role for other
countries in the U.S. regulatory and administrative process. Such an
14. See infra text accompanying notes 163-172.
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alternative will be especially valuable in an increasingly international
and complex commercial environment where traditional patterns of
regulating and decision making by countries may not achieve their
shared goals.
To execute this two stage inquiry, Part I describes the background
transfer pricing struggles that pushed the Service to explore alternatives
to traditional audit and litigation of these tax problems. Part II outlines
the introduction of the alternative that emerged, the APA program, and
its growth over the past nine years. Part III examines the direct impact of
the APA program, whether and how it has made transfer pricing issues
more administrable for participants. Part IV considers the indirect impact
of the APA program, its relation to taxpayers not using the APA process,
and to the operation of the tax system generally. Finally, Part V uses the
APA program case study and the underlying procedural tensions it has
produced to illuminate the current administrative law debate regarding
the creation and modification of administrative systems and the plausibility of reform through more interactive and collaborative
administrative structures.
I. PRESSURES ON THE SYSTEM:

TRANSFER PRICING MELTDOWN

The administration of the income tax system operated for more than
seventy years before the introduction of APAs, and throughout that period U.S. and foreign businesses engaged in cross border activity. Why
then did the Service feel compelled to design an alternative program in
the 1990s? The answer lies in the quick rise of large scale international
business transactions and the concurrent development of other countries'
tax regimes. The international nature of modern business adds stresses to
our tax system which it is not fully prepared to handle. One of the most
dramatic of these stresses is transfer pricing. Although the tax system
has wrestled with transfer pricing issues virtually since the inception of
the income tax, the results have never been entirely satisfactory. Failings
here were more easily ignored when the volume of transactions was
smaller, however, the growing scale of international business has intensified the need for better resolution of transfer pricing. Efforts to
improve transfer pricing through changes in the substantive law met with
little success. Ultimately, the Service realized that a change in the procedural mechanism for addressing transfer pricing problems might prove
the best option. Thus, the Service developed a new procedure for transfer pricing-the APA program.
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A. The Transfer Pricing Demon

Transfer pricing and the allocation of an economic unit's 5 profit
among its various functions is an issue of fundamental and increasing
significance as more income is earned cross border. In a multijurisdictional world where tax rules differ, taxpayers have an incentive
to structure their related party transactions 6 to locate the entire group's
profit or loss in the most desirable taxing jurisdiction.' 7 When a taxpayer
engages in cross border transactions with related parties, the
opportunities to limit or avoid income tax dramatically increase. Because
the parties are essentially a single economic unit, the price paid between
the two merely splits the income between the two entities, but does not
affect the wealth of the unit (tax effects aside). Thus, the two parties can
price the transaction (e.g., the sale of goods, services, intellectual
property) in a way that puts more income in the entity operating in a
lower tax jurisdiction-a strategy of transfer pricing. This objective can
be accomplished by pricing the transactions below or above market
price. For example, a U.S. company with a foreign distribution
subsidiary in a low tax jurisdiction has an incentive to sell its goods to
the subsidiary at an artificially low price so that little profit appears in
the U.S. parent. When the subsidiary sells the goods to independent third
parties at market prices, the subsidiary will have an artificially low cost
and an artificially high profit. This profit is taxed to the subsidiary and if
the subsidiary is carefully placed in a low-tax jurisdiction then that profit
bears little, if any, tax. The group's overall profit is the same and reflects
market rate transactions: the difference between the parent's cost of
producing the goods and the price the third party finally pays for the
goods. However, that difference (the total profit) is artificially split
between the parent and subsidiary so as to reduce U.S. income tax due. 8

15. The term "economic unit" here includes a parent corporation and its controlled
subsidiaries.

16. Related party transactions refer to those between commonly owned or controlled
entities. Classic examples include two subsidiaries owned by a parent, or a parent-subsidiary
pair, although the statutory conception of potential "related" parties in the context of transfer

pricing is not so narrowly drawn. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i)(4) (defining controlled to
include "any kind of control, direct or indirect, whether legally enforceable or not, and
however exercisable or exercised...").
17. See infra note 19 for more discussion of where and how profits should be taxed.
18. In some cases, the U.S. tax rules would eliminate the benefit of shifting the profit
into the subsidiary by preventing "deferral" of U.S. tax on the income of the U.S. parent's
foreign subsidiary. For example, the Code sometimes requires a U.S. parent to include its
share of the foreign subsidiary's income on its (the parent's) U.S. tax return in the year earned
by the subsidiary, despite the subsidiary's retention of the eamings. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 951 et
seq. Such rules are insufficient to stop transfer pricing because they apply only to certain
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Although proposals to end deferral entirely are offered from time to
time, there are theoretical and practical barriers to this route. Policy
decisions in cross border taxation must consider the appropriate goals of
the tax rules-particularly in terms of the impact of tax rules on taxpayer
behavior. Typically this analysis is framed as a debate about
"neutrality"-whether U.S. tax rules should make a U.S. business
neutral as between investment inside and outside the United States
(capital export neutrality) or whether the tax rules should make a U.S.
business equally competitive in the foreign jurisdiction in which it is
conducting business and competing (capital import neutrality). Allowing
deferral comports with capital import neutrality but not with capital
export neutrality. On a more practical level, the political pressure exerted
by U.S. multinationals and trade groups (in part under the banner of U.S.
competitiveness in the global market place) plays a significant role in
what tax regimes Congress likely will adopt.
Transfer pricing strategies are not limited to U.S. taxpayers seeking
deferral of U.S. tax. A foreign parent with a U.S. subsidiary would also
want to take as much profit out of the U.S. subsidiary as possible and
place it in a low-taxed related party. The parties could use the same
technique as above if the U.S. subsidiary were the manufacturer/seller
and the foreign parent were the buyer. If instead the U.S. subsidiary
were the buyer, strategic pricing would have the U.S. company pay an
artificially high price to the foreign parent so that when the U.S.
subsidiary resold the goods its cost would be artificially high and thus its
share of the profit artificially low. Same goal, different steps. Transfer
pricing, of course, is not restricted to the sale of goods, but can occur
with any related party transaction. Moreover, transfer pricing is not
limited to cases involving low tax countries. In any cross border related
party transaction, taxpayers have an incentive to assess their relative tax
positions in the pertinent jurisdictions and determine where it would be
most beneficial to locate the income. Tax ' rate is a major factor, but
unused losses as well as other specials rules can impact the taxpayer's
perspective on a particular jurisdiction."
kinds of income earned by the foreign subsidiary. And, of course, they do not (and could not)
apply at all to U.S. subsidiaries of foreign parents.
19. To fully appreciate the issue of transfer pricing it may be helpful to outline a little
more about how and where profits should be taxed. Basic principles of income taxation shared
by most members of the international community include: (1) parties (i.e. related parties)
should price their transactions as if they were independent market transactions-the arm's
length concept-so that each taxpayer has the "right" amount of income to report, and (2) that
once a taxpayer has properly identified its income, the various countries that might have a
claim to tax it must do so based on shared norms as to which country has the priority to tax.

Regarding the first point, establishing the proper pricing of related party transactions, there
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B. HistoricalTreatment of Transfer Pricing
The United States historically has combated transfer pricing by
requiring the price of the transaction between the related parties to
reflect an arm's length relationship. 2 The idea is that the related parties
should be charging each other the same price they would charge an
unrelated party. The mechanism for this rule is the broad statutory
language of the I.R.C. § 482 which grants the Service the authority to
reallocate income, deductions, and credits between or among related
parties where the transactions are not conducted at arm's length prices.
Unfortunately, while the problem and the "solution" may be relatively
simple to describe, implementation of the statutory response has not
been simple because of (1) the lack of information,2 (2) the multi
jurisdictional element,22 and (3) unsettled questions about the validity of
has been significant debate and change as seen by the history of the I.R.C. § 482 regulations.
See infra text accompanying notes 20-35. The primary question is how do we know what the
arm's length price should be. In a few circumstances there may be direct evidence, such as
sales by the taxpayer of the same goods under the same terms to both related and unrelated
parties. But in the absence of such direct evidence, efforts have turned to several formulas that
do not price by reference to other transactions, but by reference to more general numbers. For
example, the regulations can establish a "proper" transfer price by looking at the profit margin
or mark up that comparable taxpayers earn in selling similar goods or services to unrelated
parties. Assuming that the taxpayer in question should earn approximately the same margin or
mark up, then the proper related party price can be calculated by adding that same mark-up to
the taxpayer's cost in acquiring the goods.
As to the second point, allocation of income among taxing jurisdictions, a consensus has
emerged among most nations and is reflected in the common structure of income tax treaties.
The consensus view is based on distinctions between active and passive income, and between
source and residence countries: (1) if a taxpayer is actively engaged in business (e.g.
manufacturing, or selling goods or services) then the country in which these activities take
place (the source country) has the primary right to tax the income; (2) if the source country
does not tax the income then the taxpayer's residence country may do so (under U.S. law U.S.
corporations have their residence in the United States); (3) if a taxpayer is earning passive
income (such as dividends and interest not earned in active business) then the residence
country of the taxpayer typically has priority to tax. This last result regarding passive income
is usually achieved by treaties in which the source country for the passive income agrees to
reduce or eliminate any tax it would have imposed on such income going to the taxpayer. For
example, if a U.S. corporation is earning dividends from France, then under the France-U.S.
income tax treaty France acknowledges the United States' greater priority to tax this income
by reducing the French income tax (usually in the form of a withholding tax) on the income.
Of course, the United States agrees to do the same for dividends being paid from the United
States to a French resident.
20. Code provisions aimed at deferral also impact the effectiveness of transfer pricing.
See supra note 18.
21. As an initial matter, many cases lack a comparable sale to a third party to set the
arm's length price. Thus, the regulations implementing I.R.C. § 482, outline various methods
to approximate or back into the arm's length price. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 et seq.
Application of even these substitute methods calls for data both contested and often
unavailable. See, e.g., infra notes 40-42.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 30, 31, 35.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 21:143

the arm's length approach due to possible differences between integrated
multinationals and companies that deal primarily with unrelated
taxpayers. The track record of transfer pricing regulation and
enforcement reveals the difficulty that has existed through the history of
I.R.C. § 482.23 However, as the issue has become more important and the
volume of related party international trade has expanded, the holes in the
system have grown very serious.
By the 1960's, the government became increasingly concerned that
U.S. corporations were achieving a significant amount of deferral of
U.S. tax through transfer pricing strategies with affiliates in low or no
tax jurisdictions, and that the foreign corporations were effectively
shifting profits out of their U.S. affiliates. 4 Thus, the United States
issued transfer pricing regulations in 1968,25 establishing specific rules
for reaching arm's length results in different types of transactions. 2 6
Despite the hope that these regulations would adequately equip the
Service (and the courts) with the tools necessary to resolve transfer
pricing cases, it became increasingly apparent during the 1970s and
1980s that the arm's length standard did not work in many cases: it was
hard to find the "right price" and hard to draft regulations to identify
that
27
price with minimal conflict between the taxpayer and government.
In the 1980s, the focus on transfer pricing abuse turned to foreignowned companies using transfer pricing to move profits out of the
United States. 28 The concern was that foreign-owned companies
operating within the United States were paying disproportionately low

23. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the
Evolution of U.S. InternationalTaxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 95 (1995); see also Notice 8823, 1988-2 C.B. 458 (the "White Paper"); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Comm'r, 84 T.C. 96, 114-15
(1985). Although some version of the provision has been in the Code since 1917, the Service
first issued regulations in 1935 detailing more specifically how the clear reflection of income
and determination of true tax liability was to be achieved. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at

97.
24. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 100 (citing hearings on the President's 1961 Tax
Recommendations Before the Committee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 4
at 3549 (1961)); Stanley Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm's Length, 30
TAX NOTES 625, 643-44 (Feb. 17, 1986).
25. T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 112.
28. See, e.g., Barbara McLennan, Responses to Section 482 Litigation:Advance Pricing
Agreements or Arbitration?, 54 TAX NOTES 431, 431 (Jan. 27, 1992) (noting the "Pickle"
hearings conducted in 1990, which explored whether foreign controlled companies operating

in the United States were complying with U.S. tax law; and also noting then-Commissioner
Fred T. Goldberg, Jr.'s 1986 statement that foreign owned companies had $550 billion in
gross sales and negative taxable income of $1.5 billion which lead then-Commissioner
Goldberg to call for more creative approaches for resolving transfer pricing cases).
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U.S. income taxes compared to similar U.S.-owned companies.29 With
respect to both U.S. and foreign owned multinationals, the growing
magnitude of the transfer pricing problem and the difficulties policing it
were due to a number of factors: (1) the increase in cross border
transactions generally, 0 (2) the increase in foreign investment in the
United States,3' (3) the level of complication in transfer pricing audits
(because of their fact intensive nature),32 (4) the difficulty in settling
transfer pricing cases because of the size of the adjustments at issue,33
(5) the burden of transfer pricing cases on the Service and courts,34 and
(6) the increased likelihood of double taxation following other countries'
growing interest in transfer pricing issues.33
29. See, e.g., George N. Carlson, Cym M. Lowell, Rom P. Watson, Transfer Pricingfor
Goods, Services, and Intangibles, C693 ALI-ABA 117, at 182-84 (quoting Chairman of the
House Oversight Committee at the outset of hearings on the role that transfer pricing plays in
the apparently low effective tax rates paid to the United States by foreign multinationals doing
business in the United States); see also NONPAYMENT OF TAX, supra note 7, at 3, 7-8.
30. See, e.g., McLennan, supra note 28, at 431.
31. See, e.g., id.
32. See, e.g., NONPAYMENT OF TAX, supra note 7, at 33 ("The data requirements and the
subjective nature of the pricing methods imposed a significant administrative burden on both
corporate taxpayers and IRS, and also led to uncertainties for corporations about their ultimate
tax liabilities."); Tax Judge Predicts Procedural Changes to Adapt to Transfer Pricing
Globalization, 114 DAILY TAX REP. G-7 (June 13, 1997) (citing U.S. Tax Court Judge David
Laro's assessment that transfer pricing cases might require court appointed experts because of
their complexity).
33. See generally George Guttman, IRS Averages: Winning Little, Losing Big, 93 TAX
NOTES INT'L 197-2 (Oct. 11, 1993) (observing that the Service is often unwilling to settle
cases after it has invested substantial resources).
34. See, e.g., NONPAYMENT OF TAX, supra note 7, at 6 (for cases closed in fiscal year
1993 and the first half of fiscal year 1994, the Service spent 1/3 of its total international
examiner time and much more of its economists time on cases with an I.R.C. § 482 issue).
U.S. Treasury and IRS Report on the Application and Administration of Section 482 (April 9,
1992) reprinted in Daily Tax Report (BNA) No. 70, at S-34 (April 10, 1992). ("For the
foreseeable future, transfer pricing litigation will place a heavy burden on the Service and Tax
Court."). As an indication of the potential volume of information in transfer pricing cases it is
interesting to note that Chevron produced at least 650 boxes of documents for the Service in
the course of its transfer pricing litigation. See Jim Fuller, U.S. Tax Review, 93 TAX NOTES
INT'L 205-10 (Oct. 25, 1993).
35. See generally Taxpayers Must Show Substantial Evidence to Back Resale Pricing
Methods, IRS Says, 242 DAILY TAX REP. G-4, G-5 (Dec. 20, 1993) (IRS Chief, Tax Treaty
Division reporting that "[i]n bilateral transfer pricing issues ... [the] IRS has seen increasing
requests by U.S. treaty partners to get information and even to participate throughout the
whole process"). This interest in transfer pricing gradually manifests itself through the
enactment and/or revision of transfer pricing regimes in various countries. See, e.g., J. Scott
Wilkie, New Rules For an Old Game: A Transfer Pricing Update Report of Proceedings of
the Forty-Seventh Tax Conference, 1995 Conference Report 42:1, 42:23-42:25 (1995)
(describing Canada's introduction of transfer pricing penalty provisions as a response to the
potential threat on the Canadian tax base posed by strong U.S. transfer pricing penalties);
Alan Shapiro, Bill Dodge, et al., Three Downs and Out: New Canadian Transfer Pricing
Rules Level the Playing Field, 15 TAX NOTES INT'L 1623 (1997) (outlining the motivation
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C. Service's UnsatisfactoryResponses to the
Explosion in Transfer Pricing
In the face of these developments, the Service pursued a series of

transfer pricing cases against taxpayers, but failed to win major cases.36
Nonetheless, the Service continued to audit and litigate, and the volume
of transfer pricing cases in the courts exploded.37 As part of a continuing

effort to improve this situation, new transfer pricing regulations were
finalized in 1994.38
On the positive side, the 1994 regulations addressed a variety of

observations that emerged from the years of pricing controversy, such as
the relative uniqueness of many business operations, the complexity of
determining an arm's length price, and the difficulties raised by the

transfer of intangibles.3 9 Unfortunately, the very reference to a concept of
an artificially high transfer price implies knowing the correct price. In
reality, rarely is the "correct" price clear and obvious. If a comparable
uncontrolled 40 sale exists, then identification of the proper price may be
straightforward. But many related-party transactions do not have arm's
length comparables, either because such transactions are not taking place
among unrelated parties, or because the information is not available.4 ' In
behind the revised Canadian transfer pricing rules issued in 1997); Allan 0. Taylor, Transfer
Pricing: Fundamental Change in the United Kingdom, 6 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING
REPORT (BNA) 545 (Nov. 12, 1997) (extensive proposed reforms for the U.K. transfer pricing
system including the introduction of "self-assessment" for companies); IRD to Issue Revised
Guidelines Draft Soon, Will Likely Launch Formal APA Program in '98, 6 TAX MGMT.
TRANSFER PRICING REP.

(BNA) 385 (Oct. 15, 1997) (New Zealand enacted a transfer pricing

regime in December 1995, effective in 1996).
36. See, e.g., Joseph H. Guttentag & Toshio Miyatake, Transfer Pricing: U.S. and
Japanese Views, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 375, 385 n.57 (noting that five corporations had major
transfer pricing cases during the period 1990-92 and that the United States lost a significant
I.R.C. § 482 issue in each); see also IRS Loses Another Transfer Pricing Case, 80 J. TAX'N
308, 308 (1994) (the Tax Court's rejection of most of the Service's income and expense
reallocations in Seagate Technologies, Inc. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 149 (1994) represents
the third major transfer pricing loss for the Service in recent months).
37. See, e.g., Arthur L. Nims, III, Tax Court Management of Jumbo Cases: The New
Challenge, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 330, 330 (1991) (transfer pricing has become the new
"growth" area for Tax Court litigation and such cases represent "massive undertakings").
38. InterCompany Transfer Pricing Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 34971, 34990 (1994)
(T.D. 8552) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1,602).
39. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (describing the "best method rule"); see id. at
§ 1.482-4 (method for determining taxable income regarding transfer of intangible property),
see id. at § 1.482-5 (outlining comparable profits method which is based on operating profit
margins rather than individual transactions).
40. "Uncontrolled," i.e., a similar transaction or sale with a third party.
41. See NONPAYMENT OF TAX, supra note 7, at 33 ("A major obstacle in enforcing the
arm's length standard has been the difficulty that the IRS examiners have had in finding
readily identifiable comparable transactions."); Rolls Royce Executive Discusses Company's
Path to U.S. APA Agreement, 7 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 180 (July 15, 1998)
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such cases, the methods used to determine the disputed price are at best
one step removed. The 1994 regulations acknowledge this challenge by
specifying additional approaches intended to respond to these more
difficult situations.42

The new regulations did not, and were not expected to, eliminate
transfer pricing controversies because the rules continued to be complex
and the debates intensely factual. The cross border element further

compounded the domestic difficulties in developing a straightforward
approach for related party pricing. If the United States reallocates
income under I.R.C.§ 482 away from a foreign party and to its related
domestic party, then the foreign party has less income and presumably
will pay less tax in its home jurisdiction. Of course, nothing binds the
foreign country to the U.S. view of the proper pricing and resulting
income division. In fact, it would not be unlikely for the foreign country

to disagree and view the income as earned by the foreign party. The
result could be both countries taxing the income-unrelieved double
taxation. As a practical matter, there are mechanisms to resolve this kind
of dispute, but they are not always successful, nor are they costless or

quick.43 Moreover, some foreign countries view the U.S.'s "aggressive"
[hereinafter "Rolls Royce"] (noting third party comparables are extremely rare and tend to
involve one-time only sales). Similarly, taxpayers can have difficulty getting useful
information about other businesses, especially competitors. Moreover, there are suggestions
that direct acquisition by a taxpayer of its competitor's pricing data could raise antitrust
issues. See Dale W. Wickham & Charles J. Kerester, New DirectionsNeeded for Solution of
InternationalTransfer Pricing Puzzle: InternationallyAgreed Rules or Tax Warfare, 56 TAX
NOTES 339, 352 (July 20, 1992).
42. For example, the new regulations specifically outlined the profit split and comparable
profits methods for identifying appropriate prices/ranges of prices in the absence of
transaction specific data. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-6. See also NONPAYMENT OF TAX, supra note
7, at 2-3 (noting impact of the regulations). Underlying the more factual or "technical"
problems of establishing prices in the absence of similar transactions between unrelated
parties, continues an intellectual debate as to how to handle the fact that multinationals may in
fact be different from their unintegrated counterparts that deal only with third parties. Should
arm's length pricing really be the model for related party transactions if, in fact,
multinationals operate differently and operate as an integrated group precisely because they
gain various advantages, efficiencies and controls by dealing primarily with related parties. A
less philosophical, and more concrete manifestation of this question is how to allocate the
transactional savings of related party dealings, especially in the more formulaic area of the
I.R.C. § 482 regulations (the comparable profits method and the profit split method).
43. Income tax treaties contain competent authority provisions to handle situations of
double taxation but they do not guarantee agreement, nor are they necessarily speedy. See,
e.g., Christine Halphen & Ronald Bordeaux, International Issue Resolution Through
Competent Authority Process, 64 TAX NOTES 657, 661 (Aug. 1, 1994) (noting that competent
authority process has been criticized for its slow pace-and that in 1990 the average
processing time was 3.5 years, although its has been significantly reduced); Elizabeth
Schwinn, IRS Gets a New Look, New Audit Approach in 1999; Prospects Good for New
Transfer PricingRegulatory Projects, 7 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REPORT 716, 716-17
(Jan. 27, 1999) (noting that in 1998 the percentage of taxpayers receiving full relief from
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position on transfer pricing as pressuring taxpayers to price their related
party transactions to favor the U.S. fisc so that such taxpayers can
minimize costly conflict with the United States."
Even before the new regulations were finalized in 1994, the Service
recognized that it faced a renewed transfer pricing challenge which
involved high stakes and a serious burden on the tax system. The Service
sought multiple remedies. To the extent the problem derived from the
difficulty in reducing transfer pricing concepts to workable rules,
substantive law reform efforts would likely have limited success (as was
ultimately seen with the 1994 regulations). The Service recognized that
the burdens on the tax system from transfer pricing disputes also resulted
from the nonsubstantive factors noted above, including the role of other
countries, the significance of factual/legal determinations, and the high
dollars at stake with its corresponding impact on taxpayer-Service
negotiations.4 ' For these reasons, the Service pursued procedural reform
to improve the resolution of transfer pricing issues. The new procedural
approach introduced was the APA program. As a procedural response,
the APA program essentially accepts the existing substantive law
baseline, although the program anticipates an interactive effect on the
underlying tax law. Thus, the core issues raised by the innovation arise
much less from the substantive tax rules than from the administrative
and systemic implications of this alternative procedure. The focus,
therefore, shifts to the exploration of the administrative and procedural
issues-first in the immediate context of the APA program and its direct
mission. Then, the analysis moves to the level of administrative design
generally where links to broader administrative and regulatory debate
inform concrete arguments regarding the APA program.

double taxation fell to 87%). "Competent Authority" is a tax treaty term that refers to the
governmental group or division in each treaty country that is responsible for negotiating with
the other country to resolve conflicts under the treaty.
44. See, e.g., Wilkie, supra note 35, at 42:23-42:25 (Canada viewed U.S. transfer pricing
penalty provisions as encouraging multinationals to overstate U.S. income, correspondingly
understating income taxable in other countries, such as Canada). Cf Marc Levey and PierreSebastien Thill, Transfer Pricing in France Moves Closerto U.S. Approach, 7 J. INT'L TAX'N
388, 396 (Sept. 1996) (noting that as regards U.S. and French approaches to transfer pricing,
"true parity still may not exist either in the technical reading of the rules or the manner of
enforcement .... [and that] [o]nly time, actual reported experiences, and possibly an active
participation in the APA program can truly identify these gaps and indicate how to bridge
them.")
45. See supra text accompanying notes 30-35.
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II.

INTRODUCTION AND USE OF THE ADVANCED
PRICING AGREEMENT PROGRAM

A. Overview
In 1990, the Service announced the planned introduction of a new
procedure which it called Advance Determination Rulings.46 By the time
the program was formally introduced in March 1991, 4 7 the name had
been changed to the Advance Pricing Agreement Program, which is how
it is known today.48 Subsequently, in 1996, the Service issued an updated
procedure for APAs, Rev. Proc. 96-53, with changes reflecting several
years' experience with the program.
What marks APAs as an unusual procedural device in the tax system
is the fact that they permit the taxpayer and the government to discuss
and resolve substantive tax issues voluntarily, prior to the transactions
occurring, and to reach agreement on their tax treatment. At first blush
this may not seem unusual; a student of the tax system could identify
other existing mechanisms that allow this kind of interaction.4 9 The APA
differs because of the precise nature and context of the interaction.
Unlike an audit or settlement agreement, the primary function of the
APA is to cover future transactions.0 Although advance tax rulings exist
in the United States (for example letter rulings),5 ' APAs are different for
several reasons: the agreements involve foreign countries; the issues are
intensely factual (and the facts very complex) and require significant
negotiation between the government and taxpayer; the agreements can
cover a number of years; and the terms of the agreements are

46. See Full Text of Draft Revenue Procedureon Advance Pricing Rulings, 2 TAX NOTES
565 (1990) (reprinting the unpublished draft revenue procedure prepared by the
Service).
47. Rev. Proc. 91-22, supra note 12, at § 13.
48. It has been suggested that the name was changed because "rulings" are generally the
kinds of documents required to be disclosed (with key information redacted), and the Service
did not intend to have APAs made public at all. See, e.g., Mike McIntyre, IRS Affirms Plans
for Developing Secret Tax Law on Transfer Pricing, 3 TAx NOTES INT'L 267, 268 (1991)
(arguing that "[tihe Service apparently made the name change in the hope of improving its
position in court should its secrecy rule be challenged."). If the agreements were called
rulings, that fact might hinder the Service's efforts to keep the agreements secret. Id.; see also
I.R.C. § 6110 (describing disclosure rules for various categories of documents). Ultimately, in
1999 Congress eliminated any doubt surounding disclosure of APAs by amending I.R.C.
§ 6103(b) to classify APAs as nondisclosable return information. See supra note 12. This
point of secrecy and disclosure is one to which the analysis returns later in Part IV.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 56-61.
50. Its role with respect to past years, however, has been expanded and clarified. See
Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12, at § 3.06.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 56-61 for a description of letter rulings.
INT'L
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confidential with no redacted versions released to the public.52 These
APA characteristics stand in contrast to the operation of the most
common advance ruling, the letter ruling. Such rulings, which are
primarily legal determinations applied to relatively generic facts, involve
only the Service and are published in redacted form. 3 The APA
program, although clearly distinct from the existing array of procedures
available to taxpayers, drew upon domestic and foreign examples to
produce a format tailored to the transfer pricing context. The following
sections describe the origins of the APA program and the final product.
B. Origins of the APA Process-Existing
Domestic and ForeignModels

Once the Service decided to turn to procedural devices as an answer
to the transfer pricing dilemma, it was apparent that a variety of
administrative procedures already existed.54 Although none was
ultimately satisfactory for the task, they set the groundwork for the
development of the APA process.55 For example, with respect to
prospective transactions the Service will, at its discretion, grant a letter
ruling which is "a written statement issued to a taxpayer or his
authorized representative by the National Office that interprets and
applies the tax laws to a specific set of facts. 56 Typically, the Service
will not issue a ruling unless the answer is clear from applying the law to
the facts.57 For this reason, letter rulings are unavailable for transfer
pricing issues."
52. In the course of a lawsuit brought in 1996 by BNA against the Service to force
disclosure of APAs, the Service changed its views and announced intended disclosure of
APAs. See infra note 228 for a discussion of the BNA lawsuit. The Service indicated that it
viewed APAs as subject to disclosure under I.R.C. § 6110. See, e.g., Molly Moses, Judge
Allows BNA to Propose Schedule for IRS to Make APAs Publicly Available, 28 DAILY TAX
REPORT G-7 (Feb. 11, 1999); IRS-Treasury Letter Announcing Intention to Settle BNA APA
Lawsuit, 7 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 88 (Jan. 27, 1999) (copy of letter sent to
APA participants indicating the Service's intent to disclose APAs under I.R.C. § 6110).
However, as noted earlier, Congress responded in December 1999 by statutorily preventing
disclosure of APAs. See supra note 12.
53. See infra note 61.
54. See generally MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Warren,
Gorham & Lamont 1991) 1-57-1-59 (outlining the Service's interactions with taxpayers that
have traditionally extended beyond regulation drafting, audit, and litigation).
55. See H. David Rosenbloom, Charles T. Plambeck, & Craig A. Sharon, Advance
Pricing Agreements, 95 TAX NOTES INT'L 131-21 (July 10, 1995) (discussing background of
APA programs).
56. 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(a)(2) (1999).
57. 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(b)(5) (1999); Rev. Proc. 96-1, 1996-1 I.R.B. 8, § 5.14.
58. See, e.g., Sheryl Stratton, Competing Interests Snag APA ProgramGuidance, 70 TAX
NOTES 138, 139 (Jan. 8, 1996) (quoting APA program original director Robert Ackerman,
that APAs differ from letter rulings in that an APA is "not truly an interpretation of the law
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In the area of transfer pricing, although "literal" facts (e.g., whether
the taxpayer sold 10 or 110 widgets to its parent, or whether the taxpayer
charged the parent $300 or $7,000 may not be in dispute) the legal
significance of facts is disputed. For example, because pricing methods
often depend on identifying comparables, the parties will argue over
what constitutes a "comparable" transaction-What is the relevant
market? What is the relevant good or service being sold? How should
differences between the taxpayer's transaction under scrutiny and those
identified as possible comparables be adjusted to ensure comparability?
In addition, disputes over the appropriate method and its application
would ensue. This level of factual/legal dispute is considered unsuitable
for the letter ruling context which attempts to provide guidance on the
application of law to facts where the facts and their legal significance are
relatively straightforward. A National Office letter ruling is binding on
the district office in its assessment of a taxpayer's liability, 9 but the
ruling applies only to the taxpayer who requested it and cannot be cited
in other cases by either the Service or taxpayers. 6° Despite their lack of
precedential value, letter rulings are published in redacted form to
provide general guidance.6'
For a taxpayer that has completed a transaction but seeks guidance
on its tax treatment, the district office may issue a "determination letter ''62 applying principles and precedents of the National Office to a
specific set of facts. Determination letters are not available for questions
of an inherently factual nature, thus excluding transfer pricing issues. 6' A
taxpayer that has been audited and seeks to appeal its proposed
adjustment, undertakes settlement discussions with the regional appeals
office. 64 Unlike letter rulings and determination letters, the settlement
the way letter rulings are," instead an APA "is an application of law to a given set of facts,
and those facts are determinative.").
59. Rev. Proc. 96-1, supra note 57. It is not binding on the Service-thus, the Service
can revoke or revise a ruling. See, e.g., SALTZMAN, supra note 54, at 3-47.
60. I.R.C. § 61100)(3) (1999); Rev. Proc. 96-1, supra note 57; Rev. Proc. 96-5, 1996-1
C.B. 503.
61. I.R.C. § 6110 (1999) (enacted in 1976). Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, letter
rulings were not released to the public.
62. 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(a)(3) (1999). Typically, a determination letter is issued
regarding pension plans or exempt organizations. See SALTZMAN, supra note 54, at 3-60.
63. 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(e)(2) (1999). Determination letters are published in redacted
form. I.R.C. § 6110 (c)(1999).
64. See generally 26 C.F.R. § 601.106(a)(1)(i) (1999). The appeals office serves as the
last point of dispute resolution within the Service. See SALTZMAN, supra note 54, at 9-9. No
appeal can be taken within the Service from a decision at this level; litigation is the only
remaining option. The appeals offices generally achieve significant success in settling cases.
Appeals resolves "85 percent of the unagreed cases that annually leave the examination
process." Thomas Carter Louthan & Steven C. Wrappe, Building a Better Dispute Resolution:
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process is available for all tax issues including transfer pricing.
However, as discussed in greater detail in Part III, the tax system faces
great difficulty in resolving transfer pricing disputes at the appeals level.
Although the appeals office's settlement power is enhanced by the
ability to take account of the hazards of litigation in reaching an
agreement, 6 several other factors conspire to limit success. The absence
of clear, workable rules, the volume of cases, the high dollar amounts at
stake and the posture of the issues (and numbers) coming from audit into
appeals have, in the case of transfer pricing, made the settlement process
less than satisfactory. 66
In addition to domestic examples of nonlitigative resolution of tax
controversies, at least two foreign examples existed as the APA program
was being designed, both prompted by transfer pricing.67 The first
example involved General Motors' reported experience in resolving
income allocation disputes in Europe in the 1980s. To reduce tax
exposure from such controversy and to reduce the risk of double
taxation, General Motors sought written agreements from various
Adapting IRS Procedures to Fit the Dispute, 73 TAX NOTES 849, 850 (1996). The Service has
traditionally encouraged resolution of adjustment disagreements through the appeals process
rather than court litigation because of the perceived savings to all parties in time and
resources. See SALTZMAN supra note 54, at 9-2, 9-3.
65. See IRM 8631(2), MT 8-209 (May 19, 1992) (Settlement Objective). A settlement is
formally concluded when it is embodied in a settlement agreement. In a nondocketed case, the
signed appeals agreement is usually recorded on Forms 870 or 870-AD, which differ in terms
of pledges against reopening for further assessment or suing for refund. See SALTZMAN, supra
note 54, at 9-56. Although these are purely administrative (not statutory) arrangements, and
are not absolutely binding, they nonetheless have some finality as binding contracts. See id. at
9-57 to 9-60. See generally Lignos v. United States, 439 F.2d 1365, 1368 (2d Cir. 1971);
Uinta Livestock Corp. v. United States., 355 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1966); Joyce v. Gentsch, 141
F.2d 891 (6th Cir. 1944); Stair v. United States, 516 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1975); Elbo Coals, Inc.
v. U.S., 588 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Ky. 1984), aff d, 763 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1985). Alternatively,
a settlement can be reflected in a closing agreement-the only statutorily authorized
mechanism for entering into a mutually binding agreement. I.R.C. § 7121 (1976). Due to their
finality, however, the use of closing agreements is discouraged by the Service in favor of the
basic settlement agreements. SALTZMAN, supra note 54, at 9-56 to 9-57; IRM 8815, MT 8216 (Aug. 5, 1992) (Agreement Used When Taxpayer Requests Greater Finality).
66. An optional mediation procedure introduced by the Service in 1995 (after the start of
the APA program) is available for the resolution of factual issues including transfer pricing
disputes that are in the appeals administrative process and have not been docketed. Mediation
is available only after settlement efforts have failed and is limited by other restrictions.
Announcement 95-86, 1995-44, I.R.B. 27 extended by Announcement 97-1, 1997-2 I.R.B. 62.
Of the nine taxpayers interested in the program and qualified to participate, only two have
been successfully mediated. See Tonya M. Scherer, Alternative Dispute Resolutions in the
Federal Tax Arena: The Internal Revenue Service Opens Its Doors to Mediation, J. Disp.
RESOL.

215, 226 (1997).

67. See, e.g., H. David Rosenbloom et al., supra note 55 (noting the role of General
Motors "rumors" as a background element in the development of the APA concept in the
United States).
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European countries stating that they would respect General Motors'
newly developed pricing model based on the resale price method.
Reportedly, 16 of the 17 countries approached entered into unilateral
agreements with General Motors. 68
The second foreign example involved Japan's "preconfirmation
system" (PCS) introduced by the Japanese National Tax Administration
(NTA) in 1987.69 Following the adoption of transfer pricing rules in
1986, Japan established the PCS to provide a mechanism by which
taxpayers and the NTA could reach a non-legally-binding agreement on
an arm's length price. 0 The PCS model is useful, but its unilateral
approach and its absence of binding results means that it would not
address all of the factors that make transfer pricing problematic.
C. The APA Procedure

Ultimately, the global recognition of transfer pricing administrative
problems led to informal discussions among various countries and
taxpayers, and to the development of the first negotiated pricing
agreement7 involving the United States and Australia. 2 Under the APA
program introduced by Rev. Proc. 91-22, taxpayers initiate the U.S.
APA process by requesting an APA from the Office of the Associate
Chief Counsel International." The request must identify the taxpayer and
68. See Emily E. Eliot, Apple and GM Tax Chiefs Discuss Their Expectations in
Obtaining Advance Pricing Agreements, 3 TAX NOTES INT'L 373 (1991) (quoting Chief Tax
Officer of General Motors, James R. Mogle).
69. See, e.g., Akira Akamatsu, Japanese Competent Authority Discusses U.S. APA
Procedure, 14 TAX NOTES INT'L 1109 (April 7, 1997); Takashi Kuboi & Yoichi Asakawa,
Partneringin Japan: Form of Entry and Recent Tax Issues, 13 TAX NOTES INT'L 445, 449
(1996); Rosenbloom et al., supra note 55; Guttentag & Miyatake, supra note 36.
70. See, e.g., Kuboi & Asakawa, supra note 69. The PCS has been available through the
NTA as an administrative avenue but, for procedural reasons, has been difficult to use.
Accordingly, only a few companies applied for an agreement under the PCS in the initial
years. The risk of double taxation, however, has prompted Japan to explore methods for
drawing more taxpayers into advance discussion and agreement with the government.
Incorporating the PCS into law is hoped to encourage more extensive use of the process. See
Gary M. Thomas, Japan to Revise Transfer Pricing Rules in 1997: An Opportunity for
Comment by the Foreign Community?, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 2000, 2000 (June 24, 1996).
71. Apple Computer Company's advanced pricing agreement with the United States and
Australia was announced by the company in March 1991, shortly after the release of Rev.
Proc. 91-22. See, e.g., Eliot, supra note 68, at 373.
72. See Rosenbloom et al., supra note 55.
73. Rev. Proc. 91-22, supra note 12, at §§ 4,6. Although the applicable district office of
the Service plays a role in the APA process, the focus is the National Office and competent
authority (in the case of bilateral and multilateral APAs). Prior to filing a formal APA request,
the taxpayer may request a conference. This "prefiling conference" is an opportunity for the
taxpayer to get a sense of the acceptability of its proposed transfer pricing methodology. In
addition, the taxpayer can ascertain the level of information that the Service anticipates
needing to adequately examine the situation. Not all requests require the same level of factual
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all parties to the transactions; describe the business operations and
history, the ownership structure, capitalization, financial arrangements,
and principal business; provide relevant tax and financial data for the
past three years, descriptions of financial accounting methods used as
well as differences between tax and financial accounting; and explain the
taxpayer's and the government's positions on previous and current audit,
appeal, or litigation issues.74 The request also must include a detailed
description of the transfer pricing method being proposed by the
taxpayer and demonstrate this method by applying it to the taxpayer's
three prior years' data. To establish and evaluate the proposed transfer
pricing methodology, the taxpayer may need to provide party
profitability data, functional analyses, economic analyses of the general
industry, a list of competitors, and a detailed discussion of comparable
transactions. 75 Regardless of whether an APA is signed or not, factual
oral and written representations or submissions made during the APA
process may be introduced by either the Service or the taxpayer in any
administrative or judicial proceeding.76
Finally, the APA request must outline the proposed set of critical
assumptions." These are the objective business and economic criteria
that are fundamental to the operation of the proposed transfer pricing
methodology-any facts about the taxpayer, industry, or tax regime that
would significantly affect the substantive terms of an APA, if such facts
changed. 8 As part of the APA process, the Service may require that the
taxpayer provide, at its own expense, an independent expert acceptable
to both the Service and the taxpayer (and if necessary the foreign
government) to review and opine on the proposed method.7 9
After the request is completed, it is sent to the Chief Counsel
(National Office) who coordinates with the district office. These
interactions form an interesting facet of the APA process. Normally,
taxpayers deal with the local district or regional offices for most of the
audit, appeal and litigation of a tax matter. The APA process, however,
is handled by the National Office. Thus, the APA process brings new
people into the dynamic without removing the district office from the
disclosure and economic or legal analysis. Id. at § 4. The prefiling conference can be
conducted on an anonymous basis, although if the details offered during the conference are
vague enough to protect the taxpayer identity, the anonymity might hamper the taxpayer's
ability to get an accurate sense of what the APA process would involve in that case.
74. Rev. Proc. 91-22, supra note 12, at § 5.
75. Id.

76. Id.at §§ 9.03, 9.04.
77. Id.at § 5.07.
78. Id.
79. Id.at § 8.
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negotiations. As noted earlier, and discussed in greater depth in Part III,
the change in personnel focus from the district to the National Office
plays a key role in drawing taxpayers into the APA process.8
The Service representatives then meet with the taxpayer, often on a
number of occasions, to discuss facts and economic analysis, and to
negotiate.8 If the parties reach agreement and the Service grants the
request, an APA can be signed. If the taxpayer seeks to involve a foreign
government in the negotiations then (under the procedure's initial
format) the Service and the taxpayer first reach agreement with each
other and enter into a memorandum of understanding. Then the U.S.
competent authority negotiates the issue with the foreign country.82
Because such "bilateral" APAs involve competent authorities, generally
they are available only when the other country is a treaty party. 83 This
structure for involving the foreign competent authority in the APA
process was one of the key features later changed by the Service.8
Negotiating with foreign countries from a locked-in position proved
untenable in a program which relied heavily on the foreign countries'
voluntary participation.
The incorporation of other countries into the process is often the
major appeal of APAs because a pricing agreement between the United
States and the taxpayer may be of limited value if the other country (i.e.,
the country of the foreign related party) takes a very different view of
the transaction." Thus, a bilateral APA can be critical in avoiding double
taxation. Although avoidance of double taxation is a primary attraction
of the APA program-and some participants may view themselves as
merely "stakeholders" who expect to pay a total sum in tax and are
indifferent as to how that amount is divided among the relevant
jurisdictions-the picture should not be oversimplified. Tax motivations
for participating are much more complicated, and the details can take on
significance in evaluating the functioning of the program.
80. See infra Part III.A.2.b
81. Rev. Proc. 91-22, supra note 12, at §§ 6.03, 6.04.
82. See id. at §§ 6.02, 6.06, 7.
83. id. at § 7.01. If the agreement reached by the United States and the foreign

government is not acceptable to the taxpayer, the taxpayer may withdraw the request and
simply execute its APA with only the United States, although this does not guarantee that
double taxation will be eliminated. The foreign country might not share the pricing views

embodied in the taxpayer's agreement with the United States. Id. at § 7.02.
84. See infra note 104 for explanation of the change in APA procedure in 1996.
85. In a number of situations, however, a unilateral APA can be appropriate. See, e.g.,
Procedures for Bilateral APAs Continuing to Evolve, 1996 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 202
at, J-2 (Oct. 18, 1996) (then-APA program Director Michael Durst refers to the preference for

bilateral APAs, but recognizes that unilateral APAs may be necessary where, for example,
they involve a nontreaty country or small international flows).
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First, even the classic stakeholder may have an interest in where the
tax payment goes. Some have national allegiances which may lead them
to prefer a particular recipient. Others may have accounting or
regulatory repercussions from the tax treatment that create an incentive."
Second, some taxpayers are drawn to the process because of current
audit difficulties. The APA process, with its possibility for rollback
application, can be an attractive alternative for dealing with existing and87
future problems, saving interest, penalties and current dispute costs.
Third, taxpayers in a particular industry may consider the APA program,
with its ability to rely on treaty authority, as a useful way to combat
serious gaps or irrationalities of current rules. For example, taxpayers
engaged in global trading 8 sought "recognition" of interbranch
transactions (to achieve more economic taxation), an outcome not
directly possible under the Service's interpretation of the Code but
achievable through the APA program.89 Also a foreign manufacturer
could be ensured that its U.S. subsidiary would not be considered its
permanent establishment (and thereby subject to more extensive U.S.
income taxation) by building that assumption into the terms of the
APA. 90 Such strategic participation in the APA program is the logical
outcome of any system that offers participants choice.
Assuming agreement is reached (either with United States alone, or
with a foreign country as well), the APA is binding between the Service
and the taxpayer and typically effective for about three years.9' If the
taxpayer complies with the APA terms, then the Service will regard the
results obtained from applying the transfer pricing methodology
specified in the APA as satisfying the arm's length standard and
86. One of the changes to the APA process introduced after the program had been in
operation for several years reduced the role of the taxpayer in the bilateral negotiations. See
infra note 104. Much of the taxpayer response to this change was quite negative, reflecting
real concern on the part of the taxpayer that they could be harmed by being left out of that
stage of the process. See, e.g., Role of Competent Authority Seen Causing Some to Rethink
BilateralAPA Approach, 191 DAILY TAX REP. J-1 (Oct. 2, 1996) (noting complaints about

the new role of competent authority before the practice was formalized in Rev. Proc. 96-53).
87. See infra note 105.
88. Global trading generally refers to the activities of a corporation such as an investment
bank, that has many offices throughout the world that engage in buying and selling securities
and financial instruments. Different offices may perform different functions, such as hedging
for the entire group or handling a particular set of securities or instruments. Often exchanges
may take place between the branches, especially if they operate like independent units.
Serious tax problems can arise from the U.S. tax treatment which usually does not recognize
these transactions. See Diane M. Ring, Risk-Shifting in the Multinational Corporation: The
Incoherenceof the U.S. Tax Regime, 38 B.C.L. REv. 667 (1997).

89. See infra text accompanying notes 156-159.
90. See Rolls Royce, supra note 41.
91. See Rev. Proc. 91-22, supra note 12, at § 9.01.
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generally will not contest the application of the methodology to the
transactions outlined in the APA. 9' As part of the APA, the taxpayer is
required to file an annual report describing the actual operations of the
business for the year and demonstrating compliance with the terms of the
agreement.93 In certain cases, compensating adjustments to the calculations
for that year might have to be made. 94 In the event of fraud or malfeasance
by the taxpayer with respect to material facts provided or good faith
compliance with the terms of the APA, the Service can revoke the APA. 95
Clearly the APA process requires a taxpayer to provide a significant
amount of current data regarding business practices, operations, tax
treatment, and other sensitive issues. To reduce taxpayer concern
regarding vulnerability to public disclosure, the Service initially took the
position that information received or generated by the Service during the
APA process related directly to the potential tax liability of the taxpayer
under the Code. Thus, the APA itself and related data would be subject
to the confidentiality requirements of I.R.C. § 6103. In addition, the
Service noted that the information was likely to be commercially96
sensitive and may be confidential pursuant to any relevant treaty.
Although the Service would not name participants or make specific
observations and only provided summary data and statistics on the
program, some companies that have participated in the APA process
have publicly commented.97 As noted later in Part IV, the security
offered by the Service's position on disclosure in the APA context was
ultimately challenged by freedom of information act requests and a
lawsuit seeking redacted versions of APAs.9' In January of 1999, in
response to the ongoing disclosure lawsuit, 99 the Service announced a
change in its position on the disclosability of APAs. The Service stated
92. See id. at § 7.02.
93. See id. at § 10.01.
94. See id. at § 10.02(1). The example in the revenue procedure indicates that if the APA
required the transfer pricing methodology to produce results within a certain range but it failed to

do so, compensating adjustments might be made to bring the results within the agreed range.
95. See id. at § 10.05(1). Such revocation may be retroactive to the first day of the
taxable year the APA was in effect. See id. at § 10.05(2). Also, an APA may be canceled by
the Service if it determines that there was a misrepresentation or mistake as to a material fact
or a lack of good faith in compliance with the APA, but no fraud or malfeasance. See id. at
§ 10.06(1). If an APA is canceled, the cancellation is effective beginning on the first day of
the year in which the misrepresentation, misstatement, omission, or noncompliance occurs.
See id. at § 10.06(3). Finally, if there is a change in critical assumptions, law or treaty, the
APA may be revised. See id. at § 10.07(1).
96. See id. at § 11.
97. See, e.g., Known U.S. Advance Pricing Agreements, 7 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER
PRICING REP. 482 (Oct. 14, 1998).
98. See infra note 228.
99. See infra note 228.
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its new view that APAs constitute "written determinations" subject to
redacted disclosure pursuant to the terms of I.R.C. § 61 1 0 .' 0° Congress

reacted in December 1999 by statutorily protecting the confidentiality of
APAs under I.R.C. § 6103(b) and thus preventing disclosure.' °'
After the experience of several years of operating the APA program,

the Service updated the process by issuing Rev. Proc. 96-53.'°' The program
remained essentially the same although some key changes were made to
reflect the Service's evolving views and experiences. Notable changes
included a stated preference for bilateral as opposed to unilateral APAs;'' °34
0
the "decreased" role of the taxpayer in competent authority discussions;
the Service's stated preference for rollbacks; 05 more specified coordination
of the National Office, district and appeals in the formation of an APA
team; 0 6 elimination of the reference to limited APAs covering only the
appropriate transfer pricing methodology and the factual aspects of the
transactions at issue;'°7 and introduction of a sliding scale user fee.'8
100. See supra note 52.
101. See supra note 12.
102. Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12.
103. Id. at § 7.07.
104. Under the prior procedure, the taxpayer and the Service could first enter into a
memorandum of understanding ("MOU") outlining their agreed APA negotiations, and then
the competent authorities would negotiate. The problem encountered in this approach was that
other countries felt as if they were being handed a "done-deal" because the MOU had been
reached between the taxpayer and the Service. See, e.g., Service Releases Letters on U.S.
Advance Pricing Agreement Process, 15 TAX NOTES INT'L 979 (Sept. 29, 1997) (announcing
release of a Sept. 8, 1995 letter by John Neighbour of Inland Revenue [U.K.] which suggests
that such a format may create difficulties). The new revenue procedure seeks to bring the
foreign country into the process prior to an established understanding between the taxpayer
and the Service, thereby enhancing flexibility for the competent authority negotiations. Some
taxpayers expressed concern over the change in their role in bilateral interactions, in part
because of their view that they were not simply stakeholders and that it was not irrelevant
which country received how much tax.
105. "Rollbacks" refers to the application of the transfer pricing methodology to prior
tax years, which are not covered by the APA. See generally Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12,
at § 3.06. For taxpayers currently experiencing a difficult or frustrating audit (for the various
reasons discussed below in Part III) the APA program, with the prospect of rollback of the
APA approach, can be appealing. See infra note 113.
106. Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12, at § 3.07.
107. Such limited APAs described in Rev. Proc. 91-22, § 3.04 would not address the
expected range of results of applying the methodology to the facts. These APAs, known as
no-penalty APAs, served to insulate the taxpayers from transfer pricing related penalties. See
APAs: First Section 6662 Penalty-Proof APA Nearly Complete, Intel Executive Says, 1995
DAILY TAX REP. 92 G-l (May 12, 1995) (announcing that Intel Corporation was preparing to
complete the first "penalty-proof' APA that would protect the taxpayer from transfer pricing
penalties but would still leave it open to transfer pricing adjustments on the transaction at
issue). The removal of the reference to this category of APA leaves open the question as to
whether the Service will continue to consider such requests.
108. Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12, at § 5.14 (with fees ranging from $5,000 to $25,000
based on the taxpayer's gross income or the likely annual value of the transactions at issue).
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Throughout the nine years that the APA program has been in place,
the pace of completed APAs and APAs in progress has increased.09 As
of December 1999, 230 APAs had been completed." The Service had
requests pending for an additional 187 APAs, almost seventy-five
percent of which were bilateral, in conformity with the Service's
expressed preference for such use of the process."'
III.

EFFECT OF THE

APA

PROGRAM ON PARTICIPANTS:

A

PROCEDURAL HYBRID ADDRESSING THE DEMAND
FOR ADMINISTRABLE TRANSFER PRICING

The continuing administrative problems with transfer pricing
motivated the development of the APA program. These problems can
be grouped roughly into two general categories, problems stemming
from: (1) uncertainty of rule application, and (2) difficulty of resolving
disputes. This Part examines the effect of the program on its
participants-whether the procedural changes it introduced were
successful in making transfer pricing more administrable. The focus on
"administrability" reflects the problem oriented approach taken in
designing the program. Change was needed precisely because the
current system was not workable. What was sought was reform that
would make transfer pricing rules administrable. However, critical
examination of the program demands more than a narrow look at this
procedural reform and its administrability. Complete assessment of the
program's success and impact for both participants (Part III) and
nonparticipants (Part IV) reflects the tension among a number of
relevant evaluative criteria. In weighing the risks and benefits of tax
system reform, attention to broader administrative theory sharpens the
choices. Furthermore, for the APA program to serve as a case study in
administrative theory and design, it is essential to understand the
precise impact of the program and the structural decisions that were
109. In October of 1997, the Service had established another avenue for entry into the
APA process-the Early Referral Program. The general purpose of the program is to
encourage certain taxpayers to seek an APA early in an audit, where appropriate, to help

conserve resources. The referrals are made by the district offices which send the names of
possible participants to the APA program. Taxpayers are then contacted by the APA office
and if the taxpayers are interested, they may move forward with an APA and transfer pricing
issues are dropped from the audit until the APA is complete. See Robert S. Ackerman,
Negotiating Advance Pricing Agreements for Financial Institutions, 16 TAx NOTES INT'L
1713 (June 1, 1998). See infra note 184.
110. See IRS Reports Completed APAs Reached Record High of 60 During Calendar
1999, 1995 DAILY TAX REP. 14 G-I (Jan. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Record High].
111.Id.
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made. Only such an in-depth analysis enables broader generalizations
and observations to be offered later.
A. APA ProgramChanges
The APA program introduced three basic changes to the way the
Service and taxpayers interact over transfer pricing. First, the APA
program changed the timing of the interactions. Transfer pricing issues
were not susceptible to the use of letter rulings, 12 so any significant
interpretation, discussion, or analysis under the existing system occurred
after the transaction. In the APA process, however, the taxpayer and
government(s) confront the transfer pricing questions at the outset,
before the transactions occur."3
Second, the APA changed the participants. Traditionally, the initial
government participant in a transfer pricing issue is the district office,
when it audits the taxpayer. This stage is followed by an internal
administrative appeal. Ultimately, if the case fails to be resolved through
these channels it moves to court. In any event, the IRS National Office
and representatives from the relevant foreign countries are not involved
in these early stages." 4 The APA, however, brings together all of the
potentially interested parties (taxpayer, district office, National Office,
foreign government) in the up-front process. Rather than sequential
involvement, if any, the APA program facilitates the contemporaneous
interaction of the full set of actors ultimately involved in a transfer
pricing issue.
Third, the APA changes the mission and "scope of power" of the
government in handling the individual taxpayer's transfer pricing
problem. In the traditional audit context, the district's authority is
constrained in terms of flexibility and creativity. As discussed below, the
main government actor in the APA negotiations (the National Office)
possesses greater degree of flexibility due to a variety of factors,

112. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
113. This, of course, is a generalization. Some APAs are motivated by the fact that the
taxpayer finds itself in a messy transfer pricing audit and decides to pursue an APA, with the
hope it will have retroactive effect. See, e.g., Complexity of Deals Prevents Uniform Financial
Products APAs, 3 FIN. PRODUCTS REP. 959, 960 (Jan. 2, 1998) (quoting Karl Kellar, thenAPA Program Branch Chief, "One of the main reasons that taxpayers do come into the APA

program is because they are undergoing an audit and they want to deal with transfer pricing
issues that arise. In that way, they can get certainty for both the future and the past in a

consistent manner.").
114. Foreign countries may also be conducting audits, but the timing of their
administrative process does not necessarily correspond to when the Service is examining the

years in question.
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including its place in the administrative hierarchy and its reliance on
treaty power in reaching certain results with other countries.
The combination of these changes produced a new procedure that
was, in critical ways, a hybrid of pieces of the system that existedsome occurring ex ante and others ex post. In designing an alternative
structure to address the transfer pricing problem, the National Office had
the flexibility to move beyond the traditional patterns to reorganize
interactions with taxpayers and other taxing authorities. Whether and
how these changes actually improved administrability can best be
ascertained by examining how each change affected the resolution of
transfer pricing issues.
1. How the Procedural Changes Impact Uncertainty
Despite the arrival of the new transfer pricing regulations in 1993
and 1994, the rules under I.R.C. § 482 remain too vague to provide
many taxpayers with certainty regarding the taxation of their related
party transactions. Uncertainty here can be costly and likely to produce
disputes for several reasons. First, errors in pricing are quite possible
given the spectrum of interpretation in applying the rules and identifying
relevant third party data.' Such errors can be expensive as the range of
possible "arm's length" prices can be quite wide and the potential tax
adjustments (including penalties)" 6 quite significant."' Because
acceptance of an adjustment could be costly, taxpayers have a strong
incentive to challenge audit adjustments.
Second, the only forum for obtaining certainty in the existing system
is through audit, appeals and potentially litigation."8 The process can
115. See generally IRS 1992 Annual Report, Pub. No. 55 (May 1, 1993) reprinted in 93
TAX NOTES TODAY 125-76 (June 14, 1993) ("Transfer pricing is an area of ambiguity for

both foreign and domestic corporations").
116. See generally Large Companies Reconsidering Opposition to APAs Practitioners
Say, 1993 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 185, J-1 (Sept. 27, 1993) (suggesting that larger
corporations are more willing to consider an APA because of the increased threat of penalties
under the new I.R.C. § 6662 rules (covering valuation and misstatement and documentation)).
117. As of September 1992 (and again as of June 1994), proposed adjustments for large
(i.e. those with assets of $100 million or more in year of return) taxpayers' transfer pricing
cases awaiting administrative resolution in appeals or litigation totaled $14.4 billion. See
NONPAYMENT OF TAX,

supra note 7, at 23.

118. Because these after-the-fact dispute resolution steps offer less to the taxpayer, there
is less incentive for the taxpayer to be more forthcoming than strictly required in fair
compliance with the law and audit process. In theory one might think that an audit settlement
would provide sufficient guidance going forward as to transfer pricing treatment for a given
taxpayer. This has not seemed to occur, for several reasons: (1) the issues are very fact
intensive and the business conditions change, (2) for new products and transactions, error can
carry penalties, (3) audit positions are not binding, and (4) audit is not conducted immediately
so there are several years of lag time during which the taxpayer must be filing on this issue
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involve substantial transaction costs in terms of lawyer and accountant

fees, internal resources, as well as the lost opportunity to modify or
change the transaction." 9
Although participation in the APA process may not be cheap, it is
likely to have lower transaction costs than audit, appeals, and litigation' 2
for a number of reasons: (1) fewer layers; (2) less hostility, resulting in
more productive discussions; (3) taxpayer incentive to cooperate
combined with Service representatives not focused on high dollar audits;
and (4) flexibility derived from parties not yet committed to their
positions (in part because the future transactions have yet to occur).
Third, the fact that transfer pricing generally involves cross border
transactions means that in addition to domestic uncertainty there is the
international uncertainty. The other country in the related party transfer
might view the appropriate pricing quite differently and double taxation

could result. 2 ' Again, the price of uncertainty is high, leading taxpayers
to consider challenging audit positions of the governments.
Fourth, the Service's continued interest in transfer pricing, combined
with other countries' increasing interest, suggests that the opportunities
for taxpayers to achieve "no taxation" on their related party transactions,
as opposed to double taxation, might be more limited. Thus, the
potential upside of taking aggressive pricing positions and playing the
audit lottery is diminished.
without additional guidance; by the time guidance is available, facts have probably changed
enough so that the taxpayer cannot be certain of the Service's view.

119. See, e.g.,

NONPAYME*NT OF TAX,

supra note 7, at 27-28 (noting that major I.R.C.

§ 482 cases illustrate that they can be ".... extremely expensive for taxpayers and the
government by requiring the employment of outside experts, resulting in long drawn out
litigation and keeping corporate tax liabilities in an uncertain status for years .. ."). The four
major I.R.C. § 482 cases highlighted by the GAO 1995 report lasted, on average, 15 years
from earliest audit to court resolution. Id. at 27.
One central problem with the existing mechanisms for resolving transfer pricing issues is
that they occur after the transaction. For example, transfer pricing issues typically arise on
audit, a number of years after the transaction has been completed and the returns have been
filed. Such ex post mechanisms offer certainty, but it is too late to change the transactions for
the years under audit (or the years filed but not yet audited), and the audit process does not
provide a guarantee as to treatment of future transactions. Similarly, in cases of potential
double taxation, conflicting assessments of the related party transactions typically are not
addressed until well after they take place, and even that discussion (conducted through the
treaty competent authority process) can be long in producing results. See supra note 43.
120. If a taxpayer did not anticipate being audited, or if audited, did not anticipate a
serious likelihood of these issues being raised, then the comparison of costs might weigh
against pursuing an APA.
121. Cf., CanadianTelecommunications Firm Touts APA's, 1997 DAILY TAX REP. 230
G-3 (Dec. 1, 1997) [hereinafter "Canadian Telecommunications"] (noting that the
combination of significant cross border transactions combined with the risk of serious transfer
pricing penalties in the United States and Canada made APAs the right decision for that
taxpayer).
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A number of features in the APA program directly impact certainty
for the taxpayer. The basic structure of the program, as a mechanism to
obtain a binding agreement governing the treatment of a specified group
of future transactions, directly responds to the need for clear projections.' The inclusion of foreign governments in bilateral and
multilateral APAs offers the potential for real certainty-the kind that is
only possible if all the relevant players are involved. As discussed
below, the flexibility possible in negotiating an APA (due in part to
National Office's treaty authority, its position relative to the district, and
the fresh start aspect of the relations) ' makes it more realistic for the
parties to reach a mutually acceptable application of the transfer pricing
rules. Finally, to the extent the APA process may lay the groundwork for
changes or developments in transfer pricing rules, a taxpayer's
participation in the process affords the possibility of influencing the
direction of such changes and thereby increasing certainty and reducing
future conflict. "4
Moreover, having the APA discussion in advance may enable a
taxpayer to shape the transfer pricing rules it faces. Where a current rule
is very unclear, or in the extreme, prohibits a desired result, the
taxpayer's ability to discuss and negotiate on the point before it decides
to engage in the transaction is very much like negotiating with the
Service for a particular rule to be applied prospectively. This differs
from after-the-fact dispute resolution. If a taxpayer engages in a
transaction and then seeks a particular treatment in audit, the taxpayer
may or may not receive the desired result. Hence the taxpayer will be
forced to treat the transaction in an undesired manner without the
opportunity to "undo" the transaction. In this way, although settlements
and litigated cases produce rules, their impact is significantly different
than if the same results had been reached prior to the transaction's
occurrence because the taxpayer bears the risk of losing.
Based on this review, the APA changes seem effective in providing
certainty.'5 Two caveats, however, must be noted that limit this effect.

122. See, e.g., Lawyer Says Taxpayer Sought APA to Avoid Dispute Over Brand's
Overseas Value, 6 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING SPECIAL REP. (BNA) 205 (July 30, 1997)
(uncertainty over possible Service views on the brand name development in Asia led taxpayer

to conclude an APA).
123. See infra Part Ill.A.2.c for a more detailed discussion of the impact of the National
Office authority and flexibility in resolving transfer pricing issues.

124. For example, the Service's experiences with APAs involving global trading paved
the way for the proposed global dealing regulations. See infra Part IV.C.2.
125. See, e.g., Canadian Teleconunications,supra note 121 (taxpayer telecommunication
firm's corporate tax director outlined certainty and resource savings as advantages of APAs over

audits).
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First, the taxpayer's interaction with the government on transfer pricing
in the APA process is not the final step. The taxpayer generally will also
face an audit as to compliance with the terms of the APA. At the present
time it is unclear whether taxpayers with APAs will have easy audits on
the covered transactions. If district/taxpayer relations are strained, or if
the district did not share in the views reflected in the agreement, the
scrutiny of transfer pricing, even with an APA, may remain a sticky
process. 126
Subsequent audits raise another issue about the effectiveness of
APAs. The removal of the transfer pricing issue from the audit plate
might also encourage Service auditors to spend this time they have saved
looking at other issues, especially if the taxpayer is a large multinational.
If so, was the APA worth the effort? This question cannot be answered
until enough APA years have come up for audit. However, even if the
observation regarding auditors' time allocations is correct, that does not
mean the taxpayer does not benefit from the resolution of the transfer
pricing issues. Transfer pricing, as discussed earlier, can involve large
numbers, great variations, and significant penalties. Once identified it
often can be challenging to resolve. Although audits are never easy,
many other issues that could be raised might be less contentious and less
costly to contest or accept.
The second caveat recognizes that the greatest certainty comes from
the participation of both the United States and the other relevant taxing
jurisdictions. However, these other jurisdictions cannot be forced to
participate. Initially, some countries were not very receptive to the new
procedure, but gradually more countries have either implemented their
own "APA" programs or are considering the possibility.'2 7 Still others
have indicated a willingness to engage in the APA process for certain

126. Cf APA Early Referral ProgramAttracts First Taxpayer, DirectorBarrett Reports,
21 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 21, at G-4 (Feb. 2, 1998) ("Several practitioners have
complained that they had experiences in which the field refused to roll back an APA.").
127. See, e.g., A Global Review of Advance Pricing Agreements, 7 TAX MGMT.

(BNA) No. 31 (Jan. 27, 1999) (review of APA programs in
14 countries); U.K. Tax Official Outlines Scope, Goals of Formal APA Program, 1999 DAILY

TRANSFER PRICING SPECIAL REP.

TAX REP. (BNA) No. 1, G-2 (Jan. 4, 1999) (U.K. releases draft APA program legislation); see
also Ernst & Young Transfer Pricing 1997 Global Survey, 15 TAX NOTES INT'L 761, 771
(Sept. 8, 1997); Australia Issues Final APA Rules Similar to U.S. Requirements, 22 TAX
PLANNING INT'L REV. (BNA) 16 (1995) (Australian Tax Office issued final APA procedures
"that substantially mirror" the U.S. program); IRD to Issue Revised Guidelines Draft Soon;

Will Likely Launch Formal APA Program in'98, 6

TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP.

(BNA) 385 (Oct. 15, 1997) (New Zealand likely to introduce APA program in early 1998);

Geralyn M. Fallon, Advance PricingAgreements, 75 TAXES 304, 306 nn. 8, 10 (June 1, 1997)
(Canada introduced its own APA procedure in 1993, and the Netherlands in 1994).
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industries (e.g., global trading). 28 Nonetheless, the APA program's
changes to the resolution of transfer pricing questions added increasing
certainty for taxpayers in the process. This success, however, depends on
the multiple changes described involving timing, participation and scope
of authority.
2. How the Procedural Changes Impact
Difficulty in Dispute Resolution
In addition to eliminating issues of uncertainty, the APA program's
procedural innovations also sought to conquer the core obstacles to
'improved dispute resolution.
a. Limited Information
Part of the difficulty with transfer pricing rules is that both the
taxpayer and government lack sufficient information. The government
does not fully understand each industry and transaction, so the
regulations, although detailed, do not offer significant guidance on the
application of these concepts in specific circumstances. Audits do
provide the Service with more information on transactions and markets,
but the adversarial context and the lack of incentive for taxpayers to
volunteer information not literally required limits this avenue of
information acquisition. 29 Similarly, taxpayers lack information on the
government's use of methods, views on comparables, and actual practice
in applying the transfer pricing methodologies. Finally, other countries,
perhaps in some cases because of lack of information, have been
inclined to view the United States' strong emphasis on transfer pricing
as unduly aggressive, 30 arguing that transfer pricing is essentially the
allocation of a limited pie."' The situation may be exacerbated by
regulations involving complex methodologies, the real impact of which
can only be appreciated through case-specific application.
128. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 127, at 311 (Germany expressed willingness to
consider global trading and financial instrument APAs). See supra note 88 for a description of

global trading.
129. In some sense the APA program could be viewed like the mediation introduced into

the tax system in Announcement 95-86, because both are seeking a format that encourages
taxpayers to come forward with more information. See, e.g., Alexei P. Mostovoi, Tax
Mediation: Is It Just a Test, 13 TAX NOTES INT'L 1871, 1875 (Dec. 2, 1996) (discussing

taxpayer incentives and willingness to disclose information in mediation).
130. See, e.g., U.S.-French APA Could Be Completed Under Tax Treaty, 1994 DAILY
TAX REP. (BNA) No. 127, at G-3 (July 6, 1994) (OECD representative observed that some
countries were wary about the U.S. APA process because the United States has "more
experience, resources and aggressive rules.").
131. See, e.g., id. (French ministry official suggests that they believe the United States is
using APAs to "get a larger share of the tax cake.").
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The changes brought by the APA program improve the flow of
information. 32 The voluntary nature of the program (with the carrot of
up-front resolution and certainty) demands more extensive disclosures
from the taxpayer than would a traditional audit, and thus provides the
Service with a better picture of how various businesses, industries, and
transactions are conducted. The veracity of the disclosures is secondarily
guaranteed by the fact that material misstatements or omissions later
discovered by the Service can invalidate the agreement. The Service also
gathers more information on how variations in methodologies play out;
it can require trial tests with taxpayers and get detailed data and
feedback. Information generated in this fashion may result in more
useful formulations of transfer pricing rules. Foreign countries may find
that their participation in the APA process, with the joint case-specific
analyses, gives them the opportunity to better understand U.S. transfer
pricing approaches and may mitigate their hostilities or concerns."'
For the taxpayer, the informational benefit from the APA relates
closely to the certainty obtained through the process. Taxpayers are
repeat players only in a limited sense. They might renew an expired
APA, or return with additional transactions or related parties, but what
they really want to know is how transfer pricing applies to them. The
Service, on the other hand, is a repeat player that not only seeks to
resolve the case at hand, but also to improve the system. The resolution
of an individual case means more than just one less contentious,
unpredictable audit down 1the
line. It means more potential insight into
4
transfer pricing treatments. 1
The APA's role in enhancing information could be viewed as
temporary, in whole or in part. For example, if the Service ultimately
found its APA experiences sufficiently informative, it could conceivably
produce a new set of regulations that offers more guidance to the
taxpayer. In that scenario, individual case by case analysis would be
132. See Michael C. Durst Additional Structure, Growth Characterize IRS Advance
Pricing Agreement Program's Past Year, 6 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING SPECIAL REP.
(BNA) 2, 4 (Oct. 29, 1997) (suggesting that because the APA program gives the Service
earlier "hands-on" experience with particular rules and problems, it "can provide uniquely
valuable lessons for use in drafting and refining transfer pricing regulations and revenue
rulings.").
133. The value of the APA process in this regard might be inferred from the decision of
a number of countries to implement their own internal "APA-like" procedure. See generally
U.K. Tax Official Outlines Scope, Goals of Formal APA Program, supra note 127, at G-2.
134. For example, on March 6, 1998, the Service released proposed regulations
regarding the taxation of "global dealing," which were developed in part through the benefit
of the APA experience with taxpayers engaged in global trading. Allocation and Sourcing of
Income and Deductions Among Taxpayers Engaged In a Global Dealing Operation,63 Fed.

Reg. 1I, 177 (1998). See supra note 88 for a description of global trading.
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necessary until the Service developed an adequate understanding of
business practices and the impact of transfer pricing income
reallocations. If the new penalty regulations and documentation
requirements make taxpayers less aggressive, that change, in conjunction
with improved guidance from the Service, could reduce the volume of
transfer pricing audits and cases.
Alternatively, the informational role of the program could be
permanent vis-a-vis transfer pricing generally, but temporary as regards
particular issues or problems. For example, after sufficient exposure to a
particular industry or transaction, the Service could provide a detailed
description of how it approaches the arm's length standard in such cases,
as done in Notice 94-40 and the global dealing regulations addressing
transfer pricing. The scope of this informational role is considered again
in Part IV in connection with the impact of the APA program on
nonparticipants.
b. Hostility Between Taxpayer and Agent
The state of taxpayer government relations has impeded resolution
of transfer pricing issues which require cooperation and exchange of
information. The APA program makes several changes in personnel (the
who and what authority of the government) that impact the various
relationship problems experienced in transfer pricing.
In the traditional tax dispute path, the first step is audit, which
involves the taxpayer and the district office. Resolution at this stage can
be hampered for several reasons related to the participants. The district
office (agent/audit team) is the level of the Service in constant contact
with the taxpayer (especially in the case of larger taxpayers, where there
may be "permanent" on-site examiners in what can be an adversarial
relationship). Frictions can develop that are exacerbated by this constant
interaction. Once the taxpayer has come to view the agent/district level
as hostile and unreasonable, and the agent/district has come to view the
taxpayer as aggressive, deceptive and uncooperative, 3 1 the chance for
successful negotiation and resolution of complex issues is limited.'3 6 The
135. See, e.g., Eliot, supra note 68. Although rotation of auditors might ameliorate some
of the direct taxpayer-agent difficulties, there potentially is a serious learning curve issue.
Continued familiarity with a taxpayer, its industry and its reporting history can allow an agent
to develop an informed picture of a taxpayer.
136. See generally Lyons Sees APA Requests Accounting for Half of Competent
Authority's Case Load, 5 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. (BNA) 429, 429-30 (Nov. 27,
1996) (IRS Assistant Commissioner (International) observing that, for example, the district
and competent authority are "two very different institutions" with different objectives-with
the field's role being more adversarial as compared to competent authority's more "settlement
oriented" role); Scott Shaughnessy, U.S. APA ProgramOffers 'One-Stop Shopping,' II TAX
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appeals office, though distinct from the district audit function and
personnel,'37 still can have difficulty resolving transfer pricing issues
emerging from the audit. Often the posture of the issue, including the
size of the adjustment, the gap in the parties' numbers and the
recalcitrance of the participants at that point inhibits settlement at the
appeals level.'
The APA involves the National Office in the discussion at the
outset. This new participant not only acts on its own views and
authority, but it can also help mediate the views of the taxpayer and
district. In part, the National Office is able to do this because of the
absence of an intense one-on-one history with the taxpayer. Plus, its role
in the process begins before positions have become entrenched (a
problem experienced by appeals). In fact, where the focus is future
transactions, not only are positions not yet fixed, the actual subject
matter has yet to occur. ' As a result, the APA process attracts taxpayers
by granting the opportunity to sidestep or modify an unproductive
relationship at the district level and obtain a bit of a "fresh start.' ' 0
This impact of the APA process is borne out by comments of an
early APA participant. Immediately following the release of Rev. Proc.
91-22, Apple Computer Co. ("Apple") announced that it had completed
an APA regarding the sale of products to an Australian distribution
402, 403-04 (1995) (noting view of some practitioners that the field agents are
typically "more revenue-oriented than National Office [and] tend to be more exacting on
taxpayers with whom they have greater familiarity.").
137. See, e.g., Halphen & Bordeaux, supra note 43, at 662 ("Traditionally, each IRS
function has a strictly defined role: the Examination function [audit] is responsible for
identifying an audit issue and developing supporting facts and methods; Appeals is
responsible for exploring the range of a reasonable settlement given the strengths and
weaknesses of the case and hazards of litigation.").
138. See, e.g., Steven C. Wrappe, Advance Pricing Agreements: The IRS Rediscovers
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 1581, 1585-86 (1994) ("Sometimes a
large adjustment in the Notice (of Deficiency) assumes a life of its own and, regardless of the
merits, it becomes difficult for anyone at subsequent stages to take responsibility for 'giving
up' a substantial proposed deficiency." (quoting Thomas C. Durham)).
139. In substantively reaching the APAs, the up-front nature of the discussion enhances
the flexibility of the parties' positions because an in-hand dollar amount is not being
surrendered. See generally Durst, supra note 132, at 2 (noting that the up-front nature of the
APA process enhances the parties' flexibility in part because they still have the option to
change their business decisions). To the extent taxpayers gain by certainty, they are more
willing, as part of the process, to reveal more information to the government, which in turn
provides the government a more informed foundation on which to contemplate modifications
and changes to transfer pricing.
140. See, e.g., Shaughnessy, supra note 136 (quoting Deputy Associate Chief Counsel
International Benedetta Kissel that the "non-adversarial approach is at the core of the APA
Program."); Durst, supra note 132, at 3 (APAs are useful for "resolv[ing] an especially
contentious examination history (or the IRS field examiners may suggest to the taxpayer that
the program be used in this manner)").
NOTES INT'L

Winter 2000]

On the Frontierof ProceduralInnovation

subsidiary.' 4 ' According to Apple, the APA process was preferable to the
typical audit experience in which the Service selected only particular
related party transactions for adjustment-those that should be adjusted
in the U.S. favor. In addition, Apple expressed satisfaction with the
central role of the National Office in APAs, characterizing interactions
with "these higher level IRS personnel" as much better than those with
the "more antagonistic auditors.' 4' Another taxpayer, Hitachi Metals
America, turned to the APA program after its second "very contentious
audit"-Hitachi had been frustrated by the district's "unnecessary"
information requests, its factual positions, its large proposed adjustments
and its apparent interest in "horse trading.' 4 3
Although the personnel changes improved the government-taxpayer
relationship for transfer pricing, it may have come at a cost. A common
district reaction, at least at the outset, was that APA participants were
"deceiving" the National Office, which has much less familiarity than
the district with the taxpayer's detailed history and operations.'" This
concern (as well as an appreciation of the learning curve savings in time
and resources that the district can bring to the process) may have
prompted the Service to make the district a more formal and active45 part
of the National Office APA process in the 1996 updated procedure.'
Another source of concern regarding the participant changes is the
potential for manipulation of the process. Given that the district-taxpayer
relationship may be mutually strained, but that the APA process can be
initiated only by the taxpayer, strategic uses of the program may be
possible, leaving the district averse to the APA program. Again, the
1996 changes to the program may reflect sensitivity to this concern and
to the importance of having the districts as partners in a process in which
they are both up-front and tail-end (in the audit of the APA years)
participants. Furthermore, the introduction in late 1997 of a "program"
141. Eliot, supra note 68.
142. Id.; See also McLennan, supra note 28, at 437-38 (characterizing the APA staff of
the Chief Counsel's office as "generally more experienced and more knowledgeable than
revenue agents in the field"); E. Miller Williams, Jr., Basics of the U.S. Advance Pricing
Agreement Program, 13 TAX NOTES INT'L 723 (Aug. 26, 1996) (characterizing APA process
as less confrontational than audit and noting that the APA process (unlike audit with its
possible focus on the desired tax results) seeks to determine the correct methodology).
143. Hitachi Explains How Bilateral APA Resolved Decade of Audits, Years of
Outstanding Issues, 7 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 59 (June 3, 1998).
144. Cf John Turro, Apple Computer Readies for APA Replay, 5 TAX NOTES INT'L 278,
279 (Aug. 12, 1992) (noting view that field examiners "would be better able to verify the

company's [APA] submissions than the National Office personnel"); Kathleen Matthews,
Major U.S. Trading PartnersRespond to U.S Transfer Pricing Regulations," 94 TAX NOTES
INT'L 205-3 (Oct. 24, 1994) (taxpayer finding field role in APA process makes meeting
"more like an examination than a negotiation").
145. See Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12.
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that encourages field examiners to recommend appropriate taxpayers for
the APA process could have a balancing effect.'46
In addition, the involuntary nature of the taxpayer-government
relationship in traditional audit and litigation of transfer pricing
contributes to the difficulty in dispute resolution. Although most audits
are probably involuntary and negative from the taxpayer's perspective,
this element of the relationship may be even more crucial in a
substantive area such as transfer pricing which is already burdened with
other baggage (lack of information, significant uncertainty, and high
dollar amounts). A taxpayer resolving transfer pricing through the APA
program may be inclined to approach it with a different attitude because
it is a mutually beneficial interaction. Unlike the audit context, the
taxpayer comes forward and initiates the process in exchange for
certainty and the opportunity to influence the development of transfer
pricing.
For example, in global trading, which posed some potentially
unusual issues, the taxpayers that participated in the APA process
presumably had an impact on the way in which such transactions were
handled as reflected in Notice 94-40 and the subsequent global dealing
regulations. The Service, having chosen to establish the APA process,
similarly views it as a beneficial interaction for the reasons outlined
earlier,' 47 including the perceived administrative savings from reduced
controversies,1 8 the ability to gain more detailed information relevant to
improved transfer pricing guidance, and the opportunity to interact with
foreign governments in developing transfer pricing policies and fleshing
them out through concrete applications. The result is a more mutually
beneficial activity sought by both sides that requires the cooperation of
both to work. Emphasis on the "voluntary" nature of interaction with the
government in the APA process, as compared to audit, may seem
inconsistent with some of the reasons taxpayers are attracted to the APA
program. How can the APA be viewed as voluntary if taxpayers are
drawn to it because of a difficult current audit or because they anticipate
audit and double tax problems in the future and view the APA process
simply as a more cost effective package than audit, appeals and
litigation? Considered in this light, there is the unstated view that
resolving transfer pricing is not really an elective act of the taxpayer, but
146. "IRS Launches Program to Identify Likely APA Candidates at Beginning of
Audits," 6 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 331 (Oct. 1, 1997). See infra note 184.
147. Except in the case of some district offices that may view their participation in the
process as having their hand forced by the taxpayer who has the choice.
148. See, e.g., NONPAYMENT OF TAX, supra note 7, at 21-22 (for cases closed in fiscal
year 1993 and the first half of fiscal year 1994, the Service spent 1/3 of its total international
examiner time and much more of its economists' time on cases with an I.R.C. § 482 issue).
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rather something that must be accomplished in some forum. The
arguments about voluntariness and inevitability, however, are not
contradictory but rather target different concerns. The emphasis on
voluntariness and its effects on relationships can be understood as a
choice about the forum, when in many cases the use of some forum is
inevitable.
c. Limited Authority
To the extent that transfer pricing issues are difficult and involve
other countries, the district has somewhat limited opportunities for
creativity and flexibility. The APA program, however, introduces
participants (the National Office/APA team in the Chief Counsel's
Office) with a broader scope of authority than the district or appeals
levels. 4 9 This authority derives from a number of features, including the
administrative structure of authority in the Service and the ability to
draw upon treaties in reaching particular tax results.
As to structure, the National Office's mission is "to develop broad
nationwide policies and programs for the administration of the internal
revenue laws and related statutes, and to direct, guide, coordinate, and
control the endeavors of the Internal Revenue Service."'5 The Chief
Counsel for the IRS, who functions as part of the National Office, serves
as the chief legal advisor for the Service.' 5 ' The duties performed by the
Chief Counsel's Office include providing legal opinions, preparing
rulings and technical advice memoranda, and assisting litigation,
treaties, regulations, and recommendations for offers in compromise and
closing agreements.'5 2 Thus, the National Office, in part through the
activities of the Chief Counsel, provides the centralized tax law guidance

149. See infra note 153. Cf. McLennan, supra note 28 (GM former chief tax officer
characterizing IRS agents as more results oriented and revenue driven than the Chief
Counsel's Office).
150. Internal Revenue Service Manual (IRM) 1112.21; see also JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON RESTRUCTURING

THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ON

BRANCH GOVERNANCE AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT, JCX-44-97 (1997)
[hereinafter JT. STAFF DESCRIPTION].
151. Traditionally, the Chief Counsel has served under the direct authority of the
Department of Treasury. JT. STAFF DESCRIPTION, supra note 150. Under the IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, the Chief Counsel generally will now report directly
to the Commissioner. However, joint reporting to both the Commissioner and the General
Counsel for the Department of Treasury will be made with respect to (1)legal advice and
interpretation of the tax law not solely relating to tax policy, and (2) tax litigation. In the case
of legal advice or interpretation of tax law relating solely to tax policy, the Chief Counsel will
report to the General Counsel. See I.R.C. § 7803(b).
152. JT. STAFF DESCRIPTION, supra note 150; I.R.C. § 7803.
EXECUTIVE
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for Service personnel. 53' For example, the National Office (attorneys in
the Chief Counsel's Office) provide Field Service Advice Memoranda
("FSAs") in response to inquiries from these personnel. A major goal of
the FSAs is5 to
4 ensure "that field personnel apply the law correctly and
uniformly."
The National Office, as the locus of international negotiating power
in the Service, has been able to rely on treaty authority to achieve
resolutions in APAs that arguably are not available under current law. 5
(This feature of the tax system may strike some readers as inappropriate.
However, such a result should not be considered lawless; rather it
reflects the legal and practical relationship between the Internal Revenue
Code and tax treaties). In negotiating APAs on interbranch transactions,
the APA program in the National Office recognized the "existence" of
branches in a way that would have been constrained had only domestic
law (and not treaty authority) been available. For certain taxpayers,
especially banks and financial services entities that regularly engage in
business motivated interbranch transactions, the U.S. tax rules on
branches can produce unpredictable and uneconomic tax results. The
rules usually will not recognize interbranch transactions, that is,
transactions between branches or offices of a single legal entity such as a
corporation. The rationale is that a taxpayer cannot contract with itself.'
In an effort to circumvent this domestic tax treatment, some taxpayers
were thought to be using the APA process to obtain de facto recognition
of these transactions. Without specifically acknowledging this claim, the
Service announced in 1995 that it had completed its first cross border
interbranch APA."' The Service explained that it had relied on its
153. SALTZMAN, supra note 54, at 1-6, 1-10.
154. Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 609 (1997).
155. If the Service is deciding how to tax a given transaction it is supposed to follow the

existing statutory and regulatory regime (i.e. the Code and regulations). For example, in
issuing a letter ruling prior to a transaction, or taking a position in audit afterwards, the

Service is expected to rely on the tax rules in place. However, if the transaction is cross border
and involves more than one taxing authority, the picture changes. Thus, if after the transaction
conflict emerges between the two countries' tax treatment, they will attempt to resolve it
through the competent authority mechanism operating under the relevant tax treaty. In the
process of reaching resolution, the U.S. competent authority may have the discretion/authority
under the treaty to depart from the Code and thereby reach a result not strictly available under
existing domestic law. (Note that a treaty cannot be used "against" the taxpayer to produce a
result more adverse than that available under the Code.) In the APA process, the negotiation
and debate between the United States and other countries occurs prior to the transaction, but

because it takes place under the aegis of the tax treaty framework the same authority is
available to the Service in determining tax treatment.
156. See, e.g., Ring, supra note 88.
157. See id. at 668.
158. See First APA Covering Cross-Border Interbranch Bank Transactions Concluded,
1995 Daily Tax Rep. 45 G-1 (BNA 1995).
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authority under the mutual agreement provision of the relevant treaty to
provide a tax result not otherwise available under U.S. statutory law. The
Service issued this APA as soon as it concluded that it had the authority
under the treaty to recognize interbranch contracts, despite its inability to
do so under purely domestic law." 9 This is a paradigm of how the
National Office, which is the dominant governmental player in the APA
process, can bring more flexibility to the table than the district or appeals
offices in the audit/appeals process.
Related to the observations about the impact of the National Office's
authority, is the impact of the foreign governments' presence in the APA
process. The inability of the taxpayer and the district to bring the foreign
taxing authority to the table in the audit/appeals process means that the
U.S. audit of the taxpayer often takes place in the shadow of what is
happening or may happen in the other country. Although competent
authority is available to address potential issues of unresolved double
taxation, as noted earlier, the time frame for this involvement is long and
most importantly, it occurs ex post, typically as the last stage in
resolution of a cross border issue.' 6° Thus, the inclusion of the foreign
governments in the APA process dramatically impacts the dynamics of
the negotiation. As the percentage of requests involving bilateral or
multilateral APAs approaches 75% of total requests, the availability
of
6
foreign governments can improve cooperation and certainty.1 1
B. Evaluation
The changes wrought by the APA program significantly respond to
the two major administrative problems that bog down transfer pricing
review by the Service (i.e., uncertainty and difficult dispute resolutions).
In both areas the changes were fairly successful in improving
administrability, with some reservations. The degree of success
depended on the combined interaction of the changes. Although
159. Id. At the time this first APA was announced, the Service had ten interbranch
APAs pending, suggesting the importance of this issue and the flexible APA treatment. Id.
See generally "Practitioners Find Documentation Process for Interbranch Deals Difficult,

Tedious," 3

FINANCIAL PRODUCTS REPORT

986 (Jan. 16, 1998) (noting that taxpayers,

particularly bankers, turn to the APA process to cope with interbranch financial product
transactions to have them recognized for tax purposes). The proposed global dealing

regulations (issued in March 1998) provide some more generally accessible relief from this
failure to recognize interbranch contracts. See generally Yaron Z. Reich et al., ProposedRegs
on GlobalDealing Operations, 78 TAX NOTES 1689 (1998).
160. See, e.g., International Issue Resolution Through Competent Authority Process, 64
TAX NOTES 657, 661 (1994) (noting the competent authority process has been criticized for its
slow pace and that in 1990 the average process time was about three and a half years,
although it has since been reduced).
161. See Record High, supra note 110, at G-1.
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individually the changes would have been insufficient (as suggested
earlier, "certainty" with the United States, though helpful, is of limited
value for taxpayers facing other, active taxing jurisdictions), in
combination they created a more administrable path for transfer pricing.
1. Hybrid Nature of APA Program
How the combination of these changes worked can be understood by
seeing the APA program as a hybrid of administrative actions that
traditionally were either ex ante functions (specifying rules applicable to
taxpayers up-front) or ex post functions (formalizing tax treatment,
providing certainty to individual taxpayers and negotiating with foreign
governments). In contemplating the design of the APA program the
Service did not limit consideration to the existing patterns of Service
interactions with taxpayers. Changes included not just isolated
modifications, but also expansive, interactive decisions that together
substantially reshaped the Service's approach. For example, changes in
timing that provided government interaction before the transaction were
needed for improved certainty. The new structure also required the
involvement of foreign countries and of officials with sufficient
authority to craft more creative results. Thus, success hinged on a
mechanism that, in a single procedure, reordered the taxpayer's
relationship with both the Service and the foreign country.
Although transfer pricing issues frequently rise to the level of direct
clashes between countries over pricing, the actual multilateral
discussions typically occur only ex post. Ex ante, the countries operate
individually to develop and implement their rules; taxpayers confront
each country separately.' 62 It is only ex post, and more specifically after

audit and domestic resolution, that the interaction of the two (or more)
countries' tax systems on the transaction are fully evaluated. The APA
process, as a hybrid, eliminates the separation and brings the multilateral
discussion into the planning stage where the various advantages outlined
above are enjoyed. This package of changes would not have been
possible if the Service had been constrained to follow the existing
patterns of ex ante and ex post involvement with taxpayers. However,
this hybrid nature produces not only the core of the APA procedure's
success in administrability, but also the seeds of its problems (both
perceived and real), particularly for nonparticipants as explored below in
Part IV.

162. Of course general international dialogue through organizations such as the OECD
do produce serious discussions. See, e.g., COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, ORG. FOR EcON. COOP.
AND DEV., TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINAT'L ENTER.

(1979).
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Translation of this picture of the APA program into the language
and framework of administrative law can offer insights from that
discipline. The traditional administrative law analysis begins with the63
division of administrative functions into rulemaking and adjudication.1
Although it is widely acknowledged that the line between the two is not
solid,' 64 the division provides a rubric for assigning tasks,
responsibilities, power, and limits to agency actions. Appropriate agency
activity usually can be placed in one of the categories. A variety of
factors distinguish rulemaking from adjudication. In all cases these
factors are only general tendencies, not absolute descriptions.' One of
course is the "timing" of the administrative action's effect-does it
impact past or future events (a version of the ex ante/ex post
observation). 66 Others include that rulemaking: (1) focuses on the
6
general
of stand. 168•rather than the specific,1 (2) entails the elaboration
16
69
dards, (3) is generally publicly stated and accessible,' (4) allows
broad participation in its creation,7 (5) is usually more binding on the
agency,' 7 ' and (6) is more likely to come72 from higher authority (at least
compared to initial adjudicatory action).'
Measured against this basic framework, the APA program is
problematic because it defies straightforward categorization. The very
features that contributed to the APA program's hybrid format create this
unorthodox picture. The primary concern with this uneasy classification
is that the checks and constraints of the standard rulemaking/
163. See, e.g., Ralph F. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARV. L.
259, 259 (1938) (identifying rulemaking and administrative adjudication as the "primary
categories in the study of administrative law").
164. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the
Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 924 n.7 (1965) (noting
critiques of the "rulemaking-adjudication dichotomy" on the grounds that it operates on the
assumption that "clear lines can be drawn").
165. See, e.g., id. at 930-42 (outlining certain characteristics of rulemaking, but
observing the ways in which adjudicatory proceedings can reflect the same qualities).
166. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1994) (the Administrative Procedures Act defines a
rule as "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and
future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy..."). See generally
Frederick Schauer, A Brief Note on the Logic of Rules with Special Reference to Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 447 (1990) (examining the meaning and
role of rules); Fuchs, supra note 163, at 260.
167. See Schauer, supra note 166, at 450-52; see also Fuchs, supra note 163, at 263; see
also Freeman, supra note 1, at 14.
168. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 164, at 926-27.
169. Cf. id. at 940-41.
170. See, e.g., id. at 930-31.
171. See, e.g., id. at 926.
172. See generally supra text accompanying note 153 for discussion of the National
Office role.
REV.
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adjudication dichotomy are absent, leaving agency discretion
unrestricted. The importance and consequences of controlling agency
discretion through the rulemaking/adjudication distinction are pursued in
greater detail in Part IV. For the present, it is useful to note that the APA
program's case by case approach, the absence of extensive explication of
standards, the degree of nondisclosure, the limited range of participants
(i.e. only one taxpayer per APA), and the implicit expectation of
flexibility for the Service to change its position with later taxpayers,
point towards an adjudicatory classification. However, the APA's
guarantee up-front of specific tax treatments for future transactions and
the high level of Service personnel involved demonstrate core
rulemaking qualities. Changing these features of the APA program to
align more closely with traditional rulemaking or adjudication would
likely impair its function and "success". The question, therefore, is how
much flexibility should be permitted on the rulemaking/adjudication
pattern? Parts IV and V explore the effects of granting agencies some
opportunity to work outside of the standard framework.
The ex ante nature of the APA program features prominently in Part
IV's critique from a tax system implementation perspective and in Part
V's analysis from an administrative law perspective. Nonetheless, it is
important to be clear that the APA program's success in ameliorating the
structural and procedural problems of transfer pricing was not due
simply to the program's ex ante nature. As indicated by the changes
described above, both the timing and the type of government interaction
were critical. As to timing, the ex ante aspect eliminates taxpayer
concerns about penalties and documentation, provides the government
with more detail on taxpayer business, and facilitates coordination with
other governments because immediate dollars are not at stake. An ex
post format, even an informal one such as arbitration, might not achieve
the same benefits as the APA program in terms of attracting foreign
countries. While it is not impossible to imagine other countries agreeing
to participate in such transfer pricing arbitration, it could nonetheless be
difficult to implement bilateral arbitration. Part of what the countries are
achieving in the APA process is some level of agreement on transfer
pricing rules. It might, therefore, be hard to provide arbitrators with an
agreed set of rules without the parties themselves actually conducting
negotiations.
As to the type of interaction, the informality of the APA negotiation
process contributes to the program's success. That the parties have the
flexibility to examine the transactions and develop bilaterally acceptable
treatment is both a draw and a key to achieving resolution. A rigid
process, even if ex ante, would be unlikely to deliver comparable
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success, because it would limit the parties' (including the U.S.' and
foreign governments') opportunity to modify, refine, and develop their
transfer pricing practices in an interactive setting.
2. Parallels to Other Regulatory Reform
Comparison here of the APA program to recent developments in the
environmental area highlights common problems that both regimes
sought to solve through procedural innovations. Like transfer pricing,
environmental regulation (which classically operated from a command
and control structure)'73 has suffered from a number of limitations. The
central planning approach fails to gather enough information to help
design responses sufficiently sensitive to a range of environmental and
business situations. 4 Data gathering is also impeded by distrust of
government and the lack of incentives for industry to share information
or openly participate with the government.' The complexities of some
environmental issues such as the cleanup programs17 have led to high
transaction costs in determining liabilities and remedies. Moreover, the
scale of liability in these cases significantly raises the stakes for the
parties. 77 Finally, the international implications of environmental
regulatory
action in the United States have increased with global
•
•
178
integration. As difficult as a rigid command and control approach may

173. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing
Paradigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585, 585-87 (1996) [hereinafter Paradigm](describing the
centralized, rigid, and uniform approach to regulation); Richard B. Stewart, Models for
Environmental Regulation: Central Planning Versus Market-Based Approaches, 19 B.C.
ENVTL. AlT. L. REv. 547, 551 (1992) [hereinafter Models] (the command and control
approach has "produced uniform, inflexible standards that result in high compliance costs,
restrict innovation, discourage efficient use of resources, and require detailed central planning
of economic activity."); Sunstein, supra note 1, at 627 ("[a] large source of regulatory failure
in the United States is the use of rigid, highly bureaucratized 'command-and-control'
regulation.").
174. See Stewart, Paradigmsupra note 173, at 587. See also Sunstein, supra note 1, at
627 (a major factor in regulatory failure in fields such as environment protection is the "rigid,
highly bureaucratic 'command-and-control' regulation ... [and] programs [that] dictate
national control strategies for hundreds, thousands, or even millions of companies and
individuals in an exceptionally diverse nation")..
175. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 1, at 70 (to the extent regulatory negotiations are
viewed as a zero-sum exercise, granting the government more open access to business and
operating information is considered "crazy"). A separate incentive question frequently
surfaces in environmental regulation discussion-the issue of whether particular modes of
regulation encourage or discourage industry from developing better technologies such as
pollution controls. See, e.g., Stewart, Paradigm,supra note 173, at 589.
176. See, e.g., id. at 590 (discussing the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA")).
177. See id.
178. See id. at 595.
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be on the domestic front, its failure internationally is magnified. Many of
these enumerated environmental regulatory problems parallel those in
transfer pricing (e.g. role of facts, reliance on generalized regulations for
diverse circumstances, high stakes, high transaction costs, absence of
incentives to disclose information to the government, importance of
international coordination with growing cross border volume).
Significant differences do remain. Environmental regulation, like
other health and safety fields, represents an intervention by the
government into market practices. As a result, justifications for such
intervention, and assessment of its success often rely in part on market
based terminology and comparisons.'79 For example, critiques of
environmental regulation often focus on inefficiencies created where a
regulation designed to mitigate some market failure ultimately costs
more than the initial harm. Reform efforts here challenge "command and
control" regulation and tout the benefits of a "presumption in favor of
flexible, market-oriented, incentive-based regulatory strategies."'80
Environmental regulation also differs from transfer pricing in that it has
a wider immediate audience. More parties perceive a direct impact from
environmental regulation. Not only is the regulated entity deeply
concerned, but the "community" facing the environmental risk may be
as well. In contrast, although the taxpayer views its transfer pricing
problem as material, the broader public lacks a clearly defined role.
Despite these differences in market orientation and scope of
participants, the significant operational similarities in the two fields have
led to the development of related innovations such as the focus on
redefining the parties' interactions to create a more successful process.
On the negative side, as considered further in Parts IV and V, the turn
toward procedural improvements produced parallel difficulty in
measuring quality and value beyond the assessment of functional and
operational success."'

179. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 1, at 4 (agencies whose main purpose is redistributive
and lack a market counterpart, e.g., Social Security Administration or the Internal Revenue
Service, differ in part from those whose work is to modify behavior that would otherwise be
produced by the market); Sunstein, supra note 1,at 618-19 (describing value and importance
of private markets but outlining market failures that justify social regulation).
180. Sunstein, supra note 1,at 633. See also Stewart, Models, supra note 173, at 547
("As the high cost and limited effectiveness of [command-and-control] tools has become more

evident, the United States has begun shifting to the use of market-based incentives in its
environmental policies.").
181. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L. J. 1255 (1997).
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3. Further Questions on the APA Program's Effectiveness
However, understanding the critical ways in which the APA
program confronted the sticking points of transfer pricing and comparing
them to choices made in other fields is only part of the inquiry into
effectiveness. Several other significant questions remain. The first
concerns the degree of impact of the program-its actual significance.
The portion of transfer pricing business funneled through the program is
small. Although the program draws large multinationals, the total
number participating is only a fraction. Moreover, even though the
agreements may cover a high dollar segment of the participating
multinational's business, it typically does not cover all of that taxpayer's
transfer pricing. Whether this level of volume should influence the
perception of the program's success depends on its goals, short and long
term. Allowing the program to serve as a pressure valve for taxpayers
facing serious problems (e.g., audit relations, double taxation or
predictability in light of penalties) may be acceptable if the program can
ultimately improve transfer pricing generally. Clearly, that has been an
explicit goal of the Service-to provide better transfer pricing guidance
in formats available to all taxpayers. As discussed in Part IV, there has
been limited success to date on that front.
Alternatively, even if the program encompasses an increasing
number of taxpayers and transfer pricing business, through expansion of
Service personnel and growing taxpayer interest, does it justify the
government's expenditure of resources in running the program? Such a
question, which calls for comparisons and projections of the expenditure
of resources in audit and in the APA program, is the next logical
empirical inquiry if it is established that the program is useful and
working on other dimensions.
The second area of concern regards the procedural fairness of the
process. Resource allocation aside, does the creation of this alternative
path pose problems of fair and equitable treatment of taxpayers
regardless of the method of dispute resolution selected? Part IV
examines this question in greater detail and offers suggestions on what
features are critical to ensure a level of procedural equity. However, the
focus in Parts III and IV on different aspects of the procedural impact of
the program should not completely overshadow the question of the
substantive nature and quality of APA outcomes.
Certainly the design and focus of the APA program was a direct
response to a number of procedural and structural problems with the
baseline system for handling transfer pricing. Thus, the initial
measurements of success look to whether the changes effectively
respond to those procedural and structural problems, and whether they
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generate any new ones. Nonetheless, procedural changes can have an
equally powerful impact on the substantive soundness of outcomes. As
noted, one hope for the program has been that a deeper understanding of
taxpayer businesses and transactions could help the Service design better
transfer pricing treatments. But evaluation of the actual substantive APA
results turns on data not publicly available at present, although the
prospect of annual APA program reports improves the chances for future
study. Unfortunately, to determine whether the APA process is having a
negative impact on substantive outcomes, as compared to results
obtained through non APA channels, requires audit data that is even less
likely to be publicly available.
A third set of concerns involves the question of abuse and strategic
behavior in the APA process-in particular the bargaining strength of
the parties and the taxpayers' powers of self selection. As to bargaining
power, if the Service has been unsuccessful in litigating transfer pricing
cases, why would a taxpayer agree to participate in the program without
being guaranteed a good deal? That is, what kind of bargaining power
can the Service have in the program?
Despite its historical problems in litigation, the Service's position in
the APA program is considerably stronger for several reasons. First, the
new documentation requirements and penalties for improper transfer
pricing ' raise the stakes for taxpayers-because the price of losing,
even if unlikely, is much higher. Second, the intensified attention by
foreign governments' to transfer pricing increases the possibility of
double taxation. Third, for taxpayers in more unchartered territory, such
as global dealing and for which existing rules work poorly from an
economic perspective,"' the prospect of reaching an initial agreement
with the Service may be more appealing. Finally, the costs of audit and
litigation, even if successful, may be significant and worth eliminating.
In terms of strategic possibilities for taxpayers, they certainly exist.
By virtue of being a voluntary program for taxpayers, presumably
participants and nonparticipants self select to be in the most individually
favorable category. Thus, for example, a taxpayer who is willing to take
an aggressive transfer pricing position and who believes audit can be
avoided, will not enter the APA program. Conversely, taxpayers
displeased with audit prospects (whether because of relations with the
district, challenges from other countries, or details of the domestic law)
will opt to enter the program. Such is the nature of any voluntary
program with the government. Whether it ultimately poses a problem
182. See I.R.C. §§ 6038A, 6662.
183. See Ring, supra note 88.
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depends on how much the government benefits from the participating
taxpayers, and the government's ability to maintain some serious audit
pressure on nonparticipants.
In addition to the prospect of taxpayer self-selection for the program,
is the possibility of taxpayers manipulating unduly favorable
agreements. For example, if a taxpayer who has negotiated one or more
APAs for its various businesses finds one of the APAs to be very
favorable, it might seek to divert a large portion of business through the
entity with the good APA. The degree to which such a strategy could be
pursued is limited. For an APA to remain valid, various assumptions
about the business, economic environment and transactions must
continue to be true. Thus, while the business volume in the favored
entity could be expanded, it would not be possible to channel other
activities through that entity and receive the APA coverage. Moreover,
the term of an APA is restricted, typically to three years. The upside is
that any Service mistakes have a finite duration. The negative is that
renegotiations are required to extend the coverage of an expiring
agreement, although the scope and depth of such discussion can vary
significantly.
The conclusion at this stage is that the APA program as a procedural
response to a problem of tax administration has been relatively effective
in its direct application as measured by taxpayer and government
participation in a process that achieves resolution and furthers
international dialogue. Assessment of particular substantive effects
requires further information. However, the procedural and administrative
analysis does not end with the investigation of the APA program's
internal dynamics. Instead, the consequences of this procedural
development for nonparticipants, and for the quality of the tax system
generally, must also be scrutinized.
IV. EFFECT OF THE APA PROGRAM ON NONPARTICIPANTS:
THE SILENT PIECE OF THE PROCEDURAL HYBRID

The pervasive sense of frustration and failure with respect to transfer
pricing motivated the creation of the APA program. The three major
changes described in Part III were successful in improving the function
and administrability of the system for direct participants. As a result, the
tax system has an alternative dispute resolution path for transfer pricing
that seems to work for some taxpayers facing difficulty in the traditional
audit, appeal, litigation route.
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The question considered here is the impact of the program on
nonparticipants and the secondary effects of this alternative procedure
on the tax system. For taxpayers who have transfer pricing issues but are
not involved in the APA process two major areas of concern emerge:
access/participation and results. In the course of examining these
concerns, a third interrelated issue, disclosure, emerges as central in both
potential problems and solutions for nonparticipants. Thus, this Part first
considers the nature of access to and participation in the APA program.
Second, it explores the question of comparability of results between
APA and non-APA paths. Finally, drawing upon some of the
complications identified for participation and results, this Part examines
the contours of the APA program's disclosure policy in an effort to
reconcile the program's treatment of participants and nonparticipants.
Ultimately, the APA program is part of a broader tax system that
must operate and be analyzed as a whole. No one piece functions
independently. Therefore a new procedure's impact on those not opting
for it can be just as significant as its direct effects, in terms of evaluating
the success or merits of the procedure. The criteria for evaluating the
"success" or "usefulness" of the APA program become more complex
when the ramifications of the program for the tax system and
nonparticipants are taken into account. In that area, more of the tradeoffs
of the program emerge-and measuring them turns on several criteria
including horizontal equity; "correctness" of rulemaking; fostering of
international cooperation; and transparency of process. None of these
goals or criteria is paramount or exclusive. Different criteria have more
or less salience for the various issues raised here in Part IV.
A. Taxpayer Access and Participation

To the extent the APA program represents a partial remedy to
problems faced by taxpayers with transfer pricing issues, a significant
question is who can participate (i.e., are there limits on access and
participation)? As an initial matter, however, the general topic of
"taxpayer access" to the APA program cannot be taken literally. In
theory, any taxpayer with a transfer pricing problem can approach the
APA office with a request for either a unilateral or bilateral/multilateral
APA. In fact, the entire program has a strong element of taxpayer control
and electivity because only the taxpayer can initiate the procedure.
Hence the APA program serves as the taxpayer's trump card in
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interactions at the district level because the Service cannot force the
taxpayer into the process.114
The first problem of participation and access emerges from the
profile of who seeks an APA. "Profile" reflects an assessment of motive,
as well as a description of key taxpayer characteristics such as size,
country of origin and industry. Approximately 187 APA applications are
pending, and almost 75% are for bilateral or multilateral APAs.' 8' An
initial observation from the profile statistics is that larger multinationals
are seeking APAs, even though both large and small businesses face
serious transfer pricing problems.'8 6 That is, taxpayer size relates to who
gets an APA. Although the existence of APAs is presumably
advantageous to taxpayers generally (because they have the option to
decide if, when, and for what issues to pursue one), in practice smaller
taxpayers have lacked that option because of cost. Regardless of
company size, the cost of pursuing an APA is not trivial.' As outlined
earlier, however, APAs can be less expensive than the alternative of
audit, appeal and litigation. In assessing this cost savings, however, a
taxpayer must consider the probability of audit as well as the probability
that the transfer pricing issue will be identified. Larger companies are
more likely to view audit as inevitable, and thus more likely to find the
savings attractive. 88' In addition, to the extent the total cost of an APA is
184. One counterpoint is the early referral program initiated Oct. 1, 1997 through which
the Service's district offices seek to identify taxpayers who have a transfer pricing issue in
audit that may be appropriate for an APA. See Rev. Proc. 96-9, 1996-1 C.B. 575. The
decision whether to pursue an APA remains with the taxpayer, and few have chosen that path.
See Albertina M. Fernhndez, Use of Secret Comparables Goes Against Nature of APAs,
Official Says, 79 TAX NOTES 1233 (June 8, 1998) (quoting APA Program Director Richard
Barrett on the very limited taxpayer response to the early referral program); IRS Concludes
First Cost Sharing APA with Low Buy-In as Prime Issue, Barrett Says, 8 TAX MGMT
TRANSFER PRICING REP. 571 (1999) (only two taxpayers thus far have sought an APA via the
early referral program). That said, the picture is more complex because some taxpayers may
find themselves "compelled" to pursue an APA, while others may find they face practical
barriers to presenting an APA request. For example, a history of troubled transfer pricing
audits or transactions in foreign countries that actively pursue transfer pricing could lead a
taxpayer to feel compelled to pursue an APA. See supra note 105.
185. See Record High, supra note 110, at G- 1..
186. See e.g., I.R.S. Notice 98-10, 1998-6 I.R.B. 9 (noting that small business taxpayers
were not participating in the APA'program to the same extent as large taxpayers, at least in
part due to cost).
187. Even though the government fee for filing an APA application is calculated on a
progressive fee schedule, the other costs including lawyer and accountant fees, expert reports,
as well as internal resources devoted to the process are not so easily scaled.
188. Large corporations (those with more than $10 million in gross assets) are divided
into two groups for purposes of audit. Corporations with assets exceeding $250 million are
audited under the Coordinated Examination Program; the others under the general audit
program. See SALTZMAN, supra note 54, at 58-15 to 58-19. The "inevitability" of audit,
however, is not a guarantee that a particular issue will be spotted. Also, in some cases, the fact
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not directly related to taxpayer or issue size, larger taxpayers can absorb
the cost more easily.' This constitutes a participation concern because
there appears to be no policy intent to limit access to larger taxpayers,
thereby disadvantaging smaller ones where the two are competitors.i
That is, differential participation poses concerns for horizontal equity to
the extent that there seems no relevant distinction between larger and
smaller taxpayers. Although it might be argued that smaller taxpayers
would be less likely than larger ones to have the resources to swamp the
Service in a transfer pricing audit and would be more willing to pursue
an APA, the costs of the APA process can be significant enough to
discourage their participation.
The initial structure of the APA program offered no remedy for this
access and participation concern. The 1996 revised procedure introduced
a sliding scale user fee, but that only mitigated the direct government fee
for the procedure and not the more costly advisor fees and internal
resource allocations.' 9' The Service, however, expressed concern for
small taxpayer participation,'92 and recently initiated a more streamlined
track for certain small businesses.'93 Although this formal response to the
participation problem is important, its limited scope must be noted. At
present, the new track is available only for certain types of transfer
pricing issues (the ones perhaps more likely to need in depth

that the APA costs are certain and must be incurred today makes it more difficult for a
corporation's tax department to convince management to allocate the funds needed to pursue
the APA-even when a best estimate cost comparison (including time discount) favors the
APA process.
189. See e.g., Timothy W. Cox, Australian Tax Office Releases Draft Ruling on
Advance PricingAgreements, 9 TAX NOTES INT'L 1279 (Oct. 24, 1994) (noting that although
the APA process provides certainty and eliminates double tax, it may not be cost effective for
small businesses).
190. Arguably, this concern about small taxpayers is neither new nor unique; taxpayers
with more resources often may have more options and more success in the tax system.
However, it may be more important where the resource question directly impacts the
taxpayer's opportunity to participate in a procedure which itself is the response to a
problematic area of taxafion.
191. See Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12.
192. The Service has indicated for some time that it was aware of the burdens of the
process on smaller taxpayers, and was contemplating ways in which to address it. See, e.g.,
Kathleen Matthews, U.S. Branch IFA Meeting Highlights Cross-Border Corporate
Reshufflings, Tax Treaties, APAs, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 776 (March 21, 1994) (then-APA
director Robert Ackerman noting Service's interest in developing "truncated" APA guidelines
for small taxpayers, those with $100 million or less in sales); I.R.S. Notice 98-10, supra note
186 (inviting comment regarding a special APA process for small taxpayers). See also Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-IT (1994) (the 1993 temporary regulations contained a safe harbor for
small taxpayers which did not appear in the final regulations because of problems with its
application).
193. See I.R.S. Notice 98-10, supra note 186.
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evaluation-intangibles).1 4 The Service's reluctance to expand the track
is understandable in a large dollar subject like transfer pricing; perhaps
the Service's indication that flexibility may be considered on a case by
case basis reflects a compromise for developing a broader small taxpayer
track.'"95
The second access problem concerns whether differential
participation
the APA process creates advantages for certain members
• in196
of an industry. If, within a given industry, some taxpayers seek APAs
and other do not (and we might even assume that it is disproportionately
the larger taxpayers which are seeking them), will the former taxpayers
derive some competitive advantage over their non-APA seeking
counterparts? For example, if the conclusions reached in APA
negotiations with taxpayer A are not disclosed or are disclosed in a fairly
limited form, then taxpayer B who does not seek an APA may receive
different treatment than taxpayer A through the process of audit, appeal
and litigation. That is, taxpayer B may not get the same rule.' 97 Or,
taxpayer B may find itself receiving the treatment granted taxpayer A
without the opportunity to fully debate the appropriateness of its
application, as taxpayer A did in the APA negotiations. The differences
could have an important competitive impact if the transfer pricing issues
involve large sums, seriously affect business structure, or carry interest
and penalties. If taxpayer B could have sought an APA but simply chose
not to, the subsequent discrepancies might not imply unfairness. But, if
we believe that taxpayer B may have valid reasons for not pursuing an
APA (e.g., cost, limited internal resources, 19 operations in a nontreaty
country'99), then we may be particularly concerned about different
outcomes.

194. See id. ("Transactions involving non-routine intangibles ...would not ordinarily
be amenable to such special procedures ...
195. See, e.g., id. at para. 7.
196. See, Stratton, supra note 58, at 139-40 (former Treasury International Tax Counsel

Stephen Shay voicing concern over the absence of disclosure with APAs because for
taxpayers competing in the same industry, the APA program "should not be a point to provide

a competitive advantage over another company.").
197. As discussed in greater detail in the following section, results can vary for different
reasons, and the reasons why they vary are important. See infra Part IV.B.1. Inappropriate
variation will be most harmful within the same industry because of the competitive impact of
taxes.
198. Pursuing an APA requires resources from the corporation itself in terms of
gathering and organizing information, and negotiating. If the company faces other demands
on its time and resources, an APA may not be realistic.
. 199. See Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12, at § 7.01 ("bilateral or multilateral APAs
generally are preferable... when competent authority procedures are available with respect to

the foreign country or countries involved"). In the absence of a treaty and the corresponding
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How do we evaluate this aspect of participation? Unlike the above
discussion which focused on the affirmative opportunity to participate
and the elimination of unjustified2°° barriers to participation, this view of
"participation" includes more than a direct role in the procedure. It
includes access to the developments of the administrative process-the
new rules, approaches and interpretations emerging from the APA
program. One way of stating the problem envisioned here is that because
of the hybrid nature of the APA program, a taxpayer that does not use
the procedure to resolve a transfer pricing issue runs not only the risk of
having a different "process" to resolve the issue but also of having a
different rule applied. This fear, which arguably could exist across the
board because taxpayers' ultimate tax treatments are rarely made public,
is fueled by the possibility for creating "private law" through the APA
program.
As outlined above in Part III, an administrative regime like the tax
system has both rulemaking and adjudication functions, although the
degree of difference between the two is debated."20 ' While
acknowledging the fluidity between the two categories, attention should
be directed to one of the traditional differences, timing.0 2 The
rulemaking function is an ex ante interaction in that it refers to
identifying rules to which taxpayers will be held in their future
transactions. In an open legal system, this kind of interaction or function
should be uniform, consistent and visible; taxpayers should face the
same rules up-front, before engaging in their transactions. Even if results
vary, which they will for a variety of reasons, 203 a taxpayer's risk
regarding potential tax treatment should be the same, so that the
government is not inappropriately favoring one taxpayer over another. In

competent authority mechanism, the APA program lacks an avenue of interaction with
another country to produce an APA.
200. A justified barrier would, for example, be one that requires taxpayers to explain
their business and identify their competitors. A taxpayer not wanting to share any information
in the procedure would not have a valid claim that its participation was unfairly limited.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 163-72. See, e.g., Fuchs, supra note 163, at
260-65 (discussing the difficulty in drawing distinctions between rulemaking/legislation and
adjudication).
202. See supra text accompanying note 166. See, e.g., Fuchs, supra note 163, at 260-61
(noting partial reliance on the distinction that rulemaking concerns the future where as
adjudication affects past or present events and relies on past facts).
203. Although both taxpayers entered into their transactions "knowing the rule to be
applied," the non-APA participant's final treatment might differ from the APA participant's
because of several factors endemic to the ex post dispute resolution process (including
taxpayer/district dynamic; large dollar gaps to negotiate; litigation risk; and view of foreign
country), which are handled differently in the APA process. The importance of why results
could be substantially different is considered in detail, infra Part IV.B.
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terms of "similar''2°4 taxpayers, there is no reason that this standard
cannot be met. Moreover, there is a value to fair process independent of
actual results. The fact that rules can be developed through traditional
adjudicatory proceedings, or that particular problems or cases can be
resolved by a new rule, does not undermine the importance of the ex
ante/ex post distinction in this context. The distinction and focus are not
on rulemaking v. case resolution per se, but on the degree of risk or
certainty possessed by the taxpayer
at201the time of the transaction, and the
.. •
..
nature of the government interaction.
The other basic function, adjudication, is an ex post interaction
typically occurring after the taxpayer has engaged in the transaction
under consideration (e.g., in audit). The important aspect of this function
here is to produce results. The results themselves need not be the same
because the "application" process (unlike ex ante) usually does not
involve "comparable" cases-questions of litigation risk, proof and
specific facts come into play. Of course, "new" rules or interpretations
may emerge from the process. That, however, should pose no problem
given the uniform ex ante risk faced by all taxpayers. Moreover, a
pricing conclusion reached after the fact, perhaps at the appeals level
where litigation risk and offsetting issues are relevant, would be of
somewhat lesser planning value for other taxpayers .206
Although many actions reasonably may be classified as ex ante or ex
post, the APA procedure is a hybrid that fits neither.20 7 Relative to the

actual occurrence of covered future transactions, the procedure seems ex
ante and calls for clear, established rules applicable to all. The procedure
is also ex post in that it specifies final treatment (assuming taxpayer
compliance with the agreement's terms) and thus is more context
specific. The hybrid nature of the APA program means that concerns
about the impact on nonparticipants are especially poigniant. To the

204. The analysis here assumes that one can identify sufficiently similar taxpayers for
whom the tax system would seek to provide similar rules.
205. An initial criticism of these stated benefits of ex ante rule consistency questions
what the real value is if taxpayers (and administrators) can both realistically predict that
taxpayers with more resources can obtain (through the progress of audit, appeal and litigation)

results substantially different from those that taxpayers with fewer resources can obtain. This
challenge to the significance of ex ante rule consistency stands independent of the existence of
the APA program. The response turns on the role of risk. While additional resources might
improve a taxpayer's chance of a successful outcome in a dispute with the Service, it is by no
means guaranteed (and most certainly is not the tax system's goal). Even that taxpayer bears
the risk of undesired tax treatment.
206. This point is part of a larger and much more complicated consideration of the role
of disclosure in the APA program and the tax system more generally. These issues are
explored in greater detail in section B below.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 165-72.
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extent a taxpayer engaging in the APA process obtains certainty about
the rules to be applied to its transfer pricing, and to the extent such rules
may differ from those clearly available to non APA participants, valid
cause for concern exists. The APA participants would be obtaining a
different rule, but with certainty and in advance of committing to the
actual transactions-essentially a form of private law.
Where does this observation lead? It points to the questions
addressed in the following two sections: results and disclosure. A
taxpayer is ultimately concerned about its final tax treatment, the actual
results it obtains. Depending on the comparability of transfer pricing
results for APA participants and nonparticipants, we may be more
comfortable about the degree of access to "new" rules. More generally,
adequate disclosure of APA terms would help eliminate the veil that
leaves nonparticipants (including taxpayers, Congress, and academics)
uninformed about the new developments in the APA process.
B. Results and Comparabilityin APA Process
Both as a tool for evaluating participation and as an independent
concern, comparability in APA and non-APA results is critical.08 Simply
stated, the expectation here is that APA results should be comparable
(i.e., a taxpayer should not be treated better or receive more favorable
tax treatment simply because it used the APA process-the "private
law" concern). However, an assessment of the comparability of results
depends on understanding why results differ, and deciding whether the
reasons they differ are appropriate. The question of results turns out to
be complicated and reflects more than a debate over literal results. As
suggested below, the use of the term "results" can be misleading as
different observers may have different points in mind.
Before undertaking the inquiry two caveats must be noted. First, any
analysis here is impaired by the absence of full information and the lack
of data on a wide range of taxpayers and disputes. Moreover, even if
APAs were substantially disclosed we would still need detailed
information about other taxpayers' treatment in audit and appeals to
complete the study. Such information, however, is unlikely to be made
publicly available in the near future. Second, the focus on results should
not be taken to mean that there is a single correct tax treatment or tax
due. Rather, it reflects the view that if certain premises are made in the

208. See, e.g., Stratton, supra note 58, at 139-40 (former Treasury International Tax
Counsel Stephen Shay expressing concern that different taxpayers may be receiving different
treatment through the APA process).
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substantive tax law, then certain outcomes are sensible and plausible,
and others are not.
1. Appropriate Reasons for Varying Results
Most comparisons of APA and non-APA results should reveal
differences, but due to appropriate factors. This section identifies a
number of significant but valid reasons for difference. The question then
remains, what potential concerns linger?
The first reason results can appropriately differ is that the
comparison is one of results received at different stages which have
different roles and constraints. Thus, a comparison of APA results and
audit (i.e., exam level) results must recognize exam's focus on
identifying adjustments. Litigation risk may not be factored in at this
stage. However, the expectation that appeals will be assessing litigation
risk may push audit to produce a higher assessment to be negotiated and
compromised later. 20 9 The interaction between taxpayer and Service at
this level, while not uniform, is structurally more adversarial than others.
Additionally, an audit's duty is to find adjustments, it needs to justify
time spent reviewing a taxpayer, and it is rewarded for passing on big
dollar adjustments to appeals, which means differences should be
expected.2 ° Thus, APA results are not likely to equal those provided by
audit.
Even the appeals stage is not the right point of comparison for an
APA. Although appeals does consider litigation risk, and is the stage at
which the taxpayer and Service explicitly negotiate and compromise, the
results obtained at this level do not incorporate the views and positions
of the other country or countries involved. That is the province of the
competent authority proceeding. In addition, if an audit position is
particularly extreme, then even subsequent appeals and competent
authority negotiations may fail to bring the results back to the "more
appropriate" point because of the practical constraints on appeals in

209. For example, for fiscal year 1993, $900 million in proposed large I.R.C. § 482
issues were settled at a sustention rate of 27%. See NONPAYMENT OF TAX, supra note 7, at 24.
The primary reason cited by the Service for reaching these settlements was hazards of
litigation relating to facts or evidence open to judgment (accounting for 63% of the reduction
to proposed I.R.C. § 482 adjustments). The next most important reason for settlement was
"hazards of litigation relating to uncertainty about how the courts will apply the law." Id. at
25.
210. See, e.g., id. at 181 ("The U.S. General Accounting Office recently reported that
taxpayers were able to settle transfer pricing cases at the Appeals level for an average of 24
cents on the dollar." (citing GAO Testimony Before Senate Governmental Affairs Committee:
Updated Information on Transfer Pricing, Delivered March 25, 1993, Transfer Pricing 821
(Mar. 31, 1993))).
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terms of conceding large adjustments. Appeals could also move in a
slightly different direction than the APA because of explicit or de facto
offsetting compromises on other issues simultaneously on the table. The
opportunity for this kind of modification at the APA level is less likely
because of the more limited jurisdiction of the APA program. 2 ,,
Given the increasingly large fraction of cases which are bilateral or
multilateral,
the APA procedure is usually the first and final step in the
212
process. The APA process can be seen as compressing a series of
otherwise separate functions in the Service and producing the final result
in a more unified manner and in a presumably shorter time period 2 3
Thus, for taxpayers pursuing the traditional path, the proper point of
comparison with an APA is the
. 214 result ultimately emerging from the
competent authority proceedings. For both sets of taxpayers that is the
final point for a given transfer pricing issue domestically and
internationally. But even then, the sum of the individualized steps of
audit, appeals, and competent authority, does not necessarily equal the
condensed version-the APA.
A second basic reason results validly may differ is because of the
underlying transfer pricing rules used in audit as opposed to the APA
program. In contrast to most current audits and appeals, APAs are being
conducted against the backdrop of the new transfer pricing regulations,
whereas audit cycles under these new rules are only just beginning.
Thus, differences would be expected. This point, however, should not be
overstated. The actual implementation of the old rules through the audit
process, appeals and competent authority, already incorporated more of
the new regulations than would be supposed by a strict reading of the
rules. 25 For example, the comparable profits and profit split methods,
which were not explicitly authorized under the old regulations, but are
"specified methods" under the new regulations, were nonetheless a
factor in many transfer pricing discussions.
211. See Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12.
212. This assumes that the taxpayer complies with the terms of the agreement and thus
the agreement remains valid.
213. To the extent that taxpayers are able to package seven, eight, or nine years of issues
together in a single process, resources should be saved because of the transfer pricing issues
forgone. It should also ensure greater consistency in treatment across the years. It is, however,
also possible to have audit cover an issue over several audit years. See, e.g., I.R.S. Manual
Ch. 35 § 3(19)(6) (certain closing agreements may be used to provide "that resolution of an
issue under consideration during an audit cycle can be applied to resolve the same issue in
prior or subsequent tax years that have ended before the date of the agreement.").
214. U.S. income tax treaties contain a "Competent Authority Procedure" that can be
used as a forum to address potential double taxation problems resulting from two countries'
transfer pricing adjustments of a taxpayer. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 91-23, 1991-1 C.B. 534, § 2.
215. See generally NONPAYMENT OF TAX, supra note 7, at 7.
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A third observable difference in APA and non-APA results relates to
the first, but is worth identifying separately-the reliance on treaty
authority to permit APA participants to enjoy up-front certain rules not
available under domestic law. The example noted earlier involved
interbranch transactions which the United States traditionally has not
recognized. 216 That standard U.S. tax position, however, can result in
taxation that does not reflect the underlying economics. This problem is
most severe in businesses that frequently rely on interbranch contractsfinancial institutions engaged in global trading. For these taxpayers, the
APA process represents an opportunity to get different tax rules applied
to their global trading operations under the auspices of the Service's
competent authority power• 211
from the treaties. Until the Service recently
issued new proposed rules, taxpayers not obtaining an APA had to
treat their transactions under the existing framework. This is a clear case
of the results available under an APA being undeniably different from
those available through traditional avenues, but it is not inappropriate
because in the parallel traditional stage, competent authority, other
taxpayers could receive treatment predicated on the treaty.
Dissimilar results also can develop because of the different path for
unilateral APAs and bilateral APAs. If APA negotiations involve one or
more foreign countries who take a different "theoretical" view as to how
to best approach arm's length pricing, there may be differences between
bilateral APAs. In addition, bilateral APA results could differ from both
unilateral APAs and from audit/appeals of similar situations. An
example of this departure is seen in the negotiation of APAs with Japan.
The U.S. APA office and competent authority have often viewed the
comparable profits method as better suited than the profit split method to
many cases involving related party distributors.2 8 Japan, however, has
argued for use of the profit split method. The different positions seem to
reflect a combination of bottom line tax revenue expectations as well as
opposing interpretations of the relationship between parent and
subsidiary distributor: arm's length distributor for hire relationship v.
partnership-like relationship." 9 For purposes of considering the results,

216. See supra text accompanying note 88. Recently, however, the Service released

proposed regulations granting recognition to some interbranch transactions.
217. Proposed global dealing regulations, 63 Fed. Reg. 11, 177 (1998).

218. See generally Guttentag and Miyatake, supra note 36 (The United States seems to
seek to limit the use of the profit split method because it is an internal approach that does not
rely on third party transactions and data).
219. See, e.g., id. at 384 ("Japanese companies may rightfully be concerned that the use
of U.S. companies as comparables could result in over-allocation of income to the United
States, because U.S. companies generally may be more profitable ....The comparable profit
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however, it is sufficient to note that in some of these bilateral Japan-U.S.
APA cases, the countries have agreed to what has been termed a "hybrid
method" 2 ° Whether the hybrid method is considered pure compromise
or an independent method with integrity, it is clear that the likelihood of
obtaining this hybrid treatment from the United States in any other
context (i.e., unilateral APA or non-APA process) is minimal at present.
The above analysis outlines the range of factors validly producing
difference in APA and non-APA results: including "procedural22
efficiencies 22' and comparison with the "wrong" stage in the process.
To the extent these have formed the basis of some concerns about
negative impacts of the APA process on nonparticipants, they are
unfounded. The APA process is a condensed (but not equal) version of a
number of steps in the process, steps that typically occurred sequentially
ex ante and ex post. 23 Any residual dissatisfaction with differences
produced by these factors must acknowledge that they are not unique to
the APA program, but are pervasive in government enforcement action
across fields. The existence of multiple levels of agency review often
produces different results although such difference is not the goal.
Additionally, the move from the domestic to the international realm
frequently will lead to varying results.
Even if we concluded there should be no systemic reasons such as
litigation risk or posturing (e.g. agents seeking large adjustments upfront
in anticipation of settlement) for different results, it is not plausible or
appropriate to expect the treatment emerging from the last domestic
administrative stage (appeals in the tax context) always to be consistent
with a case requiring international resolution. APAs form part of an
international dialogue where some mutual agreement must be reached.
All countries, however, do not share similar views, thus the
accommodations that the United States reaches in each APA cannot
method ultimately forces a Japanese multinational group to realize as much profit as a U.S.
multinational .... ").
220. See, e.g., Akamatsu, supra note 69. The use of the term "hybrid" here is different
from the general use in this paper which identifies the APA program as a hybrid procedure.
221. As discussed in Part III, the change in participants and their roles in resolving
transfer pricing issues was in part aimed at remedying potential conflicts inherent in the
taxpayer/district dynamic. See supra Part III.A. 1.b.
222. For example, comparing audit with APA fails to incorporate (1) the differences
potentially due to the negotiation dynamic based on the role of audit versus appeal, and how
that compares to the APA team, (2) the impact of treaty power on the Service's "ability" to
accept results not clearly permissible under domestic law, and (3) the effect of the foreign
country and its negotiating position on any final resolution.
223. The factors discussed above that contribute to difference are mostly due to
comparing the APA process with traditional steps, short of the competent authority
proceeding; thus, the role of the treaty or the other country is not yet factored into the nonAPA side.

Winter 20001

On the Frontierof ProceduralInnovation

always be the same, nor can these accommodations always match the
final U.S. domestic position (e.g. the appeals level determination).
2. Inappropriate Difference in Results
The remaining question is, what factors may be creating
inappropriately different results? The answer is any departures or
developments in transfer pricing reached in the APA program. That is,
the real and relevant concern about results is a concern about the rules
that taxpayers are facing before they enter into their transactions. For
example, although the interbranch APA treatment was justified by the
Service because the departure from existing domestic rules was based on
treaty not purely the APA program, it is quite possible to imagine that
less dramatic or obvious departures from existing rules occur
independent of a treaty. Such departures may be less apparent to the
extent that the current tax treatment is less clear. For example, treatment
of foreign currency exchange or distribution subsidiaries may not be
explicitly addressed in the current regulations, but a new understanding
and practice may be developing at the APA level. In fact, one must
presume this to be the case since the Service indicated it was considering
producing issue specific guidance instead of redacted APAs. Unless the
results are publicized, taxpayers not pursuing an APA have little
assurance they will know of the "new views", or even if they know of
them, that they will be able to convince audit and appeals they should
224
apply. In fact, the audit and appeals officers themselves may not be
fully informed of the APA developments. Under these circumstances,
differing results would arguably be inappropriate.
Of course, how would a taxpayer know if results differ, and how
could it prevent such differences? At a minimum, the answer to both
involves disclosure. What a taxpayer needs to know is how it was treated
in the traditional administrative process and then compare the results to
similar industry APAs. If the APAs use a method or variation not
available to the nonparticipant then there is a serious concern that the
difference was inappropriate. What is the solution? Essentially, the
same. If all taxpayers have access to redacted APAs, they can monitor
on their own behalf and point out on audit what appears to be the "new"
approach. This does not guarantee comparable or high quality results,
but does (if respected) address major concerns of inappropriately
224. Although the main focus of APAs is future years, it is possible to rollback the
results to earlier open years. See Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12, at § 8. Part of the value of
an APA, from the taxpayer's perspective, comes from the opportunity to get the audit level
personnel involved in a dialogue with the National Office-and thus get them more
comfortable with any new transfer pricing approaches.
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different results. The pressure here for disclosure on the grounds of
ensuring "equal treatment" of taxpayers is actually more complex than
the term suggests. Implicit in a search for equal treatment is a desire to
eliminate both accidental differences in tax treatment as well as those
potentially motivated by misuse or abuse of power. But an additional
value from disclosure occurs even when all parties' face comparable
treatment. In that circumstance, disclosure still can play a critical
function on a substantive law level. Disclosure opens the tax treatment
and rules to outside scrutiny-from taxpayers, Congress, academics and
the public. Thus, the pressure to eliminate "private law" should be seen
to encompass claims for equality and quality in rulemaking.
C. Role of Disclosure in the Impact of APAs on Nonparticipants
From the above discussion of nonparticipants' two primary concerns
about the APA program, the question of disclosure emerges. Ultimately,
decisions about the disclosure of APA terms play a significant role in the
effect of the program on nonparticipants and on the tax system more
broadly. This issue of secrecy and disclosure confronts the degree to
which the methods and results from individual taxpayer APA
negotiations are made available to the public. At the outset, the Service
maintained that the content of APAs was privileged taxpayer
information subject to confidentiality under I.R.C. § 6103.225 Although
the general participation statistics released by the Service as well as the
random and occasional comments from taxpayers participating in the
APA process provided some information on the scope and tone of the
program, it has proven insufficient to satisfy the demand for the release
of redacted APAs. Moreover, the nondisclosure policy in place through
early 1999 led to the conclusion that APAs are creating a source of
"private law. '2 6 To the extent treatment is not publicly revealed, it may
225. See Rev. Proc. 91-22, supra note 12, at § 11; John Turro, United States: IRS
Official Says No APA Disclosure, But Generic Information to be Provided, 4 TAX NOTES
INT'L 709 (Apr. 6, 1992) (quoting IRS Associate Chief Counsel International, Robert E.
Culbertson) [hereinafter Turro]; Stratton, supra note 58, at 138-39 (quoting the Service's
view that APAs are not like other disclosed agreements, that disclosure would discourage
participation because of the degree of sensitive information involved, and that a redacted APA
would look "like a piece of Swiss cheese" and thus be unhelpful).
226. See, e.g., James R. Mogle, Advance Pricing Agreements Under Revenue Procedure
91-22, 45 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 356, 359-60 (July/Aug. 1991) (arguing
that there is no support for the Service's position [at that time] that an APA and supporting
documentation are tax return information, and warning taxpayers to be prepared for possible
public disclosure of a redacted APA); Turro, supra note 225 (noting the concern that
undisclosed APAs would lead to the development of a private law of transfer pricing); Mike
McIntyre, The Case of Public Disclosure of Advance Rulings on Transfer Pricing
Methodologies, 91 TAx NOTES INT'L 2-27 (Jan. 9, 1991) (expressing concern at the Service's
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effectively constitute private law either because (1) it is not available in
audit to taxpayers not pursuing APAs, (2) it is not sua sponte offered by
the Service to other taxpayers seeking APAs, and/or (3) it is not

available to taxpayers planning future transactions outside the APA
process. Such a scenario would be most sensitive for taxpayers operating
in the same industry where tax treatment is one factor which can provide
a competitive edge. 227 Disclosure, usually presumed to mean the release
of redacted APAs, would alert taxpayers to their options, better assure
consistency in the treatment of taxpayers, and contribute to a sense of
fair play and openness in the tax system. It is possible to suggest,
however, that rather than being harmed by nondisclosure,

nonparticipants should be viewed as poised to obtain an unfair
advantage if disclosure of APA terms is made because the
nonparticipants would be able to free ride off of the time, effort, and
expenditures of other taxpayers. This claim also would apply to the

disclosure of letter rulings. The degree of undesirable free riding might
be mitigated by (1) the absence of certainty when relying on another
taxpayer's APA, and (2) the fact that if smaller companies are more
likely to be the free riders, that benefit balances the burden of serious
transfer pricing compliance costs on smaller taxpayers less able to bear
such costs.
The Service's initial response to the concerns about nondisclosure
was to establish a plan for the release of industry-wide guidance after a
critical mass of APAs had been executed. 22' As noted earlier, the Service
view that APAs are more like closing agreements, which are not disclosed, than letter rulings,
which are published in redacted form). See supra notes 12 and 52 (describing the Service's
change of view on the disclosability of APAs and the subsequent legislative response).
227. Another level of disclosure concerns (reminiscent of the history of letter rulings and
rulings under I.R.C. § 367) considers the equitable treatment of tax advisors. The fear is that
to the extent APAs are kept secret, those tax advisors (law firms and accountants) that are
involved in APAs will have an advantage in retaining and assisting clients over those not
already involved, solely because the agreements are unpublished. See generally, Treasury
Wanted to Prevent Agreements from Becoming 'Private Law', Lubick Says, 8 TAX MGMT.
TRANSFER PRICING REP. 572 (Oct. 27, 1999) (hereinafter "Private Law") (Treasury
Department wants to ensure that the "public and practitioners without specialized transfer
pricing training were not being disadvantaged when they sought APAs."). Ostensibly, the
government has no interest in some taxpayers being better advised than others, nor would it
seek affirmatively to provide a profitable specialty to a limited pool of advisors. The degree of
accessibility of the agency's decisions is a relevant factor in characterizing administrative
action as rulemaking or adjudication. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 164.
228. See Turro, supra note 225. Despite the plan for more generalized releases, a major
legal publisher filed a lawsuit against the Service in 1996, seeking release of transfer pricing
methodologies contained in APAs, essentially seeking publication of redacted APAs. See
BNA v. IRS, D.C. D.C., No. 96-CV376, 2/27/96. The publisher initially sought the
information through a Freedom of Information Act (a "FOIA") request and a request under
I.R.C. § 6110, both of which were denied; the former on the ground that the methodologies
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changed its position and declared that APAs were "written
determinations" covered by I.R.C. § 6110's disclosure rules, thereby
prompting Congressional action to block disclosure and only require
reporting.2 2 9 The question this section considers is whether this level of
disclosure in the APA program is appropriate to meet equity concerns,
given the effect on both the APA participants and the nonparticipants. In
answering this question, it is important to consider what disclosure is
normatively expected for various tax-related government interactions.
With that baseline established, we can then consider what implications
the hybrid procedural setting has for the ultimate analysis of disclosure.
Related to this issue of equity is the view that transparency in an
administrative regime is valuable as an independent goal regardless of its
absolute connection to improved equity or outcomes. Thus, there may be
additional grounds for higher levels of disclosure.
1. Disclosure Ex Ante and Ex Post
A review of the basic practices in the current tax system regarding
disclosure, while not binding, provides guidance on expectations for
disclosure. From tax returns to court proceedings, there is a spectrum of
disclosure treatments which, taken together, suggest an underlying
policy. An important caveat must be acknowledged regarding disclosure.
Although general norms and baselines can be ascertained from the
operation of the existing income tax system, we still lack a
comprehensive normative picture of the basis for and contours of
privacy in a regulatory regime. Nonetheless, the basic scope of the
constitute confidential return information and contain confidential taxpayer information, the
latter on the ground that APAs are confidential documents protected from public disclosure.
Following the December 1999 amendment to I.R.C. § 6103(b) preventing disclosure of APAs,
BNA and the Service agreed to the dismissal of the suit. See "BNA, IRS Agree to Dismiss
Lawsuit Seeking Access to Redacted APAs," 8 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 740
(Jan. 12, 2000).
The effort to force disclosure of APAs parallels the battle in the early 1970s over letter
rulings, which at that time were not disclosed to the public. Two lawsuits were filed and
ultimately the courts of appeal for the District of Columbia and the Sixth Circuit found the

letter rulings to be subject to disclosure and not protected as tax return information under
I.R.C. § 6103. See SALTZMAN, supra note 54, at 3-30; Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 505

F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974); FreuhaufCorp. v. IRS, 522 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and
remanded for reconsideration in light of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 429 U.S. 1085 (1977).
The issue of disclosure was finally addressed by I.R.C. § 6110, enacted by Congress in

1976, which was intended to serve as the exclusive remedy for disclosure of rulings and
related material. See I.R.C. § 6110(1); General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, at
304 (Comm. Print 1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 2) 316. I.R.C. § 6110 generally
provides for the disclosure in redacted form of any "written determination," that is, a ruling,
determination letter, or technical advice memorandum. See I.R.C. § 61 10(a),(b)(l).
229. See supra note 12.
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disclosure question can be evaluated by accepting the apparently
existing parameters for disclosure and then considering their treatment in
the APA context. To the extent a new or different fundamental theory of
disclosure is advocated, it would require an independent argument on the
principles governing disclosure.
In ex ante interactions, the pattern is to provide significant
disclosure, except for taxpayer identifying information (including
names, dollar amounts, specific industry activity, etc.). This makes sense
because the interaction, typically some type of ruling, is establishing a
rule or interpretation. There is no litigation risk factored into the
analysis; 230 nor is there a dispute over facts (i.e., they are assumed).
Given the prospective nature of such advice, a lesser disclosure policy
would not only invite criticism, but the actual creation of private law.
Rules to which we hold taxpayers should be public to ensure notice and
equal application of the law. At the same time, however, continued
secrecy or privacy for the taxpayers' specific details seems appropriate. 3 Publication of such current financial and business information
could put the taxpayer at a significant competitive disadvantage as
compared to others in its industry both domestically and globally.
Furthermore, it might deter taxpayers from seeking guidance from the
government at the most useful point-before transactions have occurred.
Both the particular taxpayer and the Service can benefit from this upfront clarification.
Ex post, from tax returns to appeals, there is typically no disclosure
of the taxpayer-government interactions. Again, a rationale can be
discerned from the pattern: for these generally backward looking
interactions (with no guarantees of future treatment) 232 there is much less
230. Litigation risk is understood here to refer to an effort to ascertain one's chance of
prevailing in court in a given case in light of the particular facts and circumstances and their
relation to the rules. If a much broader conception of "taking litigation risk into account" were
used, then essentially all functions of an administrative agency like the IRS would be said to

include consideration of such risk. That is, even when a regulation is issued, the Service is
aware that such a regulation could be challenged in courts. Similarly in the context of the

APA program, it could never be said that the results were reached without any thought to how
alternative IRS positions would fare in court. But litigation risk as used in this broader sense

is more a function of the fact that every action by an administrative agency is ultimately
reviewable in court.
231. See, e.g., Stratton, supra note 58, at 139-40 (outlining taxpayer claims for

disclosure that nonetheless are sensitive to the need not to reveal confidential taxpayer
information).
232. There are exceptions such as closing agreements. See, e.g., 14 MERTENS LAW OF
§ 52.03 (1997) ("A closing agreement is a written agreement
between an individual and the Commissioner which settles or 'closes' the liability of that
individual (or the taxpayer or estate for whom he acts).. . A closing agreement may relate to
tax liability for a past taxable year or relate to specific items in past or future years.").
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
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information of valid and significant use for other taxpayers, particularly
when balanced by the risk to the taxpayer at issue from the disclosure.
For example, tax returns contain current business data and the taxpayer's
own legal conclusions. Neither should play an important role in others'
tax planning. 233 And although the settlement at appeals does in fact
establish a taxpayer's tax treatment (and involves the same data at a less
"contemporary" point in time), its general relevance is somewhat
limited. The settlement reflects not only the facts and legal rules, but
also the Service's assessment of its own litigation risks. Litigation risks
(including the context of the issues and the precise facts) vary from case
to case, so a settlement reached at this level has less bearing on other
taxpayers, and certainly no precedential value. That does not mean
disclosure would be of no valid interest to other taxpayers. Disclosure of
audit settlements would give taxpayers the ability to evaluate and predict
the Service's behavior in audit. Nonetheless, a stronger argument can be
made for why disclosure at this stage should be limited.
In litigation, the fact that most taxpayer information may be released
in the form of court opinions and other litigation documents reflects the
difference between internal agency settlement and the adjudicatory
process through the courts. Settlement is more context specific because
of the inclusion of litigation risk. However, litigation risk has no place in
judicial decisions. The tax system expects and requires compliance with
the rules and it is that compliance which is assessed at trial. That factor
alone would be insufficient to explain the degree to which taxpayer
information is disclosed in cases. Clearly other factors are at work,
including a powerful vision about the importance of a public judicial
process, as well as the likelihood that taxpayer data revealed in a case
will usually be at least several years out of date.
Thus, although the APA program's disclosure policy is not bound by
the particular treatment of any current disclosure pattern, the tax
system's disclosure practices seem to focus substantially on the ex
ante/ex post line as well as the degree of negotiation and risk assessment
involved. Where the government exercises primarily legal decision
making authority (i.e., it is not negotiating) the demand for disclosure is
strong. Conversely, government action premised in part on other factors
(e.g., in settlement negotiations) presents a less compelling case for
disclosure. Thus, a taxpayer's first interactions (letter rulings prior to the
In practice, the agreements reached in audit may provide some indication of what will be

acceptable in the future. However, where the agreements are based extensively on
compromise of issues and risk they may be less useful.

233. Moreover, protection of a taxpayer's contemporary
information) might enhance compliance with the tax laws.

data (i.e. the return
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transaction) and last interactions (judicial decisions) with the
government are the ones in which disclosure is expected. Both focus on
the legal issue without regard to other aspects of negotiation and
litigation risk. In addition, both represent a final stage-the letter ruling
as the last word on taxation prior to the transaction, and the judicial
decision as the final word after the transaction.
2. Disclosure in the APA Procedure
Turning to the APA context, direct application of the ex ante/ex post
perspective combined with an eye towards the nature of the government
role would require disclosure of APA terms with necessary redactions.
APAs are forward-looking arrangements that produce more finely tuned
specifications of the law prior to the transactions. As the law is being
refined and developed, such information should be available for all
taxpayers evaluating the potential impact of future action. Anything
short of "full application" of the law should not be granted in advance to
some taxpayers and not others. In such a case, two separate taxpayers
seeking to comply with the rules will in good faith conduct their
transactions very differently, and each will be correct because their laws
are different.
At the start, the government must spell out the law to be applied and
the taxpayers must strive to apply it. After the fact, greater uncertainty
arises because of issues of proof. If these uncertainties ultimately lead to
different results for taxpayers it should be less problematic because each
taxpayer took a risk in conducting itself and filing a return short of the
"law." Each taxpayer adopted a stance with no guarantee of different
treatment and risked the results. 2 4 Even if the discrepancies in taxpayer
treatment in settlement are due to human inconsistency, and not
assessment of litigation risk, that variation is less serious than variation

234. A very rough analogy to criminal law that may shed some light on this conception
of the past/future distinction is the role of the plea bargain. On the books, various crimes carry
specified penalty ranges. However, after a person has committed a crime, it may be possible
to plea bargain to a lesser offense and reduced penalty. This scenario is accepted because the

government in each case must confront its litigation risks and resources. It would not,
however, be possible (nor conceivable) to allow individuals to approach the government
before committing a crime and reach an up-front agreement as to some lesser crime and
penalty for which the individual if caught would be charged and sentenced. Obviously, the
parallel to the tax case is limited. First, disclosure is not an issue in the criminal context
because the plea agreements are made public. Second, the tax disputes at issue are civil
administrative disputes with the government and typically involve basic transactions that are
permissible in some form. Nonetheless, the analogy helps capture the visceral sense of a
distinction between the appropriateness of the variability of the rule of law before and after
the relevant actions have been taken.
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in the ex ante statement of the law because it does not provide one
taxpayer a predictable advantage over another.
Although direct application of the tax system's disclosure practices
would seem to require release of redacted APAs, the question remains
whether anything special about the APA process would support
nondisclosure. Interwoven in the debate regarding disclosure in the APA
program is a competition among several administrative values including
improved rulemaking, facilitation of international cooperation in
regulatory regimes, and the independent value of transparency. Several
arguments can be made that full disclosure, with redaction of the barest
taxpayer identifying details, would not be appropriate in the APA
process. First, the nature of the subject matter makes it impossible to
provide meaningful APA disclosures while simultaneously protecting
the taxpayer-specific data contained in the APA. This is the "Swiss
cheese" point previously made by the Service-that APAs are not like
other agreements and a redacted APA would look "like a piece of Swiss
cheese" and thus be unhelpful.235 Therefore the plan to release either
industry or issue based advice was viewed as an effective mechanism for
conveying current Service thinking and approaches on transfer pricing
without releasing individual data. This position, however, is not
dispositive. If disclosure would fail to achieve certain critical results
(e.g., equity, transparency), then the risk posed by the program could be
determined to be so severe as to warrant its rejection in the absence of an
another disclosure solution.
However, to the extent transfer pricing guidance tends to be context
specific, generalized guidance may be insufficiently detailed to
adequately inform taxpayers, and context may be difficult to provide
while protecting "privacy". The standard view is that the core APA
agreement is relatively boilerplate and the real information, and power,
resides in the attachments specifically applying the treatment to the
taxpayer's situation. Even for taxpayers reasonably satisfied with the
level of detail provided in a release like Notice 94-40, the pace at which
such releases are being issued renders them more of a theoretical than
actual alternative. To date, Notice 94-40 (and the subsequent 1998
proposed global dealing regulations) has been the only release of its
type. Moreover, the Service has indicated that it is moving away from
"industry-based" guidance,2 36 which is how that notice could be
235. See Turro, supra note 225, at 709 (quoting comments of IRS Associate Chief
Counsel International, Robert Culbertson); Stratton, supra note 58, at 138-39 (quoting
Service views on the value of disclosed APAs).
236. Apparently some industries had initially expressed interest in pursuing an
"industry-wide" APA. See Kathleen Matthews, U.S. Branch IFA Meeting Highlights Cross-
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characterized, and may focus on issue-specific guidance, such as the
treatment of currency exchange, distribution subsidiaries, and location
savings."'
The lengthy period between drafting and releasing a notice is
understandable from the perspective of an administrative agency.
Releases outlining the Service's approach to a problem cannot be
quickly drafted and published; they must be evaluated for their overall
conformity with the system. That administrative delay merely enhances
the appeal of disclosure of redacted APAs-once the APA is finalized
for the taxpayer, the only additional step necessary for disclosure is to
redact the appropriate information. Although there may be some delay
due to debates over what is and is not redacted, one anticipates this
process could be handled more expeditiously than release of a notice. In
addition, to the extent the APA program is part of an evolving process,
the notices may be significantly outdated by the time they are issued.
The second argument that disclosure in the APA program cannot be
the same as disclosure usually made for ex ante government interactions
is premised on the "source" of the program's success-its flexibility, its
ability to take a very contextual look at transfer pricing. The contribution
and value of this type of case-by-case development in transfer pricing
presupposes the flexibility to tinker with the system in each new case. If
disclosure were expected to reduce the APA office's sense of flexibility
and creativity in approaching transfer pricing, it would detract from this
major benefit of the program. But what is the current source of
flexibility and why would it be diminished through disclosure?

Border Corporate Reshufflings, Tax Treaties, APAs, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 776, 780 (1994)
(then-APA Director Robert Ackerman reporting that the Service was "working with several
taxpayers' groups to identify the appropriate industry to develop a generic industry-wide APA
approach,"). For a variety of reasons, including cost and collective action problems, the
pressure for that has declined. Similarly, the APA office has concluded that global trading and
financial instruments aside, which it views as a unique circumstance, the situations of industry
members are too varied to make that kind of guidance useful. See Shaughnessy, supra note
136, at 406 (then-APA Director Michael Durst stating that "[w]ithin an industry, every
company's situation differs and there would be no way of doing an industry-wide APA," but
suggesting they would try more guidance like Notice 94-40). Instead, the APA office expects
that developing treatments of recurring issues like currency exchange and distribution
subsidiaries would provide more informative guidance. See id.
237. See generally Stratton, supra note 58, at 138-40 (noting shift away from industry
guidance to issue-specific guidance).
238. This observation would not necessarily imply that APAs themselves are out of date.
The typical term is about three years, whereas it may take a while to feel enough perspective
has been gathered to release a notice. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 96-53, supra note 12, at § 5.09(1)
(suggesting sample term of three years). Thus, APAs can be incrementally improved, but a

Notice may be a less flexible format.

MichiganJournalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 21:143

The flexibility itself may derive from several sources: (1) given
bilateral APAs are predominant, most APA negotiations are done under
the umbrella of treaties and the broad discretion they grant the
competent authorities to resolve issues of double taxation, (2) the
continued availability under the new transfer pricing regulations of
unspecified methods,2 39 and (3) the effect of secrecy in limiting a
taxpayer's ability to rely on prior APA terms to claim the same
treatment. As to the first two points, their impact in promoting a flexible
approach would continue unchanged if APAs were disclosed. As to the
last point, one might argue that evolving flexibility is legally
permissible, and thus, if the APA office wants to change course it should
not be reluctant to say that we have changed our prior approach because
of an improved understanding in this area.
The concern here about disclosure, however, may reflect a more
sensitive and realistic assessment about the crystallizing effect of
disclosure despite the propriety of the Service's affirmative use of the
process as a creative laboratory; there is an inherent implausibility of
continued flexibility in a public forum. Also, foreign governments may
be hesitant to place themselves in the position of confronting taxpayers
who treat redacted APAs as virtually binding authority, rather than as
simply offering insight with no precedential value. This concern might
be satisfied by not specifying the foreign country in a reacted APA.
The third argument against even redacted disclosure is the
possibility that many taxpayers would not pursue an APA under such
terms, and without adequate volume the broader benefits of the program
would be limited.24° This contention is unprovable until tried. Of course,
many taxpayers who have already completed the process would, if
asked, most likely indicate disclosure would have been a serious factor
weighing heavily, if not dispositively, against an APA. Even taxpayers
seriously considering an APA might express such views if they expect
the benefits of secrecy for their future APA to be greater than the present
benefits of additional data on the APA program. However, taxpayers
who are much less certain of seeking an APA, or who perhaps have
239. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(a), (d) (outlining use of methods not otherwise
specified in the regulations to evaluate arm's length pricing in the transfer of an intangible).
240. See generally Stratton, supra note 58, at 138-40 (quoting various former IRS
officials regarding the role of nondisclosure in trying to attract participants to the new
program and the view that even now a policy of redacted disclosure would make a difference
to taxpayers at the margin and might counsel against an APA); see, e.g., Practitioners Say
More Countries Will Enter into APAs in Future, 1996 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 171, at G-

5 (Sept. 4, 1996) (identifying potential disclosure of sensitive information and trade secrets as
a serious concern for Chrysler Corporation in considering an APA, especially in an industry
where there are only three big U.S. automakers).
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decided against it, would seem to have much more to gain from
disclosure. In terms of taxpayer reaction to disclosure, early applicants
may have been particularly concerned about disclosure in an otherwise
new and untested program.14 Now taxpayers may be more relaxed in this
mature, although evolving, program. Also, the implementation of the
documentation requirements and penalty rules have added an additional
boost to the appeal of the APA program guaranteeing a stream of
242
participants .
A final argument that seeks to minimize the call for disclosure in
APAs contends that anyone worried about "private" or "secret" law in
the APA context should be worried about it more extensively (i.e., in
examination and appeals, where resolutions are not made public).2 43
Certainly the risk has always existed that taxpayers are not receiving
"similar" treatment in audit or appeals (i.e., the Service could be
"playing favorites"). 2" However, this risk in the APA context differs
because the taxpayer-Service interaction occurs ex ante and the
relationship lacks the same negotiation and risk assessment evident at
other stages. The APA provides the taxpayer participant not just with
"special treatment," but "special treatment" that is guaranteed before the
taxpayer takes the risk of engaging in the transaction.
3. Assessment of APA Disclosure
Disclosure policy in the APA program forms a direct link between
the impact of the program on participants and nonparticipants.
Depending on the policy adopted, the effectiveness of the program
shifts: the more limited the disclosure, the more attractive the program is
for participants, and thus, the more likely it is to be a successful
alternative for such participants. Limited disclosure, however, poses
risks for nonparticipants in terms of their ability to evaluate the equality
of rules imposed and the comparability of results achieved through the
APA and non-APA processes. It poses risks more universally in terms of
the limited scrutiny afforded transfer pricing treatment and
developments. Because the APA program must be understood as an
alternative procedure that is part of a larger interconnected tax system,
241.

See, e.g., Stratton, supra note 58, at 138-39 (former Associate Chief Counsel

International Robert Culbertson stating that one reason for the confidentiality aspect of the
APA program derived from the Service's desire to encourage taxpayer participation in a new
program that required such participation to provide sensitive business information to the
government).
242. See supra note 116.
243. See, e.g., Stratton, supra note 58, at 138 (citing former Associate Chief Counsel

International Robert Culbertson's view that any such fears should not be limited to APAs).
244. See id. at 139.
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the impacts on both participants and nonparticipants are critical. The
question then is how to strike that balance.
Rules, modifications, and developments made available to a
taxpayer before entering into a transaction should be available widely,
and the best way is to disclose the treatment. Taxpayers will then face
comparable tax risk going into their transactions. The APA interaction is
before the taxpayer's transaction and therefore changes the taxpayer's
risk. As a result, the APA's terms should be disclosed unless the ex post
elements of the program raise serious opposing concerns.
Attention to the ex post features of the APA program could suggest
that the price of disclosure is too high because it inevitably would
require disclosure of contemporaneous taxpayer information. Such
disclosure would put the taxpayer at a disadvantage with respect to its
competitors. This ground, with its implicit balancing or cost-benefit
approach, cannot stand separately from a specification of the particular
form of disclosure made. At the extreme, disclosure of a very heavily
redacted APA (with exclusion of the identity of the foreign country)
should be possible to protect trade secrets, financial data, and market
strategies of the APA participant. The real concern, therefore, must
reside in the expectation that "completely Swiss cheese" redacted APAs
would offer so little guidance that public demand for information would
ultimately lead to disclosure of APAs according to less stringent
redaction standards. This conflict is not usually faced in the traditional
ex ante function of developing rules because no individual taxpayer's
facts are used to define the rule. 45 Except for the interbranch and global
trading APAs, the specification and elaboration of the method may be
intimately connected to the APA participants' facts, transactions, and
data. Arguably, trying to express these applications of transfer pricing
divorced from their factual context may be difficult.
Although there is little disagreement as to the basic contention that
rules proffered ex ante (i.e., before the transactions are done) should be
publicly available, the real issue is the implementation of this in a hybrid
procedure like the APA. Satisfactory resolution of this balancing
question has been impeded by (1) the absence of even heavily redacted
disclosures, (2) the absence of substantial other guidance (e.g., notices
on industries, issues, or methodological points), and (3) the one
sidedness of information (i.e. those advocating disclosure generally lack
245. Although letter rulings are issued based on a particular set of facts provided, the
requirement that the legal question be relatively clear on the facts means that the precise

details and contours of the facts are not that critical. Thus, a highly factual and contextual
legal question like transfer pricing is not considered appropriate for a letter ruling. See supra
text accompanying notes 56-58.
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exposure to a significant number of APAs, and are asked to accept the
conclusion that it is impossible in most cases to reduce APAs to
meaningful, yet data protective, documents). Based on the
considerations outlined, disclosure of redacted APAs seems required. To
the extent their "Swiss cheese" nature would render them less than
illuminating, the Service could complement their content with more
explanatory general guidance.
What then should be made of the current situation in which
Congress has implicitly approved the APA program for the present, but
has statutorily preempted any effort by the Service to disclose
individual, redacted APAs? The legislation limiting disclosure and
calling for annual APA program reports resulted from taxpayer fears of
the release of redacted APAs. Thus, one anticipates that these reports
will constitute less complete disclosure than would have been available
under the Service's disclosure plan. Such a conclusion, however, is not
inevitable. Congress specifically detailed the information required in the
annual reports, including APA statistics; general descriptions of
businesses, transactions, and functions covered by APAs; methodologies
used to evaluate transactions; critical assumptions made; sources of
comparables used; and nature of adjustments made to comparables. 2 6
Depending on the level of information provided, such aggregate data
could offer more concrete guidance regarding appropriate transfer
pricing analysis than heavily redacted APAs. Although the fact that APA
participants prefer reports over redacted APAs suggests the reports will
be weaker, a true comparison of information released would require
seeing sample redacted APAs.
In this disclosure discussion, however, an underlying tension must
be confronted in order to evaluate the realistic prospects of a disclosure
plan. A tension exists between the explanation for why transfer pricing is
difficult and the explanation for why disclosure is useful and plausible.
On the one hand, the claim is that transfer pricing is fact intensive and
not susceptible to quick and easy rules. On the other hand, some kind of
disclosure is sought as a mechanism for providing guidance to taxpayers
generally. If it is hard to resolve transfer pricing cases in a rule oriented
fashion, how can any useful, aggregate information emerge from APAs?
There are two facets to this problem. First, is it possible to have sensible,
predictable, coherent rulemaking here-can APAs be more than ad hoc
bargains? The answer should be yes, on a relative scale. That is,
although the importance of facts may make complete uniformity of
246. Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106170, § 521(b)(2), 113 Stat. 1860 (1999).
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outcomes difficult (one can think of other areas where this arises, such
as questions of whether a payment is a gift, or whether a security is debt
or equity), it should be possible to help clarify relevant factors and
approaches. In theory, the Service could issue such guidance in the
absence of the APA program. One reason this may not have occurred is
the Service's need and desire to obtain a more comprehensive picture of
particular transfer pricing scenarios and issues first. A format that entices
taxpayers to be forthcoming with information is most useful in that
capacity. Another reason such non-APA guidance may not have been
prepared is that any unilateral issuances not developed in conjunction
with other countries would be of limited value. They would not reflect
the other country (or countries) involved and might not even represent
the Service's final position that would emerge from ultimate dealings
with the foreign country.
Second, on a more practical level, what APA "answers" will we see
following the implementation of the required APA reporting? The
Service, though desirous of providing guidance to improve transfer
pricing compliance, also wants the opportunity to develop this area
without being held too strictly to errors or changed judgments.
Even with Congress taking the decisive step to permit only APA
program reporting, other countries participating in the APA program
may resist.247 These countries could bar disclosure of information either
under their treaties with the United States, or as a condition to their
participation in the program.4 8 The United States could, of course,
complete bilateral APAs only with countries willing to permit
disclosure, but this route could produce limited participation levels. In
essence, the success of the APA program relies on participation for two
reasons. First, the program is most beneficial when all of the relevant
countries to a transaction are involved. As discussed earlier, although
unilateral APAs are occasionally appropriate, bilateral APAs are usually
the most valuable. Second, a major advantage of the APA program is the
expanding knowledge and experience base it offers the Service. This
requires a large pool of APAs, and anything that limits the number of
participating countries would inevitably limit the number of APAs.

247. See generally Private Law, supra note 227. Confidentiality may also be critical to

other countries who have legitimate concerns to protect their interest.
248. See, e.g., "President Signs Law Clarifying APA Confidentiality Policy, Mandating
TAX MOMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 710, 710 (Dec. 22, 1999) ("For the future,
taxpayers and treaty partners will determine before an APA is completed which portions of it

Study," 8

they wish to redact .... [f]or example, if a treaty partner were to insist that no information on
transfer pricing methodology be revealed, the Service would not include that information in

its report.").
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Alternatively, if the United States were unwilling to limit the
participating countries to those accepting disclosure, it instead could
have viewed the program as purely an interim function and, for the
limited window of its operation, continued to tolerate the tension created
by nondisclosure. By not taking this path (and by announcing its
intention to disclose), the Service may have been indicating its view that
the APA program should serve as more than a short term institution, and
its belief that other countries can be persuaded that such disclosure
policies are sensible. The United States has been successful in shaping
and influencing the views of other taxing jurisdictions on a variety of
issues. If disclosure is an important part of a well functioning APA
program, the Service may be willing to promote that position. The recent
Congressional action in this area, however, renders such advocacy futile
for the present.
The question remains whether disclosure through annual reports
could be a sufficient remedy for the problems outlined above in subparts
A and B. Three major concerns continue:(1) inadequate disclosure; (2)
failure to change Service behavior (i.e. a "so-what" response to
discrepancies); (3) a more subtle difficulty in persuading the Service that
there is a difference between the reports and the particular taxpayer's
treatment (for example, some of the same factors that made transfer
pricing a challenging issue could make it hard for taxpayers to convince
the agent (audit level) that a particular treatment outlined in the APA
report should be "applied" to their situation). The original problems with
transfer pricing may be serious enough to encourage acceptance of a less
than perfect procedural option. In addition, other observations may
mitigate worry over reliance on disclosure. First, as discussed above,
disclosure is not an on/off switch, but a spectrum. It may be possible to
tinker with the form and content of the reports to improve their
usefulness. Second, two "back-stop" options exist, one for participating
taxpayers, one for nonparticipants. If the Service behaves unreasonably
aggressively in the APA process, taxpayers need not participate.
Alternatively, if the Service's APA positions are "too" easy relative to
usual audit treatment, the Service will be inundated with participants
(although it is not clear what the "right" number of participants should
be). Taxpayers not participating can turn, as a last resort, to the courts to
challenge the Service's more stringent audit positions. Third,
Congressional oversight looms large for the Service. The tax system has
been the focus of recent sweeping legislative inquiry and action to
address inefficiencies and abuses.249 Such legislative involvement is a
249. See supra note 3.
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draconian, though powerful, constraint on general trends of abuse by the
Service. Finally, we can push for more explicit guidance for audit and
appeals from the APA process beyond the reports (for example more
notices, rulings, and regulations).
Ultimately, one intangible effect of the nondisclosure position will
continue to haunt the program. Even if the APA annual reports prove
robust, the literal fact of secrecy regarding actual negotiated agreements
helps harbor doubts about equal and consistent treatment in the program.
Regardless of the true facts, the lack of transparency can undermine any
program's claim to legitimacy. For the moment, Congress has made the
assessment that this balance of disclosure and secrecy represents an
appropriate trade off. Whether the choice withstands the pressure for
information will depend in large part on the quality of the reports.
D. Assessment ofAPA Program'sImpact on Nonparticipants
The focus in Part IV has been on the collateral effects of the APA
program: (1) whether there are inappropriate participation differences
that create advantages for some taxpayers, and (2) whether APA results
that differ from audit and appeals demonstrate an inappropriate
advantage to APA participants. The analysis turned in part on the ex
ante/ex post distinction and the role of the particular government body
involved. What constitutes acceptable participation or comparable
results depends on the point in the tax system under consideration.25 °
Ultimately, the conclusions for both questions were linked by the role of
disclosure. Although access and participation in the APA program is
relatively open and improving with the efforts to draw in smaller
taxpayers, "participation" in the new rules is weak because of disclosure.
Similarly, despite some valid explanations for differing results, the
concern remains that something like the special treatment of interbranch
transactions exists 2 5-- different rules available up-front for APA
participants. Better reporting may alleviate this continuing suspicion as
well as facilitate the dissemination of emerging (though not binding)
views.
250. As to the question of the scope of "participation" in the process, one could counter

that cases pronounce rules, and that only the immediate taxpayer can participate. Although
this description is accurate, the full comparison is not. The ex antelex post emphasis on a level
playing field is still maintained. Everyone engaging in the transaction before the court
decision faced the same rule (and its same potential for varied interpretation). After the

decision, all new transactions are subject to the new rule. Thus, although direct participation
in the establishment of the rule is not universally open (in part because that is an adjudicatory

procedure, not an administrative one), the goal of equal risk is preserved.
251. But without the treaty based justification for difference. See supra text

accompanying notes 158-159.
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This examination of the troubling features of the APA program
commenced by delving deeply into APA process and its relation to the
tax system. Assessment of the program's usefulness necessitated such a
specific inquiry. However, this undertaking is more than a case study in
taxation. Both the problems that prompted the creation of the APA
program and those raised by its implementation tell a story about
administrative regulation that transcends tax, and speaks to universal
issues in administrative law. Fundamental conflict exists between the
traditional framework of administrative law (a structure based on
rulemaking and adjudication) and the demand for creative solutions to
problems experienced in many regulatory fields. The establishment of
new rules through an adjudicatory process is usually acceptable if
transformed into precedent in accordance with the rulemaking and
adjudication pattern. However, the APA program's decisionmaking does
not produce precedent in the classic adjudication model, nor does it
conform to the model of classic rulemaking. The APA program's
"hybrid" nature, its very departure from the traditional models so critical
to its success outlined in Part III, helps explain the problems identified in
Part IV. They are the obvious result of a clash between the value of an
administrative system which declares its rules up-front and the value of a
flexible administrative process that permits learning, experimentation,
and testing.
Procedural innovation in tax is not the only example of conflictsimilar creative, flexible developments in the environmental area pose
comparable problems. For example, Project XL implemented by the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") allows a company to
negotiate a comprehensive permit (possibly making tradeoffs among
various emissions). The permit program focuses on providing extensive
information to the government, predicting results, testing the actual
252
conditions, and then updating terms based on the new information.
Flexibility in this individualized process is expected to generate creative,
superior solutions. Although the format of Project XL includes a broader
range of participants than the APA program, including community
groups, their impact on the process and results has been questioned.253
Another EPA program, the "Brownfields Economic Redevelopment
Initiative" allows the "prospective purchaser of contaminated property"
to reduce its liability if it pursues voluntary, satisfactory cleanup, the
254
extent of which can be negotiated.

252. See Freeman, supra note 1, at 55-56.
253. See id. at 56.
254. See Breger, supra note 1, at 333-34.
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In the language and discourse of administrative law, the dangers
posed by such flexible administrative processes are captured under the
rubric of accountability for administrative agencies-controlling
discretion. 255 Accountability and discretion issues lie at the heart of the
APA disclosure debate. They also play a prominent role in critiques of
216
the EPA initiatives. Various forces, including regulatory capture, can
lead agencies astray in exercising their discretion, especially if agencies
and regulated industries are negotiating alone.257 Not only does
disclosure constrain discretion and limit regulatory capture, but in the
APA setting, foreign countries perform this function as well through the
exercise of their often powerful self interests.
Flexibility in an administrative regime can be messy, as
demonstrated by the APA program. However, we may better understand
and improve such innovations through a detailed knowledge of their
operation and an appreciation of the connection of their problems to the
larger themes, goals, and tensions in administrative law. The effort to
facilitate flexible regulatory process makes sense, especially in an
international context where the global implications are substantial and
the likelihood of conflict is high.
V. THE APA

PROGRAM AS A CASE STUDY FOR

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW THEORY

At the outset, this paper made the claim that a case study of the APA
program was not only critical in evaluating the innovation's role in the
tax system but also could enhance the dialogue and debate surrounding
administrative law. There are two levels on which analysis of the APA
program may be beneficial: (1) on a broad theoretical level the APA
program can illuminate the usefulness of the overlapping and competing
theories of the administrative system by testing each against the
experience of the program, and (2) on a more functional level, the APA
program's creative origins and its current operation offer guidance on
the programmatic benefits of various types of flexibility in

255. See Freeman, supra note 1, at 82.
256. See, e.g., Breger, supra note 1, at 335 ("Making regulatory agreements more
'individualized', however, makes it less likely that consistency will be achieved and general
standards followed").
257. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 1, at 81 (noting that a "collaborative model that
includes only agencies and industry" would likely draw the attentions of regulatory capture
fears); see, e.g., Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and
Empowerment, 16 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 435, 438 (1991) (discussing factors producing agency
capture).
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administrative systems generally. Thus, this Part divides the
administrative inquiry into two directions. The first focuses on three
basic theoretical frameworks used to analyze administrative systems and
their functioning (public choice, neopluralism, and public interest). The
validity and applicability of one theory over the others would be
important in contemplating reform. However, failing the ability to
identify a dominant theory, we may nonetheless discern conditions
under which a given theory is more or less relevant. Regardless, these
often abstractly considered theories require real world testing.
The second direction examines administrative theories (civic
republicanism and collaborative governance) whose vision of
administrative process centers more explicitly on facilitating reform and
innovation through redefining relationships. Even if the normative
aspects of these approaches, in particular their rejection of interest group
representation as a pivotal feature of administrative law is overstated, the
value of emphasizing new ways to structure administrative relations
remains.
Making the leap from a discussion of the APA program anchored in
the tax literature to one linked to administrative law debates is more
feasible than might be thought initially. While administrative law
discussions typically do not focus on tax examples, and tax analyses
typically are not undertaken against an administrative law backdrop, the
questions about the APA program pursued in this paper parallel
questions posed generally in thinking about the administrative system.
The major issues include how to understand the dynamics and effects of
an existing process and how to think about change and innovation.
Although this section will not purport to offer a comprehensive analysis
of the intersection of the APA case study with administrative law theory,
it is appropriate and useful here to try to sketch those connections in
some detail.
A. Forumfor Testing Administrative Law Theories
The first step in using the APA program as a testing ground for
administrative law is to outline the current picture of the theories in
question. Obviously such a description is a shorthand and not inclusive
of the numerous variations of the different models. Moreover, the goal is
not to demonstrate the complete relevance or irrelevance of a given
theory, but rather to use a case study to advance understanding in at least
two ways: (1) by revealing the complexity of administrative law analysis
within a single example; and (2) by indicating directions for the
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expansion and development of the theories. 2 ' Three general theories of

regulation and the administrative state can be identified: (1) public
choice, (2) neopluralist, and (3) public interest. These theories share a
common foundation in their view of the function and significance of
interest group behavior.
The first theory, public choice, begins with the understanding that
administrative law and regulation are justified in part on the ground that
such efforts respond to the "market failure" in providing necessary rules
or outcomes in the absence of the administrative state." 9 The theory then
concludes that the administrative state generally is unsuccessful at
repairing this market failure and instead is providing regulatory benefits
to well-organized political interest groups which benefit at the expense
of the general public.' 6 The second theory, the neopluralist, is similar to
public choice in that it also places organized interest groups at the center
of the regulatory process. Neopluralism notes the dominant role that
interest groups play in setting regulatory standards but concludes that
their competition produces results very roughly reflecting the general
public interest as a whole.16 ' This competition oriented picture takes the
process and the results to be less imbalanced than the public choice
theory and thus is less critical of the regulatory system.262
258. In providing this overview, the paper relies in part on the recent work of Steven
Croley which seeks to take a more global and comprehensive look at the range of theories and
their relationship to each other and to the administrative process. See Croley, supra note 1; see
also Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 168-69 (1990) (outlining the
classical public interest theories and the opposing theories premised on special interests and
regulatory capture).
259. See generally Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J.
EcON. & MGMT. Sci. 335 (1974) (describing a "public interest" theory as adopting the view
that regulation is supplied in response to public demand to correct market failures); Sam
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 212 (1976)
(under certain models "the existence of market failure is sufficient to generate a demand for
regulation"). To the extent the theory is normative in terms of justifying the creation of the
regulatory state as opposed to positive in highlighting how such a state operates, it has less
direct relevance to distributive and redistributive regimes such as social security and taxation.
See Croley, supra note 1, at 4 n.7.
260. See Croley, supra note 1, at 5; see generally, William C. Mitchell & Michael C.
Munger, Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey, 35 AM. J. POL. ScL.
512, 517 (1991); Peltzman, supra note 259, at 212-13. But see, e.g., Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 895-900 (1987)
(reviewing empirical studies and suggesting the evidence reflects shortcomings in the public
choice approach).
261. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371, 384 (1983) (suggesting that "political policies that
raise efficiency are more likely to be adopted than policies that lower efficiency").
262. Croley, supra note 1, at 5, 59; see also Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and
Public Deliberation: An Interpretative Essay, 94 YALE L. J. 1617, 1619-20 (1985)
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The third theory, public interest, is also more open to a potentially
positive regulatory role and process. However, this theory adopts public
choice's critical view of interest groups, and holds that only full
disclosure of the administrative process to general public scrutiny and
monitoring saves an administrative regime from capture by such
groups.263 Where particular processes afford the public this critical
scrutiny of regulatory decision making, the theory contends that results
tend to reflect the general public interest. 264 In contrast, where the
process fails to provide such scrutiny and the decision makers operate
without public oversight, results tend to benefit well-organized interest
groups at the expense of the public.
Each of these theories contains both positive and normative
elements, and it is not completely clear to what degree the theories are
contradictory, compatible, or complementary. One of the claims of
recent scholarship is that the administrative law debate can be advanced
by grounding these theories in the details of specific administrative
processes. 265 It is in this capacity that the analysis of the APA program
and its operation may be valuable.
One caveat, however, must be noted. Although all regulation moves
through administrative regimes and thus theoretical discussions have
wide application, important distinctions exist. Social regulation in areas
such as environment, food safety, and occupational safety differ from
regulation in taxation and social security. The former represent acts of
government intervention into conduct otherwise undertaken by the
market. The government justifies its intervention on the grounds of
market failure. 266 In contrast, redistributive regimes such as taxation and
social security, do not redress market failure but instead serve a function
entirely separate from the market. Thus, to the extent theoretical
discussions focus on normative justifications for the creation of
particular administrative regimes, universal answers do not exist. Social
regulation and redistributive regimes rely on different foundations.
(explaining that this focus on interest group competition envisioned the public administrator's
role as to "accommodate ... the varying demands ... of competing groups" and that" 'public
interest'" was understood as an "aggregation and reconciliation of these claims [and that] the

administrator succeeded to the extent that he was able to placate the competing groups");
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1669, 1723-48 (1975).
263. See Croley, supra note 1, at 5; see also Levine & Forrence, supra note 258, at 174,

184, 192-93 (outlining theory that the degree of "slack" (i.e. lack of public scrutiny) a
regulator experiences on a given issue impacts the degree to which the regulator will pursue
interest group or ideological results instead of general interest results).
264. See generally Croley, supra note 1, at 68.
265. Id. at 7.
266. See supra note 259.
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However, to the extent the administrative theories seek to probe what
happens in a regulatory regime, both redistributive and social regulation
regimes share some common analyses. Understanding the various ways
in which power, structure and process interact in a regulatory setting has
universal salience. The similar problems experienced implementing
environmental and transfer pricing regulation attest to the potential value
of shared learning among regimes that differ in other respects.
In considering whether the APA program in particular can provide
any support for one of these theories, it is important to consider all three
facets of the APA: namely its creation, its modification, and its
operation. The creation of the APA program provides little direct
support for any of the three theories. The program was initiated at the
prompting of the Service itself in response to what it, and many
taxpayers, perceived to be serious problems with the operation of the
transfer pricing tax rules. However, even more significant than the fact
that the Service initiated the program is the fact that the general response
of the intended audience-multinational corporations with significant
cross border related party transactions-was not warm. It seems
unlikely, therefore, that the program was the result of pressure from a
narrow interest group of taxpayers as would be predicted by the public
choice theory or from a competition among well-organized interest
groups as predicted by the neopluralist theory. Certainly, of course, a
few taxpayers were interested in APAs. Shortly after the program was
formally introduced the Service announced the first completed APAs,
which obviously had been underway prior to the formal announcement.
Nonetheless, the overall factual picture of the development of the
program does not really support a strong claim that one or more narrow
interest groups were the primary actors behind the program. Nor is it
clear that its creation reflects the triumph of narrow interests over the
general public interest. To the extent that a significant motivation for
and potential outcome of the program is the alleviation of administrative
burden and the improvement of transfer pricing regulations, the benefit
is both a specific one for taxpayers facing transfer pricing issues, and a
general one for the public in terms of improved tax administration. Of
course the degree of disclosure poses some difficult questions that are
considered below in evaluating the APA program's operation.
The creation of the program also fails to provide much evidence that
the public interest theory was at work here. The APA program was
presented in 1991 as a complete, new program. The general public, even
through their congressional representatives, had little oversight of the
creation process. Despite the fact that the creation of the APA program
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lends little direct support to any particular administrative theory, the
subsequent modifications present a slightly different picture.
Two notable changes to the program, the restructuring of the role of
foreign governments 26' and the introduction of a special APA route for
small businesses, were both responses to concerns raised by particular
"interest groups." In the case of foreign countries' place in the APA
process, the Service found that under the 1991 structure, other nations
considered their role in the development of the taxpayer's transfer
pricing treatment inadequate. Given the critical position of foreign
nations in preventing the double taxation that the APA was designed in
part to eliminate, they served as a significant "interest group" whose
needs had to be accommodated.2 69 Thus, it is not surprising that the
Service reevaluated the foreign countries' role and ultimately revised the
program-to the initial dissatisfaction of at least some taxpayers.270
On one level this modification seems to support an administrative
theory along the lines of public choice, with the foreign countries
emerging as the successful interest group. This picture, however, is
complicated by the fact that this "interest group" is another foreign
government acting in essentially the same regulatory capacity as the
Service. Considered in that light, a characterization of the foreign
government as an "interest group" may be misleading. Although there is
no one valid interpretation of public choice theory and its view of
interest group competition, the simple case presumably envisions a
single government/regulatory body responding to various interest groups
formed from the general public, all portions of which are bound by the
final decisions stemming from the regulatory process. A foreign
government with an equal claim to the same regulatory authority does
not operate as a traditional interest group in that context. It does not even
have the same relationship as a state level agency in a federal system, or
even as another federal agency with an interest in the topic. The tax
bodies of other countries are in precisely the same position vis a vis
transfer pricing as the Service without any ultimate supranational
authority. Moreover, transfer pricing decisions of one country directly
impact those of another. The result is the intersection of two
independent, although connected, regimes. This relationship cannot be
examined exclusively within the context of traditional administrative law
267. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.

268. Id.
269. The Service's preference for bilateral and multilateral APAs over unilateral APAs,
(the former typically offer much more predictability and dispute reduction) is easy to
understand. However, it necessarily depends on the cooperation of foreign sovereigns.
270. See supra note 86.
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concepts. Thus, it may make sense to seriously explore the applicability
of international relations theory in evaluating that dynamic. What this
example does clarify is that administrative law theories, as difficult as
they may be to work with in the domestic context, become more
complicated with the inclusion of other governments and their parallel
regulatory bodies.27'
Regarding the other significant modification of the APA program,
the creation of a small business track, more than one administrative
theory seems relevant although none exclusively so. Viewed as a
response to demands from smaller international businesses that the APA
program be more accessible to smaller taxpayers, the modification may
seem an example of public choice theory (or perhaps neopluralist
theory). However, it may not be accurate to consider the creation of the
smaller business track to be a concession counter to the general public's
interest, nor a change taking place outside the public's attention.
Thinking in terms of the public interest theory, it is relevant to note that
the Service continually publicized its desire and intent to provide an
APA format more suitable for smaller businesses. The prospect of this
particular modification seemed to raise no general or interest group
specific complaint. Rather, it aligned with a fundamental view that if the
APA program exists it should be accessible to the full range of relevant
taxpayers.
As noted earlier, this section seeks to measure the three general
theories of administration and the regulatory state against the experience
of the APA program. The first part of this assessment looked at the
creation and modification of the program. This second part now reviews
the implementation of the program. It is here that fuller clues exist
regarding the aptness of various administrative theories in this context.
The individualized nature of the APA process and the refusal to consider
disclosure until the Service's short-lived announcement suggest that
"good" would fail to result from the clash of interest groups because
each party who wants to "play" (i.e., negotiate transfer pricing
individually with the Service) could engage the government in relative
privacy. 272 The APA regime makes it difficult, if not impossible, for
competing groups or the public to monitor or challenge the resulting tax
treatments and policies. Thus, if one takes the baseline behavior shared
271.

As is often the case for international issues, parallels to state-federal relations in the

United States may prove useful, although the absence of the federal structure internationally
means countries' relationships to each other do not completely match state-state and statefederal relations in the United States.

272. Unless the foreign government is counted as a competing interest group, which as
suggested above, does not aptly describe the role of other governments in the process.
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by the neopluralist and public choice views, one might see the
handiwork of public choice and its dismal portent, as the eventual
prospect of the APA program.
Certain additional observations about the program, however, might
nullify this prediction. The degree of resistance to the APA program
exhibited by taxpayers suggests that the corporations did not see
themselves as predominantly in a position vis-a-vis the Service to
compete or pressure for desired tax treatment. Rather, the paramount
taxpayer concerns regarding the provision of detailed information to the
Service suggest they saw a different relationship. Of course, some
taxpayers did go forward with the process, but those decisions seem
sufficiently explained by their particular risks of possible bad audits,
current bad audits, or high transaction costs. Even assuming this
description of taxpayers' understanding of their relationship with the
government prior to starting the APA process is accurate, it still remains
plausible that once engaged in the process, the factors of
individualization and nondisclosure (until now) enabled participants to
pursue their agendas in a public choice-like arena. However, the more
unique aspect of the APA regulatory environment as compared to typical
"domestic" settings may impede a participating taxpayer's ability to
fully achieve a public choice type result. The fact that most APAs are
bilateral or multilateral (and the fact that there is some element of zerosum to the amount of tax collected by all countries regarding a cross
border related party transaction) suggests that the taxpayer cannot easily
pursue an aggressively self-interested path under the public choice
theory because fiscal "sacrifices" by the Service could be eagerly
scooped up by the other country or countries. This is not to suggest that
some version of public choice behavior cannot occur, just that the
taxpayer's maneuvering is more complicated in this multi-jurisdictional
administrative setting.
Moreover, even if a public choice type result might be foreseeable
under the program as it has existed thus far, public interest theory may
provide a more accurate view of the dynamic under APA processes for
the future. As noted above, the public interest view refines the other two
theories by asserting the ameliorative effect of public monitoring. The
theory anticipates that despite the activity of interest groups, when the
public can monitor behavior it ensures that general good and not simply
individual good is achieved. To the extent this monitoring mitigates the
harsh view of the administrative process, its unavailability at all in the
APA context until now, has meant that the level of public information on
outcomes was limited (even if "public" here is taken to be the larger
class of active multinational corporations, policy makers, academics, and
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tax media) and may have provided opportunity for taxpayers to at least
vie for a public choice result behind closed doors. However, the recent
legislation barring disclosure but requiring annual reporting means there
will be more information available than there has been, but perhaps less
than it could be.
As discussed earlier in Part IV, the real operational impact of the
new reporting requirement turns on what is revealed. A very generalized
report will leave nonparticipants still unclear on precisely what rules are
being applied. Conversely, a rich report increases the awareness in the
tax community of the standards to which transactions will be held but
also risks the publication of information that might be identifiable by
country or industry. This direction could push the APA process towards
neopluralist or public interest models as parties other than the relevant
taxpayer become part of the process. Although the "public's" interest in
APA results may never be high, if the broader tax community including
nonparticipating multinationals, other taxpayers, tax media, policy
makers, and academics are able to examine the direction of the APA
program, they may effectively monitor APA treatments, thus achieving
some of the goals of the public interest model. 73
The first cut observations here support the idea that the
particularized administrative setting plays a significant role in what
theoretical view is most descriptive. Agencies and administrative
processes are not monolithic; moreover the typical interactions among
an agency, interest groups, and the public may vary-even within a
given agency and process. It is possible that different issues and facets
operate more or less under different theories. Perhaps the most
interesting observation from the APA program case study is that the
move from a domestic administrative and regulatory setting to an
international one involving multiple jurisdictions complicates the
interpretation of the various parties' actions in very specific ways. The
position of the foreign governments in the APA process makes it
difficult to classify behavior and determine who is an interest group and
who is the bureaucracy for purposes of administrative theories.

273. This, in effect, provides an opportunity for the Neopluralism theory to apply, if
other taxpayers can be considered "other" interest groups. However, the post hoc nature of the

disclosure, and the indirect benefit to such groups, counsels against placing too much weight
on such an analogy. It may be better to view other taxpayers, comprising the taxed community

in general as well as others aware of the Service's actions and the impact on the public fisc, as
providing the oversight needed for public interest theory to function properly.
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B. FunctionalAspect of APA ProgramDesign Choices
While it is possible to sift through the genesis and results of the
APA process for evidence of one or another underlying causal theory
governing administrative interactions, an alternative approach in
administrative law eschews the search for an overarching principle and
would instead examine the APA experience for more practical
information on administrative design. Instead of accepting the premises
of private party-government interactions and the dominant role of
interest group behavior and working from there, this alternative operates
under the view that new frameworks and formats of administrative and
regulatory action can produce different interactions. Thus, a substantial
emphasis is placed on what might be done differently if agencies have an
opportunity to consider creative, context-specific approaches. The
starting point for this functional view is the possible relationship that an
administrative regime may construct between and among the
government, interest groups, and public. Change in this multifaceted
relationship is sought through revised regulatory processes that
encourage participation, problem solving, and agency flexibility in ways
that permit agencies to establish systems best suited to the regulatory
problem at hand.
One version of this approach is "collaborative governance. 274 This
basic model has generated a variety of regulatory devices such as
negotiated rulemaking and special EPA permitting practices." 5 Very
briefly summarized, the suggestion is that more joint, collaborative
rulemaking processes may be advantageous because they (1) may
produce novel and better solutions if the less adversarial atmosphere
allows more information to be generated and debated, and (2) the mutual
participation in a consensus building format may improve relations
which in and of itself is valuable but also feeds back into other stages
and aspects of the administrative process.27 6
Another version is civic republicanism. Positing that regulatory
decisions reflect broad judgments about how competing regulatory
values should be balanced, 277 the civic republican theory argues that the
process of regulation serves as the occasion for collective discussion and
271
deliberation about both the means and ends of the regulation at issue.
Such deliberation, properly structured, provides a further forum for
274. See, Freeman, supra note 1.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 252-254.

276. See Freeman, supra note 1, at 23-24.
277. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
REGULATORY STATE 12 (1990); Croley, supra note 1, at 57-62.
278. See Croley, supra note 1, at 5.
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refining the requirements of the general public's interest. Reliance on
deliberation by expert administrators replaces interest group competition
as the key to legitimate rulemaking.279 Still other paradigms for
rethinking administrative law have emerged in the environmental arena
including "reflexive regulation," "cooperative implementation," and
"interactive compliance."280 Regardless of their precise scope or
formulation, these theories share a common focus on the value of
cooperation in the regulatory process and the flexibility necessary to
achieve it.
To really facilitate successful collaborative governance of some
type, an administrative system requires a certain flexibility and
discretion to consider new structures and options and retain the
possibility of rejecting plans that fail. The government agency functions
as an active administrative player in terms of exploring, testing, and
developing administrative options. The agency draws parties in by
identifying how the process can benefit them, through "cost savings,
reduced litigation, or improved relationships."28'
This ground level approach to administrative and regulatory theory,
with its rousing call for creative administrative processes still recognizes
the core concerns of accountability and measurement of success. A
collaborative approach does not eschew mechanisms for accountability.
Instead, it folds that necessary feature into the heart of the theory.
Accountability becomes one' of the administrative features for which
creativity is possible and a range of options and structures must be
investigated.
Measuring the success of a new design is a perennial problem both
in terms of deciding what factors are relevant and how they can be
measured in a useful way. To adequately assess an approach that
emphasizes creative, contextual regulatory processes, case studies
remain central. In this capacity the analysis of the APA program again
may be helpful. The connection between the APA program and a more
collaborative regulatory model is strong. The goals thought to be
achieved by changing the system and presumably the parties'
relationships are very much the ones underlying the APA program. 2" As
discussed in greater detail in Parts I and III, the transfer pricing system
appeared in crisis because among other things, it was adversarial, was
279. See Freeman, supra note 1, at 20.
280. Breger, supra note 1, at 325 (briefly reviewing the new frameworks).
281. Freeman, supra note 1, at 31-32.

282. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 135-146. The APA program's change in
the taxpayer-Service interaction was the result of flexibility to restructure and reorganize
relationships in the administrative process.
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unsuited to the highly factual content, elicited limited information, and
failed to include all of the critical parties in the initial steps. The Service
designed the APA program with the expectation that it could provide an
improved forum for examining -transfer pricing problems, designing
appropriate tax treatments, and resolving disagreements. The inclusion
of the foreign governments in the process was a novel but ultimately
crucial choice in creating a process with a plausible chance for success.
Accountability has proven the most contentious issue but is itself in the
process of being modified, though the sufficiency of the solution awaits
judgment.
The specific criticisms targeted at the APA program reveal the direct
tension between a "collaborative" model and the traditional
rulemaking/adjudication framework. In Parts III and IV, the tension was
captured in the description of the APA program as a hybrid by virtue of
its departure from a clear division between rulemaking and adjudication.
The same clash exists at the theory level because the division of tasks
and functions into the two categories conflicts with a call for flexibility
and creativity that could muddle such delineated roles. However, the
blurring of roles need not subvert an administrative process. For
example, inclusion of a range of personnel at the one and only stage of
the APA program does not inappropriately mix administrative roles.
Instead, it encourages broader participation and creates an atmosphere of
joint responsibility for solving problems. A collaborative approach may,
through its departure from traditional patterns of interaction, solve
problems without seriously undermining the integrity of the
administrative process. The real value of some version of collaborative
administrative theory is that it not only permits agencies the opportunity
to design innovative process but in fact it places intelligent creativity at
the forefront of regulatory policy. The decision to value the qualities of
creativity, flexibility, and innovative structure by supporting a different
vision of administrative relations may be most appropriate where certain
conditions exist. In particular, the existence of features such as high
information costs, fact intensive issues, large stakes, very interdependent
decisions, and multiple regulating entities, may outweigh the possible
risks. Certainly uncontrolled flexibility and administrative discretion are
not a plausible solution to the current ills of the regulatory state. What
can be stated with assurance is that refusal to seriously consider reform
alternatives and failure to allow some experimentation guarantees little
improvement will be made.
Although the APA program cannot unequivocally demonstrate the
success and correctness of an approach that emphasizes agency
flexibility, creativity and collaboration in rulemaking, it offers a useful
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example of how such changes can be made to an administrative process.
Moreover, even if specific collaborative governance routes prove
problematic, and more attention to interest group behavior is needed,
some aspects of the program such as creative rulemaking nonetheless
remain a valuable alternative for confronting regulatory problems.

CONCLUSION

SPECIFIC PROJECT

Returning to the primary goal of this paper-evaluating a recent
procedural innovation in terms of its impact on both participants and
nonparticipants-certain conclusions can be drawn. The examination of
the APA program reveals that this new hybrid, which was created in
response to burdens facing the tax system from transfer pricing, has been
reasonably successful in improving the administrability of transfer
pricing for participants, although it has introduced some problems for
nonparticipants. A continuing research agenda would next consider the
broader institutional issues raised by the APA program including the
allocation of government resources (time, money, expertise), change in
taxpayer resources devoted to transfer pricing issues, and government
revenues from the transactions under the new procedure.283
If the program is to continue to operate in its current format, a
serious question emerges as to whether the transfer pricing "solution"
has come at too high a cost. The answer to the question turns on what
government resources are expended for how many taxpayers and issues,
and how easily the results are translated into "cheaper" assistance for
multinational taxpayers generally. On the one hand, it is possible that
annual APA program reports may sufficiently offset the allocation of
resources to the program. On the other, it may be that (1) redacted APAs
are a necessary minimum, or (2) translation of the many fact specific
aspects of transfer pricing into formal guidance is too difficult. However,
even if the more pessimistic picture prevails in the long term, the
operation of the program in the interim period may nonetheless have
been useful. The program has drawn other countries into a process for
examining tax issues and cases which is different from those in place to
date. If the APA program did not specifically continue as part of the
administrative structure, its legacy of innovation and more intense,
multi-governmental involvement in the regulatory/administrative
process may continue in new forms.
283. See, e.g., Coglianese, supra note 181.
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Any analysis of innovations like the APA process will be informed
by the positive and normative theories of administrative law. The goals
for the tax system, the questions raised, and the interpretations drawn
regarding the new procedure reflect one's underlying administrative law
perspective. Nonetheless, the influence is not one way. Given the current
debate over administrative law theories outlined at the beginning of the
paper, detailed information about the dynamics and operation of
procedures like the APA program should help expand analysis and
understanding of the competing and overlapping theories. Case studies
both influence and are influenced by these trends in legal theory.

BROADER ADMINISTRATIVE CONCLUSIONS

Regardless of the particular theory advocated, two aspects of the
APA program stand out as significant for general administrative reform
efforts: (1) government discretion/flexibility, and (2) role of multi
jurisdictional interaction. The ability of the tax system to design and
implement this responsive program required two kinds of government
discretion. First, it required the flexibility to create a hybrid procedure
tailored to the problems experienced. Second, it required flexibility
within the innovation-that is, an innovation whose actual function and
operation relied on a degree of government discretion and flexibility.
This is not to suggest that unfettered discretion should be the new
mantra. However, there is an advantage to discretion, especially where
it is hard to continuously modify the rules to clearly capture cases and
catch abuse. Such authority for the Service could be effective in cabining
taxpayer abuse and simplifying the audit process by reducing formal
bases for conflict. Even without pursuing such an extreme direction,
seeing the APA program in the context of a debate over the nature and
degree of discretion permitted in the tax system can lead us to view the
program as a way to grant discretion in a limited setting. Moreover,
discretion implemented in a context like the APA program poses less
affirmative danger to taxpayers because they can walk away from the
forum.
The other special feature of the program-the role of cross border
interaction-may be most critical for the wider administrative law
community. Although international tax policy is in part based on a
284. Despite the current barrage of criticism regarding the Service, it is by many
standards a fairly well-functioning administrative and collection system, partly for structural
reasons like wage withholding that limit fraud potential, and partly because of the emphasis
on rules and regulations as opposed to de facto broader discretion and negotiation that can be
more predominant in other countries.
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shared commitment by countries to avoid double taxation-and thus
requires specific, focused interactions between governments-many
other substantive administrative regimes presumably involve
overlapping regulation with other countries. A procedure like the APA
program introduces the other government(s) to a tangible regulatory
problem in a way that may substantially change the dynamics and
results. Even if the future of the APA program is limited in some way,
this feature of the program (the role of the foreign governments) already
stands as a significant innovation.
Developing structures to link the activities of the various national
regulatory authorities is important in the current global regulatory
environment, which has extensive multilateral interactions but no supra
national authority. Existing international organizations (e.g., the OECD,
European Union, PATA) offer one type of forum. However, the APA
model's case-by-case prospective analysis requires focused attention on
a particular problem. Thus, the APA program puts a little more pressure
on countries to accomplish results. At the same time, the APA
interactions can be more principled substantively and potentially less
confrontational than traditional ex post competent authority proceedings
where focus on the legal issues can be shaded by the existence of a
completed transaction and actual tax dollars on the table.
These characteristics of the APA process are positive-countries
developing shared procedures which facilitate a clearer understanding of
their respective transfer pricing approaches and lead to multilateral
efforts to address problems like global trading. Of course, this does not
mean that underlying issues become easy; the advantage is creating
formats, structures and processes that provide better opportunities for
interaction and resolution.
Ultimately, the APA program, its history, function, and controversy
provide a valuable context in which to consider the more general
questions of administrative flexibility and discretion. The pressure for
such flexibility and creativity may be even stronger in the future as
regulatory questions commonly involve other countries with whom we
need better ways to coordinate regulatory regimes.

